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An Approach to Estimating Market Value and 
Duration of Interest-Sensitive Whole Life Contracts 
Thomas j. Merfeld* 
Abstract t 
A fixed premium interest·sensitive whole life contract is analyzed in order 
to estimate its market value. In addition, using various definitions of duration, 
we determine the duration of the contract for each definition. The results of 
this analysis have implications for market value accounting of life insurance 
liabilities and for life company portfolio management. 
Key words and phrases: cash flow, accounting, assets, liabilities, surrender ben· 
efits, yield curve 
Introduction 
American life insurance companies traditionally have not assessed 
the market value of their liabilities. Ufe actuaries compute statutory 
reserves under strictly defined rules. Neither state regulatory bodies 
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nor the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) have required or 
allowed market value liability reporting. 
Until recently, neither the nature of the life insurance products sold 
nor the financial markets have made it necessary for companies to as-
sess the market risk or the market value of their liabilities. Market val-
ues are sensitive to exogenous factors such as changing interest rates. 
For much of this century financial markets enjoyed enough stability 
that risk assessments were not necessary. life products were relatively 
simple and margins relatively wide; insolvencies were generally not due 
to the lack of liability market risk measurements. 
But needs have changed. The U.S. Congress is applying pressure 
on state regulators to tighten statutory reporting requirements. Finan-
cial reporting under Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) 
is moving in a market value direction. Complicated new products fund-
ing complex new securities are accentuating the effects of the height-
ened financial market volatility of the last 15 years. The market value 
of life company surplus has become volatile enough that effective "in-
solvencies" can result. These insolvencies can be masked by traditional 
accounting standards, but are revealed by market value methods. 
Life company financial management generally has not implemented 
the technology necessary to measure the risk of surplus volatility. Al-
though statutorily defined cash flow testing procedures adequately re-
veal certain cases of financial ruin, they also can provide false indica-
tions of problems. Most valuation actuary certifications are designed 
to protect contract holders without regard to stockholders; as a conse-
quence, these certifications constitute another test of solvency rather 
than of surplus volatility. Even internal portfolio managers remain too 
far removed from liabilities to apply established market value assess-
ment and risk management procedures to liabilities. 
Securities-type valuation and risk management methodologies can 
be applied to a particularly complex type of life product: the interest-
sensitive whole life contract (ISWL). Over the past decade, American 
life companies have added these and similar universal life contracts 
with an aggregate face amount of approximately $1.5 trillion. As a 
result, interest-sensitive products represent a significant portion of life 
company obligations. It is not clear that either the literature or the 
industry has assessed the valuation or risk of this particular liability in 
a thorough way. 
This article analyzes a fixed premium interest-sensitive whole life 
contract with the intent to: 
• Develop an approach to estimating its market value; and 
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• Assess various notions of its duration. 
The results of these analyses have implications for market value ac-
counting life insurance liabilities and for life company portfolio man-
agement. 
The FASB, through Statement of Accounting Standard (SFAS) 115, 
has taken dramatic steps to implement mark-to-market accounting for 
securities portfolios. The typical insurance company has responded 
by holding about 80 percent of its bond portfolio in the "available for 
sale" category, with annual changes in the market values reflected in 
GAAP surplus adjustments. The problem for insurance companies is 
that SFAS 115 does not provide for a parallel market value accounting 
of liabilities. As a consequence, a company can have no economic ex-
posure to changing interest rates (Le., be perfectly matched) and yet be 
reporting enormous changes in GAAP surplus from year to year. This 
hardly serves investor needs, which is one of the objectives of GAAP ac-
counting. Some analysts call for a return to amortized cost accounting 
for bonds. A better approach may be to encourage the FASB to adopt 
market value accounting for insurance liabilities. This paper attempts 
to further the discipline of liability fair valuation. 
Many product managers and portfolio managers attempt to duration-
match their assets with their liabilities. These managers believe that 
interest rate risk is not adequately compensated for by markets. In 
the past life contracts were generally considered to call for a very long 
bond portfolio. That is not necessarily the case with interest-sensitive 
business, due to the resetting feature of the crediting rate. Having de-
veloped a methodology to estimate the fair value of liabilities, we can 
then re-estimate their values after shocking market rates. The relation-
ship can then inform portfolio managers on how to invest bonds to 
match the value sensitivities. 
2 The Contract 
2.1 Provisions 
ISWL contracts are similar to traditional whole life contracts. Whole 
life products are structured to produce a level premium at any issue 
age for a large pool of insureds. This premium can be regarded as the 
periodic contribution to a fund that, when accumulated at an implicit 
rate of interest, is expected to produce periodic death benefits and is 
exhausted at the end of the pool of lives. This condition holds after al-
lowing for loadings for coverage of company issuance and maintenance 
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expenses and a competitive return to capital. An ISWL contract initially 
is structured with a level premium. 
ISWL contracts differ from traditional whole life contracts in two 
ways. First, although the contracted premium must be paid in order to 
avoid nonforfeiture status, ISWL premiums can have a more complex 
structure. Much of this complexity can be considered as discrete con-
tract owner options to adjust the mix of premium paid and coverage 
amount within constraints imposed by the issuer and tax code. The 
contract owner uses private information in exercising these options. 
The issuer can respond by adjusting the cost of insurance assessment 
within contractual and legal constraints. In a yet more general type of 
permanent life contract, universal life (i.e., flexible premium interest-
sensitive life), the contract owner effectively has continuous options to 
adjust the premium/coverage mix. I 
Second, in an ISWL contract the accumulation interest rate is explicit 
and adjustable. Whatever rate structure the issuer originally used to 
price the premium structure, the contract fund value is credited with 
a rate that resets periodically at the option of the issuer, subject to a 
floor. 
ISWL contracts also allow the contract owner to remove the accumu-
lated fund value by: 
• Taking a loan (which continues to commit the policy owner to the 
premium schedule and can expose the loaned portion of the fund 
value to a lower crediting rate); 
• Making a partial withdrawal; or 
• Canceling the entire contract (which typically exposes the policy 
owner to a schedule of surrender assessments). 
ISWL contracts also provide the standard array of nonforfeiture options, 
ignored in this analysis. See the appendix for a summary of terms and 
in force assumptions of the ISWL contracts analyzed. 
2.2 Cash Flow Components 
Contract cash flows belong to four classes: 
• Premium inflow; 
• Surrender benefit; 
1 The application of game theoretic modeling to this field could provide rich insights 
into the optimum use of this option. 
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• Death benefit; and 
• Servicing expense and commission. 
Projecting surrender benefit cash flows entails certain complexities. 
First, the industry comparable product crediting rate must be modeled. 
Second, the company crediting strategy must be established. Third, a 
function of contract holder surrender behavior with respect to these 
differential rates must be integrated into the overall model. 
2.2.1 Industry Interest-Sensitive Life Crediting Function 
Industry interest-sensitive life crediting rates track fixed income mar-
ket rates with lags for several institutional reasons: 
• Company investment committees often establish crediting rates 
as a spread to the asset book value earnings rate. Once a partic-
ular asset is on the books at a given rate of return for purposes 
of accruing interest income, its rate of return will be assumed to 
remain constant until those particular assets are rolled into a new 
security with a new rate of return. This practice delays the recog-
nition that market rates have changed; 
• The institution then needs to declare the new rate; 
• Companies are reluctant to change rates too often for marketing 
purposes; and 
• The effective crediting rate can be delayed further due to certain 
contractual provisions allowing new rates to be credited only at 
the policy's anniversary; hence, contracts containing this provi-
sion have a built-in expected delay of six months. 
The crediting rate series comes from monthly data from January 1985 
through December 1992 from the TULAS industry survey published by 
the actuarial consulting firm Tillinghast.2 The period covers a substan-
tial fall in rates and changes in yield curve shape. 
Let ICRt be the industry crediting rate at month t, T3Mt be the three 
month risk-free bill rate at month t; and T5Yt be the five year risk-free 
note rate at month t. The subscript t - m refers to the rate m months 
prior to the interest-sensitive life crediting rate. A linear regression with 
2For more information of the TULAS industry survey, write to: Tillinghast, 245 Park 
Avenue, 18th Floor, New York NY 10167-0128, USA. 
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ICRt as the dependent variable and T3Mt-6, T5Yt and T5Yt-18 yields the 
following equation: 
ICRt = 3.78 + 0.119 x T3Mt-6 + 0.342 x T5Yt + 0.146 X T5Yt-18 (1) 
with R2 = 0.72. Equation (1) is not useful in describing the response of 
the crediting rate to a change in market rate because the nonconstant 
term coefficients sum to significantly less than one. For example, the 
model indicates that the crediting rate would never fully respond to a 
permanent parallel shift in rates. 
The following is a similar model, fit without the constant term, and 
weighs recent observations more heavily. This regression yields the 
following equation: 
ICRt = 0.424 x T5Yt + 0.297 X T5Yt-6 + 0.328 X T5Yt-18 (2) 
with R2 = 0.99. In this case equation (2) also appears to give a good 
fit; in addition, because its coefficients sum nearly to one, the equa-
tion merely describes the timing by which the crediting rate will reflect 
changed market rates. 
2.2.2 Company Crediting Strategy 
The crediting rate structure that a company establishes is the re-
sult of myriad marketing, investment, legal, and game theory consid-
erations. Crediting rate rationale is not well understood from a theo-
retical perspective. Companies attempting to establish market share 
often credit above-market rates. Companies often engage in "bait and 
switch tactics" (Le., crediting above-market rates on new money and 
below-market rates at subsequent policy years). When a company has 
closed a block and is running off the reserves, it often credits low rates. 
Company crediting rates are often not closely related to the company's 
claims-paying capacity. For this analysis the rate is set at the industry 
rate less 125 basis points.3 . 
2.2.3 Contract Holder Surrender Profile 
Contract holder behavior is affected fundamentally by the spread 
between the rate earned by a particular contract and the rate provided 
30ne basis point is the smallest measure used in quoting yields on mortgages, bonds 
and notes. It represents 0.01% of yield. Thus a 5.77%rate that drops by 125 basis points 
becomes 4.52%. 
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by a similar contract issued by an industry competitor. Surrenders also 
are relatively higher during the early stages of the contract. Surren-
der behavior can be volatile at critical points in the life of the contract, 
such as premium redetermination periods and the end of the surren-
der charge period. Furthermore, it is affected by critical ages, such as 
retirement, of the contract holder. 
The analysis assumes baseline surrenders of 7.5 percent annually 
with adjustments for: 
• Early policy years due to buyer remorse; 
• Later policy years, when surrender charges are lower; 
• Higher insured ages, when contract owners typically have a postre-
tirement need for cash and when they find surrender to be tax-
efficient; and 
• Policy-crediting rates that are different from rates on poliCies of 
competitor companies. Over the projection horizon the crediting 
rate is set at the projected industry rate less 125 basis points. 
The low crediting rate used in this analysis produces moderately 
higher surrenders. 
To date, little empirical analysis has been done on contract holder 
surrender profile. There are significant barriers to conducting such 
research: 
• Lack of product homogeneity; 
• Differences in sales methods; 
• Differences in product management; 
• Differences in perceived insurance company risk; and 
• Absence of usable historical data maintained by companies. 
Contrast this with the extensive analytic work that has been conducted 
on the prepayment behaviors of single family homeowners. The mort-
gage is relatively a homogeneous product. Good data are available for 
at least 15 years, and there are few company-specific issues related to 
them. 
This asymmetric behavior reveals the fundamental interest rate op-
tion that the contract holder owns. When market rates rise there is the 
potential problem of disintermediation, i.e., the insured can surrender 
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to pursue higher new money rates elsewhere (subject to a declining sur-
render charge). Consequently, the company needs to choose between 
raising the crediting rate to keep the policy or to maintain the rate and 
cash out the policy. In the former case the company pays more interest 
over time, perhaps even a greater rate than it earns on its investment. 
In the latter case the company fails to recoup a portion of its acquisition 
cost and tends to liquidate bonds at depressed prices. 
If rates fall, however, the results are not symmetrically bad for the 
contract holder. The insured merely keeps the policy knowing that the 
company can reduce its rate only to the guaranteed rate. 
The value of this interest rate option is affected by the same two fun-
damental variables that affect all other interest rate options: interest 
rate volatility and time to expiry. Greater market rate volatility pro-
vides a greater range of opportunity for the insured to exercise. New 
money rates can become higher, providing more incentive to pursue 
them. They also can be driven lower, increasing the chance that the 
insured enjoys a guaranteed rate in excess of new money rates. In ad-
dition, these contracts often have long lives, which provides further op-
portunity for rates to move to the insureds' advantage. The effect of this 
option on insurance company surplus is exacerbated by the likelihood 
that the company has written similar options in its mortgage-backed 
security and callable bond portfolios. 
This analysis uses a quadratic function to derive excess surrenders 
(Le., surrenders in excess of baseline) stimulated by the contract hold-
ers' desire to earn higher rates. Thus 
ESt = (1 + p x TDt ) 2 - 1 
where 
ESt Excess surrenders at time t; 
p Propensity to achieve higher rates through surrender; 
TDt max {[ CRt - PRt - 0.0115 _ SCt(l ~~Rd-SPt ] , o} 
CRt Identified competitor's credit rate at time t; 
PRt Product credit rate at time t; 
SCt Remaining surrender charge at time t; 
SPt Number of surrender charge periods remaining at time t. 
Note that the rate of differential must exceed 115 basis points (0.0115) 
before any excess surrenders occur, and that the remaining surrender 
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charge is then amortized off. This paper uses the 125 basis points 
spread between the competitor rate and the product rate. The effect 
is to moderate excess surrenders in most forward rate and surrender 
charge environments. 
Surrender cash flows include new policy loans. Policy loans typically 
do not pay cash interest and, in any case, are usually not repaid. Instead, 
interest is capitalized, increasing the loan amount. New policy loans are 
modeled as a premature cash outflow from the fund. When the contract 
is extinguished by surrender, the surrender benefit is reduced by the 
amount of the loan; when it is extinguished by ultimate death of the 
insured, the death benefit is reduced by the amount of the loan. 
We assume future loan balances to be a constant proportion of con-
tract cash values. Under older whole life policies the policy loan was 
a further powerful option enjoyed by the contract holder. In high rate 
environments the insured withdrew the policy's cash value at a rate 
fixed at policy inception and invested in high market rates elsewhere. 
Under newer interest-sensitive contracts the loan rate depends on mar-
ket rates. Consequently, there may be no further benefit to taking the 
loan in high or low rates. In high interest rate scenarios, however, cash 
values increase quickly, loan balances capitalize quickly, and cash paid 
upon death of the insured is reduced. 
In high interest rate scenarios our model shifts cash flows to earlier 
periods and from the death benefit component to the surrender benefit 
component. This modeling assumption does not distort aggregate con-
tract duration, but may affect the respective durations of the surrender 
component and death benefits component. 
2.2.4 Cash Flow Generation 
Various interest rate scenarios are generated in estimating market 
values and durations. Each scenario is associated with a yield curve. 
Under each scenario for each projected month premium cash flows into, 
and benefit and expense cash flows out of, the fund are generated for 
each contract remaining in force. In addition, the fund accumulates 
by capitalizing interest at the credited rate and is reduced by the cost 
of insurance and expense charges deducted for each policy in force. 
Industry and company crediting rates are functions of medium term 
forward rates implied by the scenario yield curve. Contract surrenders 
are triggered, generating surrender cash flows. Finally, mortality cash 
flows are generated, further reducing the number of policies in force. 
The process is repeated for each month and each yield curve. 
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2.2.5 Duration 
The market value of financial instruments is sensitive to interest 
rates at various points on the yield curve. The concept of duration pro-
vides a measure of the extent of this sensitivity. The basic duration 
measure is the Macaulay duration; see, for example, Boyle (1992, Chap-
ter 3). It is defined as follows for an arbitrary series of cash flows Ck 
paid at time k, k = 1,2, ... , n with yield-to-maturity rate of Yn 
. Ir=l kCk(l + Yn)-k 
Macaulay DuratIOn = In ( ) k . 
k=l Ck 1 + Yn -
(3) 
For example, a one year Treasury bill has only one cash flow; its du-
ration is explained by what happens to the one year rate. A five year 
investment grade corporate bond's duration is explained largely by the 
five year rate, but also by the change in rates at the same term as coupon 
payments. A mortgage-backed security can be affected by medium term 
rates because its cash flow is centered in that region, and also because 
refinance rates, which affect the amount and incidence of cash flow it-
self, an: centered there. Interest-sensitive life contracts can have highly 
complex cash flow magnitude and incidence of cash flow profiles. 
In general, the duration of a financial instrument can be calculated 
as follows: let Po be the current price of the financial instrument, P + be 
the price after a very small increase of Y + in the interest rate, and P_ 
be the price after a very small decrease of Y - in the interest rate. The 
duration D is defined as: 
(4) 
For example, if a bond currently trading at par (Le., Po = 100) is sub-
jected to an instantaneous rate increase of one half of one percent 
(Y+ = 0.005) and its price drops to 98 (P+ = 98), while if it is sub-
jected to an instantaneous rate decrease of one half of one percent 
(y_ = 0.005) and its price increases to 102 (P- = 102), then D = 4. 
Duration increases as the time to maturity increases, other things 
being equal. Floating rate instruments usually have quite short du-
rations. Although duration was initially introduced for fixed income 
instruments, all financial instruments have a duration as defined in 
equation (2). 
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3 Market Value Estimate 
Consider a comparison to corporate debt whereby the accumulating 
ISWL fund represents the proceeds from company debt issuance in the 
same way as an industrial firm can issue debt as part of the financing 
structure for a capital project. In either case the issuer is accumulating 
assets with the promise to repay the debt, with interest, at a future date. 
The issuing firm (in the case of debt issuance) and the life company (in 
the case of contract issuance) are charged a certain number of basis 
points as a risk premium by entities providing the funds. Issuers in both 
cases incur issuance costs and enjoy related tax advantages. Because 
the ISWL contract provides risk-reducing services to the provider of 
funds (the contract holders), some or all of such cost of funds is offset. 
The insurance company is rewarded for providing risk intermediation 
services. Consider the aggregate of these costs and their offsets to be 
a cost of funds basis point spread to Treasury. 
The spread can be estimated for a line of business or a block of 
policies at any time in its life. To accomplish this, solve for the spread 
that when added to the respective risk-free zero coupon rates discounts 
all future expected contract cash flows to the market value of funds 
that insureds willingly provide to the insurer. Immediately prior to 
issuance such assets equal zero; after the initial premium such assets 
equal the premium reduced by the commission and other acquisition 
costs incurred in issuance; at any time such assets equal the sum of all 
net cash flows and their investment earnings at risk-adjusted rates. 
Let CFc•t be the cash flow of component c at projection month t 
where c is a nominal integer parameter taking possible values from 
1 to 4 (1 = premium, 2 = surrender benefit, 3 = death benefit, and 
4 = expense), and t = 1,2, ... ,480 (that is, 40 years). Thus, we are 
interested in projecting cash flows component by component over 40 
years. The cash flows can depend on the level and shape of the yield 
curve at any projection month, and each month's discount rate also can 
be different. This component by component approach is consistent 
with pricing of mortgage-backed securities and derivatives that have 
been in place for about a decade. See, for example, Roll (1988). 
Let Zt be equal to the risk-free zero coupon rate at projection month 
t, and ~k.t be an instantaneous shift in the zero coupon rate at time t for 
key rate k, k = 1,2, ... ,9. The shift is applied to Zt at all t near the term 
of a Treasury on-the-run instrument. Finally, let 5 be the spread. In this 
analysiS the resultant presumed spread is set to 20 basis points for the 
entire projection period. Using the semi-annual coupon convention of 
the investment literature, let d be the market price discounting factor 
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such that, at any month t, 
( ) 
-t/6 
d t = 1 + Zt + ~;,t + 5 (5) 
A simple procedure provides the market value (MY) of ISWL, 
4 00 
MV= I ICFc,tdt. (6) 
c=lt=l 
This analysis uses 480 months as a practical analog for infinity. Ap-
plying the methodology produces Table 1. Because this market value 
measure is that of a liability, cash flows of the premium component 
have a negative sign. 
Table 1 
Base Market Value ISWL 
Component 
Premium 
Surrender Benefit 
Death Benefit 
Expense 
Aggregate 
Market Value 
(71,687,488) 
53,262,613 
34,190,301 
7,852,738 
23,618,164 
A few points are worth noting about these values relative to the 
various in force values in the appendix: 
• The aggregate market value is only about 50 percent of the statu-
tory reserve, reflecting the conservative nature of statutory ac-
counting principles; 
• The surrender benefit is even higher than the fund or cash values 
due primarily to the inclusion of future premiums in this compo-
nent; and 
• The death benefit is only about 5 percent of face amount, indicat-
ing the impact of withdrawals and the time value of money. 
4 Notions of Duration 
In general duration is a measure of the sensitivity of a stream of cash 
flows to an interest rate change. Different notions of interest rate shifts 
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are depicted graphically in Figures 1 and 2. Figure 1 shows parallel and 
nonparallel (Le., dampened) shifts from a base case yield curve. Figure 
2 shows a piecewise dampened shift. Each shift produces a different 
sensitivity, or duration, of the present value of the product cash flow. 
Consider the following four concepts of duration. 
Spread Duration: Spread duration is the percent sensitivity of market 
value to a shift in s. This is similar to Macaulay duration and 
modified duration which are measures of sensitivities to changes 
in yield for fixed and certain cash flows. It is useful as an average 
life index and as a measure of the capitalized value of a unit of 
higher cost of funds. Mathematically, 
S dD . 1 dMV prea uratlOn = - -d . MV s (7) 
Parallel Effective Duration: Parallel effective duration is the percent 
sensitivity of market value to a parallel shift in z simultaneously 
over all k. That is, ~k,t are equal at all k. This is the type of duration 
customarily used in asset and liability matching. Mathematically, 
Parallel Effective Duration = ~ d=. (8) 
Dampened Effective Duration: Dampened effective duration is the per-
cent sensitivity of market value to a function f that produces 
nonparallel shift vector in z over all k such that: ~k,t > ~k+l,t. 
Rates for months within a region also are shifted according to 
the nonparallel function f. This is similar to effective duration, 
but recognizes that short rate volatility typically exceeds long rate 
volatility. In this analysis the average shift over the region k = 9 
is about 60 percent of the average shift over the region k = l. 
Mathematically, 
Dampened Effective Duration = ~ ~~ (9) 
where the vector z is produced according to f. 
Key Region Effective Duration: Key region effective duration is the per-
cent sensitivity of market value to a set of shifts in z sequentially 
over each k. Measures under either of the following two subsets 
of this notion can be considered partial durations: 
18 
"0 
~ 
~ 
9.50% 
9.00% 
8.50% 
8.00% 
Journal of Actuarial Practice, Vol. 4, No.1, 1996 
Figure 1 
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Parallel: This duration measures shifts by region of the curve. 
Mathematically, 
Parallel Duration = ~ dd~. 
MV ",k,t 
(10) 
The methodology developed in this paper provides a dura-
tion, termed piecewise duration, to each significant point on 
the yield curve. It effectively decomposes overall duration to 
assess the impact of changes of pieces of the yield curve. For 
example, the duration of a five year bond is about 4.2 percent; 
about 70 percent of this duration can be attributed to the five 
year rate. For instruments with fixed cash flows, piecewise 
durations approximately sum to the aggregate durations. For 
instruments whose cash flows are interest contingent piece-
wise durations may sum to a different number. The piecewise 
(region-by-region) shifts in the yield curve are similar to Ho's 
(1992) key rate duration methodology. This analysis shifts 
entire segments of the yield curve by cutting and excising 
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these portions. This happens over all t within a given region 
k. Ho uses a series of triangle functions in shifting Treasury 
on-the-run rates. Both methodologies create kinked undif-
ferentiable curves. The curves used in this paper are also 
discontinuous. This key region methodology, however, im-
proves the performance of the aggregation of piecewise du-
ration. 
Dampened Duration: Dampened duration is similar to dampened 
effective duration, but relates to the effect of dampened shifts 
by region of the curve. Mathematically, 
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5 Duration Calculations 
Consider point estimates of these measures shown in Table 2. These 
figures are scaled to a 100 basis point shift. Under dampened measures 
figures are scaled to reflect an approximately 100 basis point shift over 
the region k = 1. We show only the dampened category of key region 
measurements. 
Component 
Premium 
Surrender Benefit 
Death Benefit 
Expense 
Aggregate 
Component 
Premium 
Surrender Benefit 
Death Benefit 
Expense 
Aggregate 
Table 2 
Point Estimate Durations 
Parallel Dampened 
Spread Effective Effective 
-5.94 -5.94 -4.94 
10.86 3.78 3.55 
14.15 7.93 6.51 
5.49 5.49 4.59 
28.79 3.82 3.95 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Total 
-0.01 -0.03 -0.11 -0.02 -0.44 -1.11 -1.85 -0.99 -0.16 -4.94 
0.01 0.05 0.12 0.35 0.5 1.92 1.32 0.02 0.45 4.74 
o 0.02 0.06 0.17 0.29 1.37 3.45 2.13 0.21 7.71 
0.01 0.04 0.12 0.24 0.44 1.08 1.58 0.88 0.19 4.59 
o 0.05 0.06 0.42 0.37 3.31 2.89 0.34 1.75 9.18 
Premium duration figures are provided with respect to their effect 
on the value of the liability. For example, at a higher discount spread 
of 100 basis points the market value of premium will become less neg-
ative, producing a higher overall liability. In this sense premium has a 
negative duration as well as a negative market value. 
Consider also the more intuitive market value change by component 
shown in Figure 3. See also the aggregate market value changes by 
effective and dampened effective-type shifts shown in Figure 4. Each 
of the figures shows a market value change from the base case resulting 
from the indicated shift. 
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6 Discussion 
Estimating the cost of funds is a complex process_ The rate credited 
to the fund accumulations explains less of such cost than do analogous 
rates in depository institution or corporate bond environments_ A sim-
plistic comparison between a life company's asset earning rate and its 
crediting rate provides inadequate information with respect to its net 
spread_ Such comparison in a depository context, however, provides 
much more significant information_ Market value approximations for 
complex insurance liabilities, however, can be made_ Actuaries can pro-
vide market value estimates using the ideas presented in this paper-
22 Journal of Actuarial Practice, Vol. 4, No.1, 1996 
Figure 4 
Aggregate Market Value Changes By Shift Type 
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The death benefit component is highly positively convex4 due to 
the mere length of the cash flows and to the effect of policy loans. 
Our model of policy loans causes the death benefit component to have 
greater absolute cash flows in lower interest rate environments, a com-
bination sure to produce convexity. Liability convexity is not desirable. 
The surrender benefit component is also highly positively convex due 
primarily to the presence of the guaranteed rate in the contracts, which 
acts as an interest rate floor. The effective duration of the surrender 
benefit component, primarily a floating rate set of cash flows, is long 
due to the lagged nature of adjustments to crediting rates. 
4The concept of convexity refers to the extent that the price function changes over 
greater yield intervals. A financial instrument is said to be positively (negatively) convex 
when its duration increases (decreases) as the yield decreases. Positive convexity is 
desirable for assets but not for liabilities. 
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Financial managers need to decide whether to use the dampening 
notion of effective duration or whether to use the strictly parallel ap-
proach. The alternative methods can give significantly different re-
sults. Long-tailed cash benefits and the customary front-loaded pre-
mium structure of whole life combine to produce a net asset at the be-
ginning of contract time and a net liability at the end of such time. The 
present value of this configuration is subject to yield curve twists such 
as are emphasized in the difference between effective and dampened 
effective durations. 
Spread duration, indicating average lives of cash flow components, 
are long with respect to the following components: 
• Surrender benefits, as interest is capitalized rather than paid cur-
rently on the surviving contracts; 
• Death benefits, because as the insureds of surviving contracts 
grow older, cash flow increases; and 
• Aggregate, because it is leveraged, in a sense, by negative premium 
flows in earlier periods. The leveraged characteristic of this com-
ponent renders its spread duration a less reliable measure of cash 
flow life. It remains a measure of the value of a basis point change 
in discounting spread. 
Spread and effective durations are equal for fixed cash flow com-
ponents such as premium and expense, and are different for interest 
rate-sensitive cash flows such as surrender and death benefits. 
Dampened effective durations and aggregate dampened effective 
partial durations are equal for fixed cash flow components and dif-
ferent for cash flow components. Premium cash flows are fixed over 
different scenarios even though surrender cash flows change. We have 
fixed the incidence of surrender in the analysis by leaving the crediting 
strategy unchanged-hence the constant premium cash flows. On the 
other hand, the amount of surrender cash flows can change dramati-
cally under different forward rate scenarios. 
Because the partial durations with respect to interest-sensitive cash 
flows are relatively high compared to an equivalent dampened effective 
duration (in the context of Reitano (1990)), it appears that the interest-
sensitive nature of the cash flows has the effect of adding durational 
leverage to the component. Other elements capable of causing the 
effect include negative partial durations, portfolios of securities, and 
short positions. Option-adjusted spread methodology would provide 
yet additional texture to the duration results. Additionally, analogous 
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shocks can be made in mortality and surrender scenarios to reveal ad-
ditional risk measures. 
A further consideration is the duration of cash flows distributable to 
the stockholders. Under life insurance accounting conventions in most 
states, dividends generally can be paid without restriction to the extent 
of the prior year statutory earnings. In this case statutorily defined ac-
counting and legal conventions actually drive a cash flow stream. In 
most cases these conventions have a significant historical cost compo-
nent that stabilizes earnings. As a result, intracompany durations and 
the durations of returns to the ownership rights to such company may 
diverge substantially. Management and stockholders rarely synthesize 
an optimal duration position. 
7 Conclusions 
Life insurance companies can adapt market pricing methodologies 
that customarily are used in the financial area to the cash flow provi-
sions of their particular contracts. Adapting such methodologies can 
provide rich insight into the market value of liabilities. These modeling 
methodologies can guide investment strategies and provide manage-
ment with measures of the market value of life company surplus. 
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Appendix-Hypothetical ISWL Contract Terms and In 
Force Assumptions 
Following is a sample cell of the ISWL model used in the analysis. 
Table Al 
Representative Cell Information 
Field 
Gender 
Weighted Average Issue Age 
Smoking Classification 
Premium Mode 
Underwriting Class 
Weighted Average Policy Age 
Number of Policies 
Basic Annual Premium 
Total Face Amount (Policy yrs 1-10) 
Total Face Amount (Policy yrs 11 +) 
Total Fund Value 
Total Cash Value 
Total Statutory Reserve 
Total Policy Loan 
Value 
Male 
32 
Nonsmoker 
Monthly 
Nonmedical 
10 Years 
70 
$5.60/$1000 
$7,605,500 
$6,844,950 
$266,633 
$226,639 
$250,740 
$22,664 
Common to all 102 cells of the analysis are a guaranteed credit-
ing rate of 5.5 percent; a 15 year declining surrender charge schedule 
as a percentage of existing fund value; a provision whereby interest 
crediting on loaned balances can be less than on unloaned balances; a 
specified agent commission schedule; and a standard servicing expense 
structure. The descriptive statistics for the insured groups, weighted 
by face amount, are: (i) issue age = 41.5, and (ii) months seasoned = 
55.0. 
Other beginning characteristics of the model contract are a face 
amount of $709,585,000; cash value of $36,348,600; fund value of 
$50,426,020; statutory reserve of $47,150,500; annualized premium 
in projection month one of $5,886,800; and 6,951 policies. The anal-
ysis assumes a simple mortality experience equal to 80 percent of the 
1975-80 basic select and ultimate mortality table. 
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Participating GICs: Performance Attribution Analysis 
Alec Stais* and John P. Toohey lilt 
Abstract 
The increasing popularity of participating GICs has created a need for an 
objective understanding of their performance. The fixed income attribution 
techniques are not adequate for measuring participating GIC performance be-
cause they typically restrict performance measurement to concepts such as 
duration management, sector rotation, and issue selection. We develop an at-
tribution technique based on four components or effects that are helpful in 
explaining the changes in credited rates. They are the constant duration ef-
fect, the reinvestment effect, the cash flow effect, and the investment effect. 
The underlying mathematical approach to calculating these effects is presented 
along with examples. 
Key words and phrases: investment, duration, yield, spread, cash flow, invest-
ment manager 
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Introduction 
Defined contribution plans often offer a stable value fund as an in-
vestment alternative. Stable value funds provide a fixed credited rate 
and a guarantee of principal to participants. Plan sponsors historically 
have invested in nonparticipating insurance company contracts called 
GICs (guaranteed investment contracts) to support the principal plus 
interest guarantees to participants. The Stable Value Association esti-
mates that aggregate stable value funds currently account for approx-
imately $300 billion in assets'! Recent years have seen the advent of 
participating GIC products (often referred to as synthetic or separate 
account GICs). These products reflect the investment experience of a 
specific asset or portfolio of assets. Participating GICs now command 
over half of all stable value sales, according to a recent Stable Value 
Association survey.2 
The increasing use of participating GICs within GIC/stable value 
portfolios has created a need for an objective understanding of partic-
ipating GIC performance. Performance measures were not required for 
traditional GICs because performance essentially was guaranteed (ig-
noring default risk) in the form of a fixed credited rate. Fixed income 
attribution techniques3 are not sufficient for measuring participating 
GIC performance. Such techniques typically restrict performance mea-
surement to concepts such as duration management, sector rotation, 
and issue selection. These techniques decompose portfolio experience 
into components in order to isolate the performance effect of various 
investment strategies. 
Other concepts are often more important, however, in explaining 
changes in participating GIC credited rates. Rennie (1994) deals with 
some of these concepts but he does not explain the mechanics of an 
attribution. As a result we have developed an attribution technique for 
explaining changes in participating GIC credited rates. In particular, we 
develop four key components or effects that are helpful in explaining 
the changes in credited rates: 
• The constant duration effect; 
1 For more information on this survey, see the Stable Value Association's Guaran· 
teed/Stable Value Product Sales: 1996 Sales-Participants Report. Hartford, Conn.: Life 
Insurance Marketing & Research Association (LIMRA), June 30, 1996. 
2 Again, see the Stable Value Association's Guaranteed/Stable Value Product Sales: 
1996 Sales-Participants Report. Hartford, Conn.: Life Insurance Marketing & Research 
Association (LIMRA), June 30, 1996. 
3Fixed income attribution techniques decompose income security total returns into 
components based on the sources or factors that contributed to the return. See, for 
example, Dietz, Fogler and Hardy (1980) and Fong, Pearson and Vasicek (1983). 
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• The reinvestment effect; 
• The cash flow effect; and 
• The investment effect. 
Likewise, the investment effect consists of five subcomponents: invest-
ment market, spread; investment manager, time-weighted and noncon-
stant duration. 
This approach described in this paper is not the only way to attribute 
changes in credited rates, but we believe our approach offers several ad-
vantages. It helps plan sponsors to manage their stable value portfolios 
by explaining, in an intuitive way, why credited rates on participating 
GICs change. The framework can be integrated with the investment 
manager's attribution of investment performance. The framework pro-
vides a mechanism to compare the participating GIC products of dif-
ferent providers. 
To explain the conceptual framework behind our approach, we dis-
cuss the characteristics of participating GICs, the basic resetting for-
mula and introduce our notation in Section 2. In Section 3 we de-
velop our attribution methodology, which is based on the four key 
components or effects described above that are helpful in explaining 
the changes in credited rates. Section 4 consists of two detailed hypo-
thetical examples illustrating our attribution methodology. 
2 Background 
2.1 Participating GIC Characteristics 
Participating GIC products typically have these characteristics: 
• They combine a market value fixed-income portfolio (bond fund) 
with a book value guarantee (wrapper) that covers benefit pay-
ments to participants. A credited interest rate is established at the 
inception of the contract and reset periodically (quarterly, semi-
annually, or annually) to reflect contract experience. 
• They are similar to bond funds in that performance is recognized 
immediately in the market value. In addition, participating GICs 
possess other characteristics of bond funds: active management, 
total return, market value, yield, and duration. Unlike bond funds, 
however, performance is not immediately passed to participants 
but is reflected prospectively in the form of adjustments to the 
credited interest rate. 
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• They possess some of the characteristics of traditional GICs: a 
credited rate and a guarantee of principal. Unlike traditional GICs 
that have a fixed credited rate that is guaranteed for the term of 
the contract, participating GICs have a credited rate that changes 
to reflect contract experience . 
• Most participating GICs are designed as evergreen products with 
no maturity date and assets managed around a constant duration. 
We discuss only this common form of participating GICs, although 
our framework can be modified to accommodate participating GICs 
with a target maturity date. 
2.2 The Resetting Formula 
The formula used for resetting the credited rate for participating 
GICs at time t (t = 0,1,2, ... ) typically is: 
(1nVt + wefd x (1 + Yt - ed d = (CVt + wefd x (1 + CYd d (1) 
where the variables below are defined with respect to portfolio values 
at time t: 
1nVt Market value of assets in fixed income portfolio; 
CVt Contract value or book value of liability; 
weft Cash flow expectation for the period between resets; 
Yt Actual annualized market yield to maturity of the assets; 
et Contract expenses/fees; 
d t Duration in years (usually the portfolio duration); and 
CYt Credited rate 
with 1nVo = CVo and CYo = Yo - eo at the inception of the contract. 
Equation (1) can be solved directly for CYt as a function of several 
variables: 
(2) 
Equation (2) illustrates that the credited rate reflects current invest-
ment yields plus the amortized effect of any differences between mar-
ket value and contract value. 
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2.3 Notation 
Throughout the rest of this paper, the following notation is used 
in subscripts and superscripts to denote quantities subjected to the 
particular effect: 
CD Constant duration; 
RI Reinvestment; 
CF Cash flow; 
IV Investment; 
1M Investment market; 
SP Spread; 
IX Investment index; 
MG Investment manager; and 
ND Nonconstant duration. 
In addition, without loss of generality, we will change our time ref-
erence point from the time of the inception of the contract to the time 
of the prior (previous) reset, i.e., 
• as time t - 1 represents the prior (previous) reset, events at time 
t - 1 are denoted with the subscript 0; and 
• as time t represents the current reset, events at time t are denoted 
with the subscript 1. 
Also, fees are assumed to be held constant between the prior reset and 
the current reset, i.e., et = eo = e for 0 :::; t < 1. 
3 The Attribution Methodology 
3.1 The Four Components 
Let ~cro denote the change in the credited rate that occurs from 
prior reset (time 0) to current reset (time 1), i.e., 
(3) 
The values of the variables 11tVo, CVo, wefo, Yo, eo, and do serve as the 
starting point for credited rate reset attribution. All effects are mea-
sured relative to these values. Each of the intermediate steps involved 
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in changing the values of these variables at time 0 to their respective 
values at time 1 corresponds to a component or effect. 
The change in the credited rate can be decomposed into four com-
ponents: a constant duration effect, a reinvestment effect, a cash flow 
effect and an investment effect. The fundamental equation for the de-
composition of the change in the credited rate is as follows: 
where 
t.cr6CD) 
t.cr(RI) 
o 
t.cr6CF) 
t.crgV ) 
The constant duration effect; 
The reinvestment effect; 
The cash flow effect; and 
The investment effect. 
(4) 
In addition, the investment effect is decomposed further into five sub-
components as follows: 
where 
t.crgV ) = t.crgM) + t.cr6SP) + t.cr6MG) + t.cr6TW) + t.cr6ND) (5) 
t.cr(IM) 
o 
t.cr6SP) 
t.cr6MG) 
t.cr6TW) 
t.cr6ND) 
The investment market effect; 
The spread effect; 
The investment manager effect 
The time-weighted effect; and 
The nonconstant duration effect. 
This attribution framework is sufficiently flexible to accommodate 
a wide variety of methods of measuring yields and durations including: 
• Portfolio, index, or model yields and durations; 
• Duration-weighted or market value-weighted yields; 
• Option-adjusted yields and durations; and 
• Macaulay or modified durations. 
In our examples in Section 4, we use duration-weighted portfolio yields, 
Macaulay portfolio durations as the amortization period, and annual 
resets. We do not use time-weighted cash flows. 
Next we develop the formulas needed to compute magnitude of each 
effect. 
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3.2 The Constant Duration Effect 
Participating GICs have a constant duration product design, i.e., they 
do not have a maturity date. Assets are managed around a constant (or 
target) duration, d, which is consistent with plan sponsor objectives. 
As equation (2) shows, any difference between mvl and CVl is amor-
tized over the constant duration, d. The amortization process acts as 
a smoothing mechanism, reducing the volatility of returns to partic-
ipants. It also will cause mvt and CVt to converge to each other (as 
t - 00) in a stable interest rate environment. 
Assume market value is below contract value. As equation (2) in-
dicates, the credited rate will be lower than the market yield, as the 
loss is amortized. In a constant duration product the difference grows 
smaller each year, but is still amortized over the initial duration. This 
creates a declining drag on the credited rate; see Figure 1. With a fixed 
maturity product design (declining duration) the credited rate would 
have remained unchanged until the end of the fourth year, at which 
time market value would have equaled contract value. 
With a constant amortization period the credited rate will change 
even if all other prior reset assumptions are realized. Over time the 
credited rate will approach the portfolio's net yield. In summary, the 
constant duration effect captures the effect of a constant duration prod-
uct design as opposed to a fixed maturity product design. 
The constant duration effect is calculated by assuming that the port-
folio returns its net yield and the contract value grows at the credited 
rate. In mathematical notation, 
where 
mv(CD) 
1 
cviCD) 
er(CD) 
1 
ero 
A rv(CD) - er(CD) CYi 
Ll<'-IO - 1 - 0 
(mvo + wcfo) x (1 + Yo - e) 
(cvo + wcfo) x (1 + ero) 
«
CD) (CD) d ) d er mv1 'CV1 ,0,Yo - e, 0 an 
er(mvo, CVo, wcfo, Yo - e, do). 
3.3 The Reinvestment Effect 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
As interest rates change, the effect on the bond portfolio is twofold. 
A drop in interest rates tends to increase the portfolio's market value 
and decrease the portfolio's yield. In an instantaneous interest rate 
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Figure 1 
Constant Duration Effect 
(do = 4, net yield = 8% and 1nVo / CVo = 98%) 
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shift these effects are largely offsetting, and the credited rate will re-
main stable. 
As the portfolio moves through time in a lower interest rate envi-
ronment, however, it tends to earn less coupon income. Thus, at the 
end of the year the portfolio's market value will reflect the impact of 
the lower coupon income. Consequently, the credited rate will be re-
duced. In other words, the overall impact on the credited rate should 
be in the same direction as the movement in market interest rates. In 
summary, the reinvestment effect captures the responsiveness of the 
credited rate to the movement in market interest rates. 
The reinvestment effect is calculated by assuming that the yield on 
the portfolio changes by the change in interest rates and the portfolio 
return reflects the change in yield. We use Treasury yields as a proxy 
for interest rates. Using Treasury yields and temporarily ignoring the 
effect of spread, credit, and prepayment factors, the portfolio return is 
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given by: 
R (1 (T1-fex))( l+Yo-e )d
O 
RI = + Yo - e + - - 1 2 1 + Yo - e + (Tl - Tex) 
where 
Tt The Treasury rate at time t (0 :s; t :s; 1); 
mvo x To + wefo x f av . 
mvo + wefo and 
fav A weighted average of Treasury rates over time. 
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(ll) 
(12) 
Note that fav is given in the examples that follow. Also, fex is the 
weighted average of Treasury rates using the initial market value and 
the expected cash flows as weights. 
In mathematical notation, 
where 
(mvo + wefo)(l + RRI) 
Yo + Tl - fex and 
cr(mviRI), cviCD), 0, yiRI) - e, do). 
3.4 The Cash Flow Effect 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
(16) 
Many participating GICs accept ongoing contributions and make ben-
efit payments at book value. Cash flow expectations are reflected in the 
reset formula, i.e., in the prior reset assumption wefo. If actual cash 
flow experience (amount and timing) matches expectations, we define 
the cash flow effect to be zero. Therefore, our cash flow effect incor-
porates deviations from both the expected amount of cash flow and 
expected interest rates (at which the cash flow was invested). In sum-
mary, the cash flow effect captures the effect of unexpected cash flows 
on the credited rate. 
The cash flow effect is calculated by adjusting the market value and 
contract value to reflect the actual as opposed to the expected cash 
flows. 
R (1 (T1-fac )) ( l+yo-e )dO 1 (17) CF = + Yo - e + - -2 1 + Yo - e + (Tl - Tac) 
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where 
- mvo x To + Ii:oeii x Tt; 
Tae = 00 (18) 
mvo + Ii=o eii 
and eii is the actual i-th cash flow at time ti, with ° = to < tl < t2 < .... 
Note that rae is the weighted average of Treasury rates using the initial 
market value and the actual cash flows as weights. 
In mathematical notation, 
where 
acio 
mviCF) 
cviCF) 
criCF) 
The actual cash flow received; 
(mvo + acio) x (1 + RCF) 
CVI and 
cr(mviCF), cviCF) , 0, yiRI) - e, do). 
3.5 The Investment Effect 
(19) 
(20) 
(21) 
(22) 
This investment effect component can be further divided into five 
subcomponents: investment market, spread, investment manager, time-
weighted and nonconstant duration. From equation (4), we know that 
/::,.crgV) = (cri - cro) - (criCD) - cro) 
- (criRI) - criCD») - (criCF) - criRI)) 
cr cr
(CF) 
I - I (23) 
It follows that the sum of the effects of the five subcomponents must 
satisfy equation (23). We now review each of these subcomponents 
individually. 
3.5.1 The Investment Market Effect 
The investment market effect captures the impact of the chosen in-
vestment universe on the credited rate. The investment universe is 
represented by the index or other benchmark selected to evaluate the 
portfolio's performance. Participating GIC contracts allow for a variety 
of portfolio structures and benchmarks, developed by mutual agree-
ment between the plan sponsor and the investment manager. 
The investment market effect is designed to provide a basis for eval-
uating benchmark performance by a manager. (The basis or proxy is 
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indexed management or a manager whose return exactly matches the 
chosen benchmark.) The performance of the index is compared to the 
rate needed to support the initial credited rate. This is expressed in 
terms of a Treasury-plus-spread benchmark. Treasuries are used be-
cause they are the universal underpinning of all fixed income prices 
and returns. 
We calculate the investment market effect by performing a rate reset 
with a market value calculated using the index return. In mathematical 
notation, 
where 
The index return. 
(mvo + acjo)(l + RIX) and 
(IX) (RI) d ) cr(mv1 ,CV1, 0, Yl - e, o. 
(24) 
(25) 
(26) 
The comparison of a standard market index, such as the Lehman 
aggregate or government/corporate index, to a Treasury-plus-spread 
benchmark implicitly assumes the use of non-Treasury assets. The 
actual impact on the credited rate is derived from the fact that the 
total return of the index incorporates initial spread plus changes in 
spreads, while the Treasury-plus-spread proxy only incorporates the 
initial spread. 
For example, the Lehman MBS index may yield 100 basis points over 
Treasuries at the start of the year, with a four year index duration. 
Assume that mortgage spreads widen 50 basis points during the year, 
with Treasury rates and durations remaining unchanged. The mortgage 
portfolio will underperformduration-matched Treasuries by roughly 75 
basis points during the year (assuming spread change occurs uniformly 
over the year). The investment market effect will be roughly -44 basis 
pOints (-75 basis points actual performance versus + 1 00 basis points 
assumed performance produces a 175 basis point difference amortized 
over four years). The spread widening will be reflected in the spread 
effect (see below) of +50 basis points, more than offsetting the invest-
ment market effect. 
3.5.2 The Spread Effect 
Spread widening/tightening may offset the investment market effect 
results because widening asset spread to Treasuries negatively impacts 
portfolio return. The impact of spread changes on portfolio return is 
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recognized in the investment market effect. The impact on the yield 
to maturity is recognized in the spread effect. These effects there-
fore should be viewed together rather than individually. An increase 
in spread translates directly into a like increase in yield which in turn 
translates directly into a like increase in the credited rate. The opposite 
holds for a decrease in spread. Thus 
(27) 
where 
(SP) ( (IX) crl = cr ntVI ,CVI,O,YI - e,do). (28) 
3.5.3 The Investment Manager Effect 
The investment manager effect is designed to show the effect of a 
manager's performance (relative to a benchmark) on the credited rate. 
The manager's relative performance (also called the excess return) is 
RMG - R,x where RMG is the portfolio return. 
We compute the investment manager effect by performing a rate 
reset with a market value calculated using the actual portfolio return. 
In mathematical notation, 
where 
(ntVo + acio)( 1 + RMG) and 
( (MG) d ) cr ntVI ,CVI, 0, YI - e, o. 
(29) 
(30) 
(31) 
This effect can be analyzed in further detail using standard portfo-
lio management attribution techniques. These techniques typically al-
locate the manager's excess return to categories such as duration man-
agement, yield curve management, sector and security selection, and 
other factors relative to the performance benchmark. This analysis can 
be incorporated easily into the credited rate attribution framework by 
applying a factor of (1/ do) to each category in the portfolio attribution 
analysis. For example, if the manager added 15 basis points of return 
through duration management for a five year duration portfolio, the 
credited rate impact would be (15/5 =) 3 basis points. 
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3.5.4 The Time-Weighted Effect 
So far we have used the time-weighted rates of return4 adjusted for 
the impact of actual cash flows for three previous effects (cash flow ef-
fect, the investment market effect, and the investment manager effect). 
As a result, there is a residual effect, which we call the time-weighted 
effect that is given by: 
(32) 
where 
(33) 
3.5.5 The Nonconstant Duration Effect 
The duration of the portfolio at the current reset (time 1) probably 
will change from the duration at the prior reset (time 0). Regardless of 
the reason (rate anticipation strategy, revised client objectives, duration 
drift), duration changes will affect both the portfolio return (investment 
manager effect) and the amortization period. For example, duration 
shortening will accelerate the recognition of any gains or losses.s 
The duration effect is calculated by substituting the actual portfolio 
duration at time 1. In mathematical notation, 
where 
3.6 Other Considerations 
3.6.1 Investment Risks 
(34) 
(35) 
Plan sponsors are accustomed to thinking in terms of investment 
risks including reinvestment risk, credit risk, prepayment risk, liquidity 
risk, and active management risk. These risks are inherent in one or 
more of the four components or effects introduced in Section 2 above. 
In particular, 
4The dollar-weighted return may have been used instead, but it requires more com-
plicated calculations. 
5This effect refers to the end-of-year portfolio duration, not the management of the 
portfolio duration during the year. Duration management has been accounted for in 
the investment manager effect. 
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• Reinvestment risk is captured by the reinvestment effect; 
• Credit risk, i.e., a decline in credit quality, appears as a negative 
impact in the investment market effect and a positive impact in 
the spread effect; 
• Prepayment (extension) risk appears as a negative impact in the 
investment market effect and presumably a positive impact in the 
spread effect. In addition, prepayments (extensions) reduce (in-
crease) duration and thus the amortization period. The direction 
of the impact on the duration effect depends on the ratio of mar-
ket value to book value; 
• The realization of liquidity risk appears as a negative impact in 
the investment market effect and a positive impact in the spread 
effect; and 
• Active management risk affects the investment manager effect. 
3.6.2 Treatment of Cash Flows 
We ignore future cash flow expectations for the current reset, i.e., 
we assume wefI = O. If well does not equal zero, the future cash flow 
assumption will affect the credited rate because it affects the ma.rket-to-
contract value ratio. Positive assumed cash flow increases the credited 
rate when market value is less than book value. Negative assumed cash 
flow decreases the credited rate when market value is less than book 
value. The effects are reversed in a situation where market value is 
above contract value. 
Though cash flow is not a significant element for most contracts, 
some contracts have significant and frequent cash flows. For these 
contracts cash flows can be handled more precisely by using dollar-
weighted portfolio returns instead of time-weighted portfolio returns. 
Using dollar-weighted returns will eliminate the time-weighted effect 
described in Section 3.5.4. Otherwise, the change in credited rate may 
be incorrectly allocated between the cash flow effect, the investment 
market effect, and the investment manager effect. The allocation prob-
lem concerns the timing of any market or manager outperformance 
during the reset period. 
3.6.3 Participant Equity 
The smoothing mechanism raises the issue of equity among plan 
participants. For instance, when the market value is below contact 
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value, Le., mvt < CVt, the credited rate will be lower than current the 
market yield, Le., crt < Yt as indicated by equation (2). A participant 
who withdraws funds at contract value causes the portfolio to realize 
a market value loss. As the remaining participants participate in the 
experience of the portfolio, they will be hurt by the withdrawal in the 
form of lower future credited rates. 
The participant equity issue is inherent in any blended rate stable 
value plan. The extent of the participant equity issue depends on the 
overall plan design and operation, not just the characteristics of one 
of the plan's investments. By helping plan sponsors to better under-
stand the behavior of one possible investment (the participating GIC), 
the attribution methodology can help plan sponsors better address the 
equity issue. 
4 Two Examples 
4.1 Example 1: Prior Reset Assumptions Realized 
4.1.1 Prior Reset Assumptions 
These assumptions were made one year ago (Le., at time t = 0), the 
last time the credited interest rate was reset: 
• The portfolio had a 2.1% market value loss. This implies that 
mvo = (1 - 0.021) x CVo = 97.9% of CVo; 
• mvo = 93.0 and CVo = 95.0; 
• A $5 cash flow expected at t = 0.5, Le., wefo = 5.0; 
• Cash flows are not time-weighted; 
• The portfolio net yield will be Yo - e = 8%; 
• Interest rates will remain unchanged; and 
• On average, funds are to mature in four years, making do = 4. 
From equation (2) we have 
cro ( 93.0 + 5.0) 1/4 x (1 + 0.08) _ 1 95.0 + 5.0 
0.0746. 
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4.1.2 Actual Activity Since Prior Reset 
As we prepare to reset the interest rate today (Le., at time t = 1), we 
must review the actual performance of the contract. For this example, 
let us assume all prior reset assumptions were realized, meaning: 
• Actual cash flow of $5 at t = 0.5; 
• No change in interest rates; 
• The portfolio actually returned a net yield of 8%; and 
• On average, funds are now expected to mature in three years, mak-
ing the duration d 1 = do - 1 = 3. 
4.1.3 The Calculations 
Once the assumptions are exactly realized, the credited rate must 
be equal to the constant duration credited rate, Le., 
cr - cr(CD) 1 - 1 
So, using equations (7) and (8) we see that: 
Equation (9) gives 
105.84 from equation (7); 
107.46 from equation (8); and 
Yo - e = 8%. 
crl = cr(105.84, 107.46,0,8%,3) = 7.46%. 
As the assumptions were exactly realized, it is not surprising that 
the credited rate is unchanged from the initial credited rate established 
at time O. 
4.2 Example 2: Prior Reset Assumptions Not Realized 
In developing this example, we use the same set of prior reset as-
sumptions that are described in Section 4.1.1. As a result cro = 7.46% 
as before. 
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4.2.1 Actual Activity Since Last Reset 
As we prepare to reset the interest rate today, the actual activities 
since last reset are listed below: 
• Interest rates (using Treasuries as a proxy) declined 1% from time 
o to time 1. Specifically, Treasury rates were To = 7.50%, To.s = 
7.00%, Tl = 6.50%, and fay = 7.00%; 
• The only actual cash flow received was $15 (acfo = 15) immedi-
ately following the prior reset at time 0;6 
• R,x = 0.11, i.e., the index returned 11% from time 0 to time 1 (net 
of fees e)/ 
• The manager returned 11.50% from time 0 to time 1 (net of con-
tract fees e), i.e., RMG = 11.5%. (The manager outperformed the 
index by 50 basis points); 
• The portfolio duration at time 1 is 4.25 years, i.e., d 1 = 4.25. In 
other words, the portfolio lengthened by 1/4 year; 
• The actual portfolio net yield at time 1 is 7.10%, i.e., 
Yl - e = 7.10%;8 
This gives 
rnvl (93 + 15) x 1.115 = 120.50 
CVl (95 + 15) x 1.0746 = 118.21 and 
en cr(120.50, 118.21,0,7.10%,4.25) = 7.58%. 
4.2.2 The Component Effects 
Constant Duration Effect: From equation (6), 
rnv(CD) 
1 
CV(CD) 
1 
cr(CD) 
1 
(93 + 5) x 1.08 = 105.84 
(95 + 15) x 1.0746 = 107.46 
cr(l05.84, 107.46,0,8%,4) = 7.59% 
6The additional cash flow was received while the contract was in deficit (market 
value below contract value). This unexpected cash flow reduced the deficit and thus 
increased the credited rate. The subsequent fall in interest rates during the year has 
been captured in the reinvestment effect. 
7The index returned 58 basis points less than the Treasury-plus-spread bogey. 
8Thus, yields fell 90 basis points (from 8% to 7.10%) from time 0 to time 1 while 
interest rates fell 100 basis points. In other words, spreads increased 10 basis points. 
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giving 
t.,.cr~CD) = 7.59% - 7.46% = 0.13%. 
Reinvestment Effect: From equation (12), rex = 7.47, so RRI can be 
calculated from equation (11) to give RRI = 11.47%. This rate ignores the 
effect of spread, credit, and prepayment factors. Thus, from equations 
(14), (15) and (16), we have 
giving 
(93 + 5) x (1 + 0.1147) = 109.24 
Yo - e + Tl - rex = 7.03% 
cr(109.24, 107.46,0, 7.03%,4) = 7.47% 
t.,.cr~RI) = 7.47% - 7.59% = -0.12%. 
Cash Flow Effect: To isolate the effect of cash flows we adjust the 
mv and cv terms for the amount and timing of actual cash flow, acfo. 
As there was only one cash flow and it occurred at time 0, then rae = 
To = 7.5%. Accounting for unexpected cash flow, the portfolio returned 
11.58%, Le., RCF = 0.1158 (after using equation (17)). 
giving 
(CF) 
mv1 
cviCF) 
crfF) 
(93.0 + 15.0) x (1 + 0.1158) = 120.51 
CVl = 118.21 
cr(120.51, 118.21,0,7.03%,4) = 7.55% 
t.,.cr~CF) = 7.55% - 7.47% = 0.08%. 
Investment Market Effect: Using equations (2), (25) and (26) to get: 
giving 
(93.0 + 15.0) x (1 + 0.11) = 119.88 
cr(119.88, 118.21,0,7.03%,4) = 7.41% 
t.,.crgM) = 7.41% - 7.59% = -0.14%. 
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Spread Effect: Using equation (2B) we find: 
cr?P) = cr(l19.BB, 11B.21, 0,7.10%,4) = 7.4B% 
giving 
6.cr6SP) ~ 7.4B% - 7.41% = 0.07%. 
Investment Manager Effect: Using equations (30) and (31), we find: 
giving 
(93.0 + 15.0) x (1 + 0.115) = 120.42 
cr(120.42, 11B.21, 0,7.10%,4) = 7.60% 
6.cr6MG) = 7.60% - 7.4B% = 0.12%. 
Time-Weighted Effect: Using equations (32) and (33), we find: 
criTW) = cr(l20.42, 11B.21, 0,7.10%,4) = 7.60% 
giving 
6.cr6TW) = 7.60% - 7.60% = 0.00%. 
Note that the time-weighted return equals the dollar weighted return 
since the only cash flow occurs at time O. 
Duration Effect: Using equations (34) and (35) we find: 
criND) = cr(l20.42, 11B.21, 0, 7.10%,4.25) = 7.57% 
giving 
6.crtD) = 7.57% - 7.60% = -0.03%. 
4.3 Summary of Attribution 
The credited interest rate in our example changed from 7.46 per-
cent to 7.57 percent, a net increase of 11 basis points in a declining 
interest rate environment. The credited rate benefited from the amor-
tization of a previous market value loss, unexpected cash flow when 
market rates were favorable, manager outperformance, and widening 
spreads. Adverse factors included a declining interest rate environ-
ment, a longer portfolio duration, and underperformance by the port-
folio's investment universe relative to initial assumptions. 
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Table Al 
Summary of Components 
Prior Credited Rate 
1. Constant Duration Effect 
2. Reinvestment Effect 
3. Cash Flow Effect 
4. Investment Effects 
New Credited Rate 
5 Conclusion 
A. Investment Market 
B. Spread 
C. Investment Manager 
D. Time-Weighted 
E. Duration 
Total 
7.46% 
+0.l3% 
-0.12% 
+0.08% 
-0.14% 
+0.07% 
+0.12% 
0.00% 
-0.03% 
+0.02% +0.02% 
7.57% 
The increasing use of participating GICs within GIC/stable value 
portfolios has created a need for objective measures of performance 
attribution. When a credited rate is reset, providers should expect to 
provide detailed attribution analyses that explain how the new credited 
rate was derived. 
Current explanations discuss, in general terms, such concepts as is-
sue selection and yield curve positioning. These explanations ignore, 
however, other important concepts such as product design (constant 
duration effect), credited rate responsiveness (reinvestment effect), cash 
flows (cash flow effect), initial return assumption (investment market 
effect), and amortization period (duration effect). We have presented a 
framework to explain the performance of participating GICs by isolat-
ing the effects of all relevant factors. 
Our approach analyzes these effects in static fashion and in a partic-
ular order. We recognize that in actuality these components are likely 
to affect performance in a dynamic way. 
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meet liabilities. The traditional risk/reward framework of financial economics 
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1 Historical Overview 
Both financial economists and actuaries have been involved in the 
development of quantitative asset allocation techniques for many years. 
The two major asset allocation techniques examined are immunization 
and mean/variance analysis. 
1.1 Immunization 
In 1952 Redington introduced the theory of immunization. Since 
then, the theory of immunization has had a profound influence on 
the way actuaries approach the valuation of insurance companies and 
their assessment of solvency. As a practical asset/liability management 
(ALM) model for insurance companies, immunization has had little com-
petition to date. Tilley (1988) remarked that "a whole investment advi-
sory business has grown up in the United States around immunization 
concepts." 
The idea of equating the duration l of assets with the duration of 
liabilities has been used widely by insurance companies worldwide. Re-
cently the notion of convexity (which is similar to duration, but with 
second derivatives replacing first derivatives) has given immunization 
new life. But immunization does have its limitations: (i) it has little rel-
evance to interest-sensitive and performance-linked products; and (ii) 
immunization immunizes against profits as well as against loss. 
Redington's ideas today may be viewed as the classical actuarial ap-
proach to ALM. The success of the Redington model as an accepted 
ALM tool lies in its relative simplicity and the ease with which the cal-
culations necessary to test immunization can be made. As Buff (1989) 
states "if you can't compute it, you can't compute it." It is not possible to 
use theoretical advances unless it is feasible to execute the calculations 
necessary in these advances. 
Actuarial research into ALM modeling was muted for many years 
after Redington, but the actuarial profession recently has found a new 
interest in the subject. Some of the most interesting work has been in 
the United Kingdom where pioneering stochastic investment modeling 
has been done by Wilkie (1986). The focus of the U.K. work, however, 
is in the area of solvency testing. See Hardy (1993) for an excellent 
example of the usage of stochastic modeling in assessing solvency. 
A new concept is beginning to appear in the ALM literature in the U.S. 
concerning solvency in connection with ALM; this is the idea that ALM 
1 Duration of a financial instrument is a measure of its sensitivity to interest rates 
at various points on the yield curve. 
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focuses on asset/liability surplus management (ALSM). ALSM refers to 
ALM that focuses on the NAIC risk-based capital standards. These stan-
dards require certain minimum surplus amounts to be maintained in 
respect of various classifications of risk. An ALSM model might assess 
how well the required minimum surplus levels are likely to hold us-
ing the potential investment strategies under consideration. Hepokoski 
(1994) gives an excellent introduction to ALSM as an extension of ALM. 
In practice, an asset allocation model might view the risk-based capital 
standards as constraints rather than defining risk purely in terms of 
those standards. 
1.2 Mean/Variance Analysis 
The same year that Redington published his ideas on immunization, 
one of the most important papers of modern financial economics also 
was published. In 1952 Markowitz introduced the idea of asset alloca-
tion within a risk/reward tradeoff framework. 
Markowitz notes that a reduction in risk, measured by the standard 
deviation of return on assets, could be achieved by diversification (into 
assets whose returns are uncorrelated) without any reduction in return. 
Markowitz also introduced the idea of an efficient frontier, which is a 
curve joining the risk/reward combinations of asset mixes that give the 
highest reward for any given level of risk. 
At the time the financial world was not ready for the concept of 
an efficient frontier-to return to Buff's truism, computer power had 
not reached the stage where Markowitz's ideas could be implemented. 
A practical adaptation of these ideas had to wait over a decade, when 
Sharpe (1963) introduced the diagonal model that suggests that the fu-
ture price of a security depends on its alpha, the market return through 
its beta, and a random error term, the values based on simple linear re-
gression on historical data. This marked the birth of the now widely 
used capital asset pricing model. 
Sharpe (1970) suggests that mean and variance alone "may suppress 
too much reality" and that a different utility curve may be needed to 
compare different portfolios of different riskiness. Risk is not neces-
sarily the same for all investors; in Arthur's words (1989), "risk is in the 
eye of the beholder." 
Many of Sharpe's ideas in the area of asset/liability management are 
summarized in Managing Investment Portfolios (1990). In this volume 
he presents the concepts of risk/reward indifference curves and states 
that "the optimal asset mix lies at the point at which an indifference 
curve is tangent to (Le., touches but does not intersect) the curve along 
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which the efficient investment opportunities lie." He also presents a 
complete ALM model for a defined benefit pension scheme in which re-
ward is defined in terms of surplus return (equal to the change in value 
of surplus divided by the initial asset value) and risk is the standard 
deviation of the surplus return. Such a model is close to the model we 
use in this paper. 
1.3 Other Approaches to ALM 
Other variations on the efficient frontier idea experiment with con-
straints that can be used to narrow acceptable portfolio mixes on the 
efficient frontier. They also attempt to be dynamic in the sense that ac-
ceptable portfolio mixes change and reflect the particular market con-
ditions present at any particular time. 
A good example of such a model is developed by Leibowitz, Kogel-
man, Bader, and Dravid (1994). Looking at a one year time horizon, 
their model updates the asset allocation strategy whenever interest 
rates move. Their model does not just look at portfolios on the effi-
cient frontier, but also introduces the constraint that portfolios must 
have no more than a specified probability of generating one year returns 
that fall below a certain level. This is incorporated by the introduction 
of a shortfall line, such that all portfolios above the line of constraint 
meet the maximum probability criterion. 
If interest rates fall (with the equity risk premium, stock and bond 
volatilities, and stock/bond correlations all held constant) the entire 
risk/reward curve will shift down, decreasing the expected returns of 
all potential portfolio mixes. With the shortfall line unchanged, mar-
ket conditions make all portfolios riskier in shortfall terms, and few 
portfolios will fall above the shortfall line. This requires revision of the 
bond/equity mixes previously deemed acceptable. 
1.4 Objectives of this Paper 
We will develop a simple model of an insurance company and use 
it to explore some of the basic concepts of ALM. The model is a true 
ALM model where the two sides of an institution's balance sheet are 
considered equally in setting or appraising long-term investment policy. 
The nature of financial risk is briefly explored. Risk is related to 
the chance of not meeting the rate of return that is required to support 
a life insurer's liabilities, rather than the typical risk measures postu-
lated by mean/variance models. A specific measure of risk, based on 
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the probability of continued solvency rather than asset volatility, is in-
troduced. 
The company is assumed to invest only in domestic stocks and long-
dated government bonds. Stochastic simulation is used to create a large 
number of future investment scenarios using historical total return data 
for domestic stocks and long-dated government bonds. The ability of 
the institution to meet its liabilities under each simulated scenario is 
examined for each possible mix of assets and risk characteristic. Thus, 
for each asset mix, the model produces a certain level of risk and a 
certain level of reward. 
We then assess the minimum level of risk for any particular level 
of reward; the asset mix that produces such a level of risk is retained, 
and all such retained risk/reward points are plotted to create an op-
timal risk/reward profile. The paper demonstrates that such optimal 
risk/reward profiles-and hence the optimal asset allocation strategy-
can vary considerably by liability profile. 
2 VVhat is Return? 
Although the meaning of the term return on assets usually can be 
taken for granted in financial modeling-it is based on market value 
changes after allowing for positive and negatiye cash flows-this is not 
the case in an ALM model. This extra consideration arises because def-
initions of return and risk must be consistent. 
In our paper risk is viewed as the ability of the financial institution 
to demonstrate, from time to time, that it is in a financially stable situ-
ation. This requires an assessment of the solvency of the institution by 
comparing the actual value of assets with the value of assets required 
for the institution to meet future liabilities. 
For a U.S. life office a solvency valuation is required by regulation, 
and asset values in such a solvency test are prescribed by state law or 
by the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC). This 
valuation generally requires carrying assets at market values, although 
there are important exceptions such as amply secured bonds not in 
default that are written up or down in order that the value at maturity 
will equal the maturity value. To be consistent with the risk/solvency 
assessment, return must be defined in terms of return on the actuarial 
value of assets as carried in the solvency valuation, and these values 
mayor may not be market values. 
Our highly simplified model office is in a financially unstable condi-
tion if the office becomes insolvent, which will arise if the actual return 
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on assets falls below the expected return on assets used in pricing the 
liabilities. (The expected return is the terms on which the business was 
sold.) In other words, risk is defined in terms of underperforming the 
pricing assumptions over the lifetime of the policies. No reference is 
made to valuation margins and capital (the reserves and, therefore, the 
value of assets required from year to year are based purely on the as-
sumptions used in setting the premium rates), and the values of assets 
are based on market returns. In effect, risk is in terms of actual market 
returns underperforming expected market returns, so both risk and re-
turn need to be defined in terms of market values. The actuarial value 
of assets is defined as the market value of assets. 
In practice, the risk of insolvency should not be judged against pric-
ing assumptions with no valuation margins and no capital; if valuation 
margins and capital were incorporated, it would be more appropriate 
for the risk measures to be based on statutory results rather than sim-
ply on market values. Also, risk ideally should be measured not just by 
the probability of underperforming, but by the amount of underperfor-
mance. 
3 The Model 
There are four important stages in the development and exploration 
of the model: 
• An assessment has to be made of the probability distribution of 
the returns on assets available to the financial institution; 
• An accurate cash flow projection must be made of the future lia-
bility outgo of the financial institution; 
• Using the information about the probability distribution of asset 
returns, large numbers of possible investment scenarios must be 
derived. The performance of the fund in meeting the liabilities 
under each scenario must be examined; and 
• A large number of runs will enable an assessment of how a partic-
ular mix of the various asset classes will meet the liabilities. This 
assessment forms the basis for the construction of a risk/reward 
profile from which possible optimal asset mixes can be considered 
for investment policy. 
The means used to explore the model is via Simulation, where the sim-
ulated variable is the return on assets. Simulation is necessary because 
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a mathematical solution to the model is too complicated. This com-
plication is due not to the intractability of the return on assets, but is 
due to the other variable in the model-the risk variable-which is not 
necessarily a straightforward variable to handle mathematically. Even 
the risk variable that we adopted for this paper, although simple in 
concept, is difficult to express mathematically. More sophisticated def-
initions of risk that also incorporate constraints would pose even more 
of a challenge. 
As a result, the simulation process starts by generating random ob-
servations for the random variable with a known distribution (or at 
least a distribution for which a reasonable assessment can be made) 
that can be used to calculate random observations for the complicated 
random variable. From these observations it is possible to make infer-
ences about the distribution of the complicated variable. 
We assume that the financial institution being assessed is a life office 
that issues a large number of level annual premium whole life policies 
on male lives age 50 at entry, and these policies all begin today. The 
only decrement is mortality, and this is assumed to accord with the 
Society of Actuaries (SOA) 75-80 15 Year Select and Ultimate Table (age 
nearest birthday). All expenses and commissions are assumed to be 
zero. 
Let Ft be the fund at end of policy year t. The model tracks forward 
for each of the years for which the whole life contracts are expected to 
be in force and computes the following for t = 1, 2, ... : 
Ft = (Ft -1 + Pd(1 + i) - Ct(l + £)1/2 (1) 
where 
i Interest rate used to determine the net premium; 
Pt Net premium received at start of policy year t; and 
Ct Aggregate claims in policy year t. 
Claims are assumed to occur on average in the middle of the year. 
Thus, the sequence {Ft } represents the target fund level to which 
the office should strive, based on an investment return equal to that 
assumed in the premium basis. If the actual fund falls persistently 
below this target fund in practice, the office is heading toward financial 
difficulties. It is therefore appropriate to examine the success of any 
particular investment policy in generating a fund size consistently at 
least as great as the target fund. 
Let Nt be the Simulated fund at the end of policy year t, then 
Nt = (Nt-1 + Pd(1 + sd - Cdl + sd 1/2 (2) 
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where St is the simulated annual rate of return in policy year t; and P t 
and Ct are as previously defined. Mathematically, St is defined as the 
weighted average of the simulated annual rates of return from stocks 
and bond, Le., 
St = Pt X Simulated Annual Return on Stocks 
+ (1 - pd x Simulated Annual Return on Bonds (3) 
where Pt is the proportion of assets invested in stocks during policy 
year t. 
Thus, for example, suppose that in year 1 we have the following 
information: 
• There is a mix of 60 percent in stocks and 40 percent in bonds; 
• The annual rates of return on stocks and bonds are 0.1507 and 
-0.0014, respectively; 
• The level net annual premium for a whole life policy covering a 
male age 50, face amount of $1,000, using the SOA 75-8015 Year 
Select and Ultimate Tables and assuming a rate of interest of 6 
percent, is PI = $16.38; and 
• The expected claims cost for year 1 is Cl = 1.7. 
We can determine Fl and Nl as follows: 
Fl = (0 + 16.38) x 1.06 - 1.7 x (1.06)1/2 = $15.61 
PI = 0.6 and 
SI = 0.6 x 0.1507 + 0.4 x -0.0014 = 8.986% 
yielding 
Nl = (0 + 16.38) x (1 + 0.08986) - 1.7 x (1 + 0.08986)1/2 = $16.08. 
As the simulated fund is in excess of the target fund, the office may be 
off to a good start. 
4 The Probability Distribution of Asset Classes 
The most difficult aspect of the construction of the model is deter-
mining the probability distribution of the available asset classes. To 
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avoid complicated analysis, we consider exclusively common stocks 
and long-dated government bonds. In our opinion this is a reasonable 
starting point for any discussion of the basic asset allocation decision 
process for a u.s. financial institution. 
We use the annual total returns for common stocks and long-term 
bonds compiled by Ibbotson Associates of Chicago. The data for these 
returns go back as far as 1926 and are shown in Table l. 
The first, and most critical, step in using this historical data is to 
establish the framework in which the data set can be used as a fore-
casting tool. The objective is to use the historical data as a basis for 
saying something about future returns. This raises three questions: 
• How much emphasis do we place on old data? 
• Do returns move randomly over time? And 
• Is there a relationship between stock and bond returns? 
Indeed, the question of whether the past is any indicator of the future 
is contentious in itself. This last assumption is not justified by either 
intuition or empirical evidence-it is a simplifying assumption for the 
purposes of the example presented in this paper. The decision on how 
to model returns could affect the results of the model materially. 
Considerable evidence exists to justify that stock prices, like bond 
prices, vary inversely with interest rate movements-see Solnik (1983) 
and Peavy (1992) for good discussions on the subject-so that some 
correlation should be recognized between stock and bond returns. In 
order to keep the model Simple and to concentrate on illustrating ideas 
outside those of modeling stock and bond returns, however, we employ 
the assumption that both stock and bond returns move randomly and 
independently of each other. Re-running the model to incorporate an 
approach that correlates successive returns in some fashion or recog-
nizes a relationship between stock and bond returns would introduce 
a major layer of complexity to the modeling process. 
To test the success of a fund in meeting its liabilities using any par-
ticular mix of stocks and bonds (assuming random returns), we derive a 
large number of potential individual investment scenarios by creating 
a set of random rates of return for each year for which the projec-
tion is made, where these random rates of return are based on cumula-
tive probability distributions constructed from the historical data. The 
projection period extends to the year in which all policyholders are ex-
pected to have died, in this case 52 years on the basis of the SOA 75-80 
table for a portfolio comprising excluSively 50 year old males. 
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Table 1 
Annual Returns for Common Stocks 
And Long-Term U.S. Government Bonds 
Year Stocks (%) Bonds (%) Year Stocks (%) Bonds (%) 
1926 11.62 7.77 1959 11.96 2.26 
1927 37.49 8.93 1960 0.47 13.78 
1928 43.61 0.10 1961 26.89 0.97 
1929 (8.42) 3.42 1962 (8.73) 6.89 
1930 (24.90) 4.66 1963 22.80 1.21 
1931 (43.34) (5.31) 1964 16.48 3.51 
1932 (8.19) 16.84 1965 12.45 0.71 
1933 53.99 (0.07) 1966 (10.06) 3.65 
1934 (1.44) 10.03 1967 23.98 (9.18) 
1935 47.67 4.98 1968 11.06 (0.26) 
1936 33.92 7.52 1969 (8.50) (5.07) 
1937 (35.03) 0.23 1970 4.01 12.11 
1938 31.12 5.53 1971 14.31 13.23 
1939 (0.41) 5.94 1972 18.98 5.69 
1940 (9.78) 6.09 1973 (14.66) (1.11) 
1941 (11.59) 0.93 1974 (26.47) 4.35 
1942 20.34 3.22 1975 37.20 9.20 
1943 25.90 2.08 1976 23.84 16.75 
1944 19.75 2.81 1977 (7.18) (0.69) 
1945 36.44 10.73 1978 6.56 (1.18) 
1946 (8.07) (0.10) 1979 18.44 (1.23) 
1947 5.71 (2.62) 1980 32.42 (3.95) 
1948 5.50 3.40 1981 (4.91) 1.86 
1949 18.79 6.45 1982 21.41 40.36 
1950 31.71 0.06 1983 22.51 0.65 
1951 24.02 (3.93) 1984 6.27 15.48 
1952 18.37 1.16 1985 32.16 30.97 
1953 (0.99) 3.64 1986 18.47 24.53 
1954 52.62 7.19 1987 5.23 (2.71) 
1955 31.56 (1.29) 1988 16.81 9.67 
1956 6.58 (5.59) 1989 31.49 18.11 
1957 (10.78) 7.46 1990 (3.17) 6.18 
1958 43.36 (6.09) 1991 30.55 19.30 
1992 7.67 8.05 
Source: Ibbotson, R.G. and Sinquefield, R.A. Stocks, Bonds, Bills and In-
flation, 1993 Yearbook. Chicago, Ill.: Ibbotson Associates, 1993. Used 
with permission. All rights reserved. 
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5 A Note on the Number of Simulations 
We need a sufficiently large number of simulations to ensure that 
a smooth curve can be drawn between any set of risk/reward points 
at a particular interest rate assumption and to accurately estimate the 
probability of insolvency, p. Suppose we perform n simulations and 
X is the number of times insolvency results, then we can estimate the 
probability of insolvency by p = X In. However, to ensure that our 
estimate has a high probability, say 1 - E (for small E > 0), of being 
within, say, a margin of 100()(% of the true value p, we must ensure that 
n satisfies 
Pr[(1- ()()p::::; Xln::::; (1 + ()()p] ;::: 1 - E. 
As n is large, we can appeal to the central limit theorem and show 
that the smallest value of n is given by: 
(4) 
where Zy is the 100(1 - y)% percentage point of the standard normal 
distribution. Suppose p is calculated using n = 1,000 simulations and 
the result is p = 0.1. Then if E = 0.05, equation (4) gives the minimum 
value of ()( = 0.186, derived from 
1000 = C·!6 r C ~.~.1 ) . 
This is not small enough to make a credible graphical presentation of 
a smooth risk profile. For example, if the values of p were plotted, 
a smooth curve (shape) would not be achieved, but a sample of ran-
dom points would result. If 25,000 simulations were used for p = 0.1, 
however, the margin ()( would be 0.037, which is accurate enough for 
graphical purpose. As a result, throughout this paper we use 25,000 
simulations. 
6 The Simulation Process 
The life office's simulation process must be built into its liability 
cash flow framework. This means the target fund needs to be com-
pared with the simulated fund in each year of projection, as derived 
under each simulated investment scenario. The progress of the tar-
get and simulated funds is tracked for the full expected future term 
of the business in force. This is repeated for various simulated stock 
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and bond returns-as discussed in Section 5, the model has been run 
using 25,000 simulations-using all possible combinations of stocks 
and bonds in steps of 1 percent and using liability profiles based on 
actuarial interest rate assumptions of 0 percent, 2 percent, 4 percent, 
6 percent, and 8 percent. 
For each simulated investment scenario, the internal rate of return 
for each mix of stocks and bonds is calculated as: [ ll/n rn = fl (1 + sd - 1 (5) 
where n is the projection period (in years). This return (rn ) is aver-
aged over the 25,000 simulated scenarios to derive an expected rate of 
return on the fund for any particular mix of stocks and bonds. This 
expected rate remains the same regardless of the liability profile under 
consideration. 
The next step is to determine how risk should be specified within 
the framework of the cash flow projections for any particular liability 
profile. This assessment is critical to the modeling process. For the pur-
poses of this paper, our measure of risk is defined as the probability of 
the simulated fund being less than the target fund for three consecutive 
years during the full projection period. A three year period (rather than 
a one year time horizon) is chosen on the premise that if the fund has 
gone this amount of time in an unbalanced financial position, it may 
have long-term financial problems. 
This definition of risk is a convenient way of assessing the real risk 
in the example used (the real risk is underperforming the pricing as-
sumptions over the lifetime of the policies) because of the way in which 
solvency is defined (Le., in terms of market value of assets versus liabil-
ities valued on the basis of original pricing assumptions). This would 
not be the case in a more sophisticated model that incorporates val-
uation margins and capital in its computations. In such instances an 
alternative measure of underperformance against pricing assumptions 
may be more satisfactory, with the risk of insolvency incorporated as a 
constraint. In addition, risk should be measured not just by the prob-
ability of underperforming, but by the amount of underperformance. 
We now formally define our measure of risk, R, algebraically as fol-
lows: For t = 3,4, ... , n, let 
{
I if Nt-k < Ft-k for k = 0,1,2; and 
Rt = 0 otherwise. 
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R is now given as: 
n 
R = Pr[U{R t = I}]. (6) 
t=3 
The measure of risk for any particular mix of stocks and bonds is the 
sum of all values of R over the 25,000 simulations, divided by 25,000 
to give an average probability of insolvency. 
7 The Monte Carlo Sampling Method Used 
In order to use Monte Carlo simulation, we first need to specify a 
distribution function of asset returns. In our case this function is an 
empirical function. If the rate of return on a particular asset class is 
defined as a random variable, S, then the empirical probability distri-
bution function (pdf), f(s) and the empirical cumulative probability 
distribution (cdf), F(s), of S must be determined. 
Suppose we have data on S and we construct a relative frequency his-
togram with m (a positive integer) distinct intervals such that a return of 
Sk-l < S s Sk occurs with relative frequency fk :2: 0, for k = 1,2, ... , m 
with Ir fk = 1. FollOwing Hogg and Klugman (1984, Chapter 3), we 
can construct a continuous cdf using a piecewise linear approximation. 
First we choose a sequence of points {Ck} such that Sk-l < Ck < Sk for 
k = 1,2, ... , m - 1, and Co = So and Cm = Sm. The CkS do not have to be 
equidistant. It can easily be verified that the cdf is given by 
o 
(5 - CO)!l / (Cl - Co) 
(5 - cm-dfm/(Cm - cm-d + I}:l l fj 
1 
for 5 < Co 
Co S 5 S Cl 
Cm-l S 5 S Cm 
5> Cm. 
(7) 
Having defined the cumulative distribution function of S, it is now 
possible to demonstrate how the random variable S is simulated (Le., 
how samples of the observation of the variable S are generated). Let U 
be a uniform distribution on [0,1]. The standard approach to gener-
ating a random variable S is as follows (see, for example, Bratley, Fox, 
and Schrage (1983, Chapter 5.2.2)): Suppose Ui is a random observa-
tion from U. We must determine the Cj be such that Cj S Ui S Cj+l. It 
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follows that the corresponding observation from S is Si where 
S' _ [F(cj+r) - Uil x Cj + [Ui - F(cj)] X Cj+l (8) 
t - F(cj+r) - F(cj) . 
Table 2 shows the cumulative distributions for the two asset classes 
(common stocks and long-term bonds) used in the model. Table 2 is 
derived from the basic data of Table 1. 
Table 2 
Empirical Cumulative Distributions Functions 
Common Stocks Long-Term Bonds 
k Ck F(Ck) Ck F(Ck) 
0 -45 0.00% -10 0.00% 
1 -40 1.49% -5 7.46% 
2 -35 2.99% 0 26.87% 
3 -30 2.99% 5 58.21% 
4 -25 4.48% 10 80.60% 
5 -20 5.97% 15 88.06% 
6 -15 5.97% 20 95.52% 
7 -10 11.94% 25 97.01% 
8 -5 22.39% 30 97.01% 
9 0 29.85% 35 98.51% 
10 5 32.84% 40 98.51% 
11 10 43.28% 45 100.00% 
12 15 50.75% 
13 20 62.69% 
14 25 73.13% 
15 30 76.12% 
16 35 88.06% 
17 40 92.54% 
18 45 95.52% 
19 50 97.01% 
20 55 100.00% 
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8 Results of the Simulation 
The results for each liability profile under consideration (Le., for 
each rate of interest assumption) using various combinations of stocks 
and bonds are summarized in Figure 1. In particular, Figure 1 shows 
the optimal risk/reward points for various possible combinations of 
stocks and bonds under the various interest rate assumptions used in 
pricing the underlying liabilities. A curve is drawn through the points 
to create a risk/reward profile for each rate of interest. All points on 
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any line to the left of the minimum risk point can be ignored, because 
it is possible to achieve simultaneously a higher return and a lower risk 
by altering the mix of stocks and bonds. 
The point at which the minimum level of risk is achieved depends 
on the liability structure under consideration (Le., assumed interest rate 
used for pricing). At a rate of interest of 2 percent the minimum risk is 
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achieved where 32 percent of the fund is held in stocks and 68 percent 
of the fund is held in bonds. This minimum risk point shifts toward 
a heavier weighting in stocks as the rate of interest rises; at high rates 
of interest the minimum risk point is not achieved until 100 percent is 
held in stocks. 
Our results are intuitive, Le., if there is a high minimum guarantee, 
the office will be driven to more volatile assets (with higher potential 
upside and downside) because they are the only assets with a chance 
of outperforming the guarantee. An easy target is associated with a 
conservative strategy, and a difficult target is associated with a not-so-
conservative strategy. Although the not-so-conservative strategy often 
will miss the difficult target, it nevertheless has a higher probability of 
exceeding the target than a more conservative strategy that never hits 
the target. On the other hand, if a company is adequately capitalized, 
a 2 percent minimum guarantee will not result in a low stock holding. 
Further, there is a business risk associated with not being able to offer 
competitive guarantees. 
The curves based on the low rate of interest assumptions look like 
traditional efficient frontiers. This is not surprising. At relatively low 
rates of interest the nature of the liabilities becomes relatively unimpor-
tant, so the model reverts to the conventional asset-only model. But at 
relatively high rates of interest the concept of an efficient frontier col-
lapses, and at a rate of interest of 10 percent there is only one efficient 
point (where 100 percent is held in stocks). 
In practice the efficient frontier may be of limited use, because a 
life office may be required to hold certain asset categories. For exam-
ple, there may be an investment policy constraint within the office that 
at least 50 percent of the portfolio must be held in long-term bonds. 
Moreover, in many countries there are legal restrictions on the extent to 
which certain categories of asset may be held by life offices. Thus, this 
paper does not concentrate on analyzing the efficient combinations of 
the various asset classes. 
The final part of the exercise is to determine an acceptable level 
of risk; having decided this, it is possible to derive a uniquely defined 
optimal asset mix. For example, for the fund that has used a rate of 
interest assumption of 2 percent in its pricing assumptions, it may be 
appropriate to go 100 percent into stocks (and therefore go for the 
maximum possible return) if a probability of insolvency level of around 
30 percent were deemed acceptable. 
Setting an acceptable level of risk is a largely subjective decision, 
and in practice the usefulness of this model is in assessing the relative 
riskiness of various portfolio mixes rather than in making any sense of 
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the absolute values generated for the risk and reward of any particular 
investment policy in isolation. The absolute values for the probability 
of insolvency in the model look extremely high across the board, the 
result of the relatively large probability of a market crash in anyone 
investment scenario. See Hardy (1993) for similar findings when using 
a stochastic model. 
A highly artificial liability profile is being considered, and the fact 
that the results drive toward a higher stock allocation than most com-
panies hold in practice indicate the failings of the simplified model. A 
significant shortfall of the model is that the RBC implications of any 
particular asset allocation recommendation have not been considered; 
in practice, this would be a major constraint on the asset allocation 
decision. 
Because the example in this paper has been highly simplified, the 
liability structure is expressed entirely in terms of a pricing interest 
rate. Similar efficient frontiers could be created by merely comparing 
the simulated portfolio returns to the 0 percent to 8 percent pricing 
rates. 
Finally, the complete asset allocation model should incorporate the 
full range of assets available to the financial institution, which for a 
life office should include cash, property, and overseas stock and bond 
investment in addition to domestic stocks and bonds. 
9 Summary and Conclusion 
This paper describes an approach to asset allocation modeling for 
institutions that invest to meet liabilities. The model is consistent with 
conventional financial economics. Traditional risk/reward profiles be-
come apparent where the nature of the liabilities is not considered or 
is relatively unimportant, but such traditional risk/reward profiles may 
or may not become apparent once the nature of the liabilities is intro-
duced. Thus, the traditional ideas of financial economics have been 
shown to be a special case of the more general asset allocation system 
using a true ALM model. 
We have concentrated exclUSively on the applications of an ALM 
model in the context of a highly simplified life office issuing purely 
nonparticipating whole life assurance. The principles can be applied 
equally, however, to any financial institution that is concerned with in-
vesting to meet liabilities. 
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The critical element of the model is the definition of risk. It is not 
important that risk is taken as some measure of exposure to insolvency, 
but that it incorporates the liabilities. 
Refinement of the model to incorporate the features of participating 
business should not be problematic; this would be akin to lowering the 
rate of interest assumption used in pricing the liabilities which implic-
itly means a general reduction in the risk profile and, hence, potentially 
greater freedom in investment policy. 
The application of our model to a pension fund poses some interest-
ing issues, although these issues are specific to the particular country 
under consideration. Although it is recognized that pension funds can 
overcome deficit situations by increasing contribution rates from time 
to time, pension fund trustees may be interested in knowing whether a 
particular investment policy is more likely to lead to persistent deficits. 
Alternatively, if a primary objective of pension fund investment policy 
is to avoid unduly fluctuating contribution rates, then the ALM model 
could use a refined definition of risk (say, the probability of the fund 
falling outside a certain surplus or deficit range). 
Incorporating the inflationary aspects of a pension fund model is 
problematic. Possible approaches include linking inflation to the yield 
curve or stochastically modeling inflation as an independent variable. 
It is not obvious which of the two approaches may be more appropriate; 
perhaps, given the major uncertainties associated with inflation, there 
is no definitive model. Some innovative research in this area has been 
done by Wilkie (1986). 
There remains much exciting assetjliability modeling work to be 
done. Dramatic developments can be expected as microcomputer pro-
cessing power becomes more widely appreciated and makes the type 
of stochastic model described in this paper a standard tool of financial 
analysis. 
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Introduction 
Asset allocation decisions are often reached through a three-step 
process: first, the risk and return characteristics of available and rele-
vant investment opportunities are identified; second, the investor's risk 
tolerances or expected returns are parameterized; and finally, the risk-
return trade-offs of the investor are combined with those observed in 
the market to produce an optimal asset allocation. A frequently used 
tool for asset allocation problems is the mean-variance optimization 
technique developed by Markowitz (1952). 
Mean-variance optimization refers to a mathematical process to de-
termine the security (or asset class) weights that provide a portfolio 
with the minimum risk for a given expected return or, conversely, the 
maximum expected return for a given level of risk. The inputs needed 
to conduct mean-variance optimization are security expected returns, 
expected standard deviations, and expected cross-security correlation. 
The Markowitz model has been one of the methods widely used by insti-
tutional investors, retail brokerage houses, and pension fund managers. 
Another type of asset allocation strategy is dynamic asset allocation, 
which continually adjusts a portfolio's allocation in response to chang-
ing market conditions. The most popular use of these strategies is 
portfolio insurance, which attempts to remove the downside risk faced 
by a portfolio. A popular means of implementing portfolio insurance 
is to engage in a series of transactions that give the portfolio the return 
distribution of a call option. Black and Scholes (1973) show that under 
certain assumptions, the payoff of an option can be duplicated through 
a continuously revised combination of the underlying asset and a risk-
free bond. Rubenstein and Leland (1981) extend this insight by showing 
that a dynamic strategy that increases the stock allocation of a portfolio 
in rising markets and reinvested the remaining portion in cash would 
replicate the payoffs to a call option on an index of stocks. 
Portfolio insurance concentrates on only two assets, both of which 
are carefully predetermined. To the extent that its assumptions about 
the behavior of uninsured investors turn out to be less than 100% cor-
rect, however, the increasing volatility of risky assets could drive in-
sured portfolios to sell or buy even more aggressively than they would 
have in the first place; see Sharpe (1992). 
On the other hand, tactical asset allocation (active asset allocation) is 
the process of diverging from the strategic asset allocation when an in-
vestor's short-term forecasts deviate from the long-term forecasts used 
to formulate the strategic allocation. If the investor can make accurate 
short-term forecasts, tactical asset allocation has the potential to en-
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hance returns. In practice, tactical asset allocators are the investors 
providing portfolio insurance; see Sharp and Perrold (1988). 
In this study, instead of the traditional mean-variance approach, we 
describe the uncertainty of the rate of return by a triangular possibilis-
tic distribution. A possibilistic linear programming model (see, Lai and 
Hwang (1992, Chapter 5)) is formulated and then solved by introducing 
two control constraints to the auxiliary multi-objective linear program-
ming model. By selecting different values for the parameters in control 
constraints, our method can be applied in solving the following prob-
lems: 
• Maximizing the most possible return and minimizing the risk of 
obtaining lower return as well as maximizing the possibility of 
obtaining higher return. 
• Minimizing the risk of obtaining lower return and maximizing the 
possibility of obtaining higher return for a specified most possible 
return. 
• Maximizing the most possible return and maximizing the possi-
bility of obtaining higher return for a given risk tolerance. 
2 Models 
Let us consider the problem of allocating capital C among Nasset 
classes, S 1, S2, ... , S N. In the mean-variance optimization method [Fong 
and Fabozzi (1992)], the rate of return, Ri, of asset Si is assumed to 
be a random variable with Ili and (Tj. denoting the mean and standard 
deviation, respectively, of Ri for i = 1,2, ... , N, and Pij denoting the 
correlation between Ri and Rj for i,j = 1,2, ... ,N. 
If the N assets are combined linearly to form a portfolio, where the 
allocation weight, Xi, for asset class Si, is equal to the dollar value of 
the asset class relative to the dollar value of the portfolio, then the rate 
of return of the portfolio is 
N 
Rp = I XiRi 
i= 1 
which is also a random variable. The expected return of the portfolio 
is 
N 
IIp = I Xilli 
i=l 
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and the variance of the portfolio is 
N N 
O"~ = I I XiXjO"iG"jpij. 
i=lj=l 
2.1 Mean-Variance Analysis 
The mean-variance method for determining weights Xl, X2, ... , XN is 
to fix the expected portfolio return J-lp to a desirable level J-l and deter-
mine the allocation weights Xl, X2, ... ,XN that minimize the risk level 
O"J of the portfolio for the fixed J-l. The following quadratic program-
ming model (1) is employed to accomplish this goal: 
Modell: 
min 
subject to 
N 
0"2- " P - L. 
i,j=l 
i=l 
N 
I Xi = 1 
i=l 
li :::; Xi :::; J-li, i = 1,2, ... , N 
where li is the lower bound and Ui is the upper bound on funds allo-
cated to the i-th asset class, i = 1,2, ... , N. 
An equivalent approach is to fix the risk level O"J of a portfolio to 
a tolerable level 0"2 and determine the weights XI. X2, ... , XN that maxi-
mize the expected portfolio return J-lp for the fixed 0"2. The following 
quadratic programming model (2) is employed to accomplish this goal: 
Model 2: 
max 
subject to 
N 
J-lp = I XiJ-li 
i=l 
N I XiXjO"iO"jPij = 0"2 
i,j=l 
N 
I Xi = 1 
i=l 
li:::;Xi:::;J-li, i= 1,2, ... ,N. 
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2.2 Mean-Variance-Skewness Analysis 
The mean-variance method, which does not consider the skewness 
of the return random variable Rp , is frequently used in practice for 
asset allocation. In a continuous time model with asset prices follow-
ing a diffusion process, Ito's differentiation rule l implies the higher 
moments are irrelevant to asset allocation decisions. In this case, the 
mean-variance method provides optimal portfolio selection. In a dis-
crete model, however, Samuelson (1970) shows that the mean-variance 
efficiency becomes inadequate and the higher moments become rele-
vant to the portfolio selection. 
It has been shown empirically by Simkowitz and Beedles (1978) and 
Singleton and Wingender (1986) that stock return distributions are of-
ten positively skewed. Under asymmetrically distributed asset returns, 
it is important to take skewness into consideration in discrete models 
of portfolio selection. Arditti and Levy (1975) have illustrated the im-
portant role of skewness in the pricing of stocks. As shown by Arditti 
(1967), the investor's preference for more skewness is consistent with 
the notion of decreasing absolute risk aversion, because a positive-
skewness asset return refers to a right-hand elongated tail of density 
function of asset return. 
If the skewness of Rp, defined as E[ (Rp _/1p)3] / uJ, is incorporated 
in the mean-variance method, model (1) then becomes a multiple ob-
jective nonlinear programming model: 
Model 3: 
N 
min u~ = L XiXjUiO"jPU 
max 
subject to 
i,j=l 
E[(Rp _/1p)3]/UJ 
N 
L Xi/1i = /1 
i=l 
1 Ito's differentiation rule states that if I = I (X, t) and X follows 
dX = adt + (TdW. 
Then di can be written: 
1 2 di = [aIx + 2(T Ixx + Itl dt + (T Ix dW. 
See Shimko (1992). 
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N 
LXi = 1 
i=l 
li ::; xi ::; J.li i = 1,2, ... , N 
while model (2) becomes the following: 
Model 4: 
where 
max 
max 
subject to 
N 
J.lp = L XiJ.li 
i=l 
E[(R p - J.lp)3]/O'J 
N L XiXjO'iO'jPij = 0'2 
i,j=l 
N 
LXi = 1 
i=l 
li::;Xi::;J.li, i=I,2, ... ,N 
N 
E[(Rp - J.lp)3] = L XiXjXkO'ijk 
i,j,k=l 
and O'ijk is defined as 
The skewness of a portfolio of securities is not simply a weighted 
average of the skewness of the component securities. Like variance, it 
depends on the joint movement of securities. This means that to mea-
sure the skewness on a portfolio, a great number of estimates of joint 
movement must be made. As indicated by Elton and Gruber (1995), 
for these estimates to be feasible, it requires the type of single indexed 
model or multiple indexed model development to calculate the corre-
lation structure of security returns and some simple techniques for de-
termining the three dimensional efficient frontier. This developmental 
work has not been done. 
In this paper, instead of dealing with models (3) or (4) directly, we 
present a possibilistic linear programming model to implement the 
idea of maximizing the expected return, minimizing the risk, and max-
imize skewness simultaneously without estimating the third moments 
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of securities. Possibility theory studies primarily imprecise phenom-
ena. Possibilistic decision making models handle practical decision 
making problems where input data are imprecise. Applications of pos-
sibility theory to linear programming problems with imprecise coeffi-
cients have been discussed by Lai and Hwang (1992). 
3 The Possibilistic Model 
The possibility distribution TTX of an event X states the degree pos-
sibility of the occurrence of the event. To illustrate the difference 
between the possibility distribution and the probability distribution, 
we consider the following simple example due to Zadeh (1978, p. 8): 
Consider the statement "Hans ate X eggs for breakfast," where X = 
{I, 2, ... }. A possibility distribution as well as a probability distribu-
tion may be associated with X. The possibility distribution TTX (u) can 
be interpreted as the degree of ease with which Hans can eat U eggs 
while the probability distribution Px(u) might have been determined 
by observing Hans at breakfast for 100 days. The values of TTX(U) and 
Px(u) might be as shown in the following table: We observe that a 
u 
TTX(U) 
Px(u) 
1 234 5 6 7 8 
1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.4 0.2 
0.1 0.8 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 
high degree of possibility does not imply a high degree of probability. 
If, however, an event is not possible, it is also improbable. Thus, in a 
way the possibility is an upper bound for the probability. For a more 
detailed discussion of possibility theory, readers are referred to Zim-
mermann (1991, Chapter 8) or Dubois and Prade (1988). 
For our model, we use the possibility distribution to describe the un-
certainty of the rate of return. Because uncertainty from the return of 
assets can be regarded as the nature of imprecision, possibility distri-
butions are suitable for characterizing such kinds of uncertainty. More-
over, using the possibility distribution may also reduce the impact of 
the underlying structure of the asset market shifts. 
For the i-th asset Si, i = 1,2, ... , N, we describe the imprecise rate 
of return by i\ = (rf, rt, riO) , where rf, rt, and rt are the most pes-
simistic value, the most possible value, and the most optimistic value 
for the rate of return, respectively. Assume that the imprecise rate of 
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- (p m 0) . h P m ° h h . I . return, n = ri , ri ,ri ,WIt ri < ri < ri , as t e tnangu ar POSSI-
bility distribution TTfi defined as: 
o 
1 
for r < rj or r > riO 
for r = rf 
TTfi (r) = (r - rf)J(rf - rj) for rj ::; r < rf 
and is displayed in Figure 1. 
Figure 1 
The Triangular Possibility Distribution of i\ 
1 
r 
(1) 
As shown in Figure 1, possibility distribution of the rate of return 
describes the possibility degree of occurrence of each possible rate of 
return. For example, if for i-th asset Si, TTfi(0.10) = 0.8, then the pos-
sibility degree of occurrence of n = 10% is 0.8. 
Next, let Xi denote the allocation weight and ri = (r[, rf, rf) denote 
the impreCise rate of return to asset Si for i = 1,2, ... , N. Then the 
imprecise rate of return for the portfolio is 
N 
r = L rixi. 
i~l 
1 
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Linear combinations of triangular possibility distributions are also tri-
angular possibility distribution, and r = (rP, r m , rO) is given by 
N N 
P _ '" P, rm _ '" m , r - L r i Xt , - L r i Xl" 
i,~l i~l 
N 
rO = L r?Xi. 
i~l 
Notice that the triangular possibility distribution ITf for r, as indicated 
by a bold triangle in Figure 2, is determined byrP, r m , and rO according 
to the definition of ITf. 
Figure 2 
The Triangular Possibility Distribution of r 
ITf 
r 
We now select the optimal portfolio that maximizes the portfolio 
return by solving the following possibilistic linear programming model: 
Model 5: 
max 
subject to 
N 
L i\Xi 
i~l 
N 
LXi. = 1 
ii. ::::; Xi. ::::; Ili, i = 1,2, ... , N. 
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4 Solution Procedures 
From Figure 2, we observe that rm has the highest degree of pos-
sibility to be the rate of return for the portfolio; we therefore define 
portfolio return as rm. We also notice that, in Figure 2, the larger the 
area of region (I) is, the more possible it is for the portfolio to obtain 
lower return. As the area of region (I) is (rm - r P )/2, we define port-
folio risk as (rm - r P). Similarly, (rO - rm) / 2 is the area of region (II) 
in Figure 2. Larger values of (rO - rm) /2 indicate higher degrees of 
possibility for the portfolio to reach higher return. We define portfolio 
skewness as (rO - rm). 
In order to maximize the imprecise rate of portfolio return, P, we 
select the optimal portfolio in the sense of maximizing portfolio return, 
minimizing portfolio risk, and maximizing portfolio skewness. There-
fore model (5) can be approximated by the multiple objective linear 
programming model (6): 
Model 6: 
N 
max z(l) = L rixi 
i=l 
N 
min z(2) = L (ri - rj ) Xi 
i=l 
N 
max z(3) = L (rf -ri)xi 
subject to 
i=l 
N 
f31 :s; L rixi :s; f3u 
i.=l 
N 
Yl :s; L (ri - rj ) Xi :s; Yu 
i=l 
N 
LXi = 1 
i=l 
li :s; Xi :s; fJi, i = 1,2, ... , N. 
There are three objectives in model (6): 
• The first objective is to maximize portfolio return; 
• The second objective is minimizing portfolio risk; and 
• The third objective is maximizing portfolio skewness. 
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This strategy is essentially analogous to maximizing mean return, mini-
mizing variance, and maximizing skewness for a random rate of return. 
In Figure 2, the triangle made by the thin lines denotes the optimal tri-
angular possibility distribution for the imprecise rate of return for the 
portfolio. 
4.1 Selecting the Parameters 
Model (6) has two control constrains: 
and 
N 
f31 :s; I rf'Xi :s; f3u. 
i=l 
N 
Yl :s; I (rf' - rf ) Xi :s; Yu.· 
i=l 
By selecting parameters f31 and f3u., the decision makers could use the 
first control constraint to assure portfolio return within the desirable 
range. On the other hand, by selecting parameters Yl and Yu., the sec-
ond control constraint can be used to adjust portfolio risk to a tolerable 
range. In the following, we discuss three special cases for selecting pa-
rameters f31, f3u., Yl, and Yu.· 
Case 1: If we set 
f31 = . min {rf'}, f3u. = . max {rf'}, 
t=1,2, ... ,N t=1,2, ... ,N 
and 
Yl = . min {rf' - rf}, Yu. = . max {rf' - rf}, 
t=1,2, ... ,N t=1,2, ... ,N 
both control constraints become inactive and model (6) is reduced to 
model (7), as proposed by Lia and Hwang (1992): 
Model 7: 
max 
min 
max 
N 
Z(l) = I rf'Xi 
i=l 
N 
z(2) = " (r!"l - r P ) Xi L t I 
i=l 
N 
z(3) = " (r!7 - r!"l ) Xi L t t 
i=l 
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subject to 
N 
LXi = 1 
i=l 
li .:::; Xi .:::; l1i, i = 1,2, ... , N. 
Case 2: If we set {3I = {3u = {3, a constant, 
YL = . min {rf' - r[}, 
1.=1,2, ... ,N 
and 
)lu = . max {rf' - r[}, 
t=1,2, ... ,N 
then the first objective and the second control constraint in model (6) 
become inactive. In this case, model (6) becomes the following: 
Model 8: 
min 
max 
subject to 
i=l 
N 
z(3) = L (rf - rf' ) Xi 
i=l 
N 
L rf'Xi = {3 
i=l 
N 
LXi = 1 
i=l 
li':::;Xi':::;l1i, i=I,2,···,N. 
It is easy to notice the similarity between models (3) and (8). 
Case 3: If we set )II = )lu = )I, a constant, 
{31 = . min {rf'} and (3u = . max {r~m}, 
t=1,2,···,N 1.=1,2,···,N 
then the second objective and the first control constraint in model (6) 
become inactive. In this case, model (6) becomes: 
Model 9: 
N 
max z(1) = L rf'xi 
i=l 
N 
max z(3) = L (rf - rf' ) Xi 
i=l 
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subject to 
i=1 
N 
LXi = 1 
i=1 
li ::;; Xi ::;; Pi, i = 1,2, ... ,N .. 
Notice that model (9) is also analogous to model (4). 
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The selection of parameters Ih /3u, Yl, and Yu may be based on either 
experience or managerial judgment. The examples given in Section 5 
show the significance of our control constraints. 
4.2 The Solution 
In trying to find the solution to model (6), we must remember that 
model (6) has three simultaneous objectives: (0 maximizing portfolio 
return, (ii) maximizing portfolio skewness, and (iii) minimizing portfo-
lio risk. With these multiple conflicting and competing objectives we 
cannot expect to achieve the best values for all objectives simultane-
ously. Therefore trade-offs among conflicting objectives are necessary. 
There are various techniques to handle these trade-offs. Examples 
of such techniques include utility theory, goal programming, fuzzy 
programming, or iterative approaches. In this paper, we use Zimmer-
mann's fuzzy programming method (1978) with a normalization pro-
cess to solve the multiple objective linear programming model (6). 
Let X denote the set of feasible solutions satisfying all the con-
straints in programming model (6). Next, for the objective function 
z(1) defined in model (6), we first calculate 
N 
(1) . "" m zmin = mm L r i Xi 
XEX i=1 
and 
N 
z(1) = max "" ri'"Xj. 
max XEX L 
i=1 
Then we define the linear membership function pz(1) as 
1 if z > Z(1) • 
- max, 
(z - z(l~ )/(z(1) - z(1) ) mtn m.ax mtn if z(l~ < z < Z(1) • mtn max, (2) 
o 'f < (1) 1 Z - Zmin' 
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Now, for the second objective function Z(2) of model (6), we calculate 
N 
(2) . '" (m p) Zmin = rnm L r i - r i Xi 
XEX i=l 
and 
N 
z(2) = max '" (rim - riP. ) Xi. 
max XEX L 
i=l 
The corresponding linear membership function J-lz(2) (z) is: 
1 
1 
z~1x-z(2) 
J-lz(2) (z) = (2) m 
Zmax-Zmin 
o 
if Z < Z(2~ . 
- min' 
'f (2) (2) • 
1 Zmin < Z < Zmax, 
'f (2) 1 Z;:: Zmax, 
Similarly, for the objective function z(3) of model (6), we compute 
N 
(3) ,'" (0 m) Zmi.n = mm L r i - r i Xi 
XEX i=l 
and 
N 
z(3) = max '" (rl~ - rim) Xi 
max XEX L 
i=l 
and the corresponding linear membership function J-lz(3) (z) 
1 
1 
(3) 
Z-Zmin 
J-l z(3) = (3) _ (3) 
Zmax Zmin 
o 
if Z > z(3) . 
- m.ax, 
if Z(3~ < Z < Z(3) , 
min max, 
'f (3) 1 Z::; Zmin' 
Finally, we solve the following max-min problem 
Y = max {min (J-lz(l) (x), J-lz(2) (x), J-lz(3) (x))} 
XEX XEX 
to obtain the optimal allocation weights Xl, X2,.··, XN, 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
By introducing a variable y, equation (5) is then equivalent to a 
single-objective linear programming problem: 
Guo and Huang: Possibilistic Linear Programming 
Model 10: 
max 
subject to 
y 
Ilz(l) (x) ~ y 
Ilz(2) (x) ~ y 
Ilz(3) (x) ~ y 
x EX. 
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The optimal solution of model (10) provides a satisfying solution 
under the strategy of maximizing portfolio return r P , minimizing port-
folio risk (rm - r P ), and maximizing portfolio skewness (rO - rm). 
Our algorithm for asset allocation is now summarized as follows: 
Step 1: For each available asset Si, estimate the most possible return 
rate rt, the most pessimistic return rf, and the most possible 
return rate rio, i = 1,2, ... , N. 
Step 2: Determine the initial values for parameters f31, f3u., )'1, and Yti. 
calculated by: 
f3z = . min {rt}, f3u. = max {r!"'} 
t=I,2,. ..• N i=I,2, ... ,N I. 
and 
. {m p} )'1 = mm r· - r· 
i=I,2,. .. ,N t I. 
)'u. = max {rf - ri}. 
i=I,2,·· ·,N 
The parameters f3z, f3u., ;yz, and )'u. can also be determined by expe-
rience and managerial judgment. 
Step 3: For each objective function z(j) (j = 1,2,3) in model (6), use 
linear programming techniques to find its maximal value z~~x 
and its minimal value z~~n subjected to the four constraints in 
model (6). 
Step 4: Solve the following linear programming model with N + 1 vari-
ables to determine allocation weights Xl, X2, ... ,XN: 
max 
subject to 
y 
N 
L rtxi - (z·~~x - z~~n) y ~ z~;n 
i.=l 
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N 
L (rim - rf)xi + (z~~x - Z~;n) y :$ Z~~x 
i=l 
N 
L (rf - rim)Xi + (Z~~x - Z~;n) y ;:0: Z~;n' 
i=l 
Step 5: For the optimal solution xi, xI, ... ,xtr, calculate 
N N 
(r P )* = L r;xt, 
i=l 
(rm)* = "" r:mx* L t 1 
i=l 
and 
N 
(rO)* = "" rOx*. L t 1 
i=l 
If (rm)* - (r P )* ;:0: ~,where~istherisktolerancebound,then 
decrease the value of )In and goto Step 2; 
Else if (rm) * :$ 11, where 11 is the lower bound for the most possi-
ble rate of return, then increase f3l and goto Step 2; 
else STOP! xi, xI, ... , xtr is the optimal solution. 
5 Numerical Examples 
5.1 Data Used to Construct Examples 
Assume there are six asset classes in the market and the i-th as-
set class has mean and standard deviation of Pi and (Ti respectively, 
i = 1,2, ... ,6. The values of Pi and (Ti are taken from Fong and Fabozzi 
(1992, p. 145) and Lederman and Klein (1994, Chapter 2, p. 27). Next 
d f · P mOb . P 2 m d 0 we e me r i ,ri ,ri y settmg r i = Pi - (Ti, r i = Pi, an r i = 
Pi + 3(Ti, i = 1,2, ... ,6, with some adjustment. Table 1 displays the 
basic data used in the examples. The data are summarized in Table 1. 
Example 1: We solve model (7) by setting f3l = 0.05, f3n = 0.17, YL = 
0.008, and )In = 0.4. (See Case 1 of model (6).) The optimal alloca-
tion weights are Xl = 0.0061, Xz = 0.5, X3 = 0.0354, Xs = 0.4584, and 
(r P , r m , rO) = (-0.0881,0.1078,0.4307). The optimal allocation is al-
most a combination of the second most risky asset and the second most 
conservative asset. 
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Table 1 
Data For Examples 
f..l (J" yP ym yO 
Stock 1 0.17 0.200 -0.230 0.17 0.800 
Stock 2 0.15 0.185 -0.220 0.15 0.750 
Bound 1 0.12 0.055 0.010 0.12 0.270 
Bound 2 0.08 0.050 -0.020 0.08 0.200 
Cash 0.06 0.005 0.050 0.06 0.090 
T-bill 0.05 0.004 0.042 0.05 0.075 
Example 2: We solve model (3.3) by fixing portfolio return at 22 dif-
ferent values. (See Case 2 of model (6).) The computational results are 
summarized in the following Tables 2 and 3. 
The fifth column in Table 3 gives the set {y I Tffi (y) ;::: 0.85}, which 
contains all the possible values of the return rate whose degree of oc-
currence is at least 0.85. This interval is called the acceptable event 
with degree of occurrence at least 0.85. Similarly, the last column in 
Table 3 gives the acceptable event with degree of occurrence at least 
0.95. 
We observe that both portfolio risk (ym -yP) and portfolio skewness 
(yO - ym) increase as portfolio return ym increases, which is consistent 
with the fact that as ym is pushed higher, more weight should be allo-
cated to higher risk assets. We also observe that when ym increases 
gradually, the weights are adjusted gradually, showing that our numer-
ical results are stable. 
Example 3: We solve model (9) by fixing portfolio risk for 22 different 
values. (See Case 3 of model (6).) The computational results are sum-
marized in Tables 4 and 5. 
Example 4: We solve model (6) by adjusting i31 to control portfolio re-
turn. The computational results are summarized in Tables 6 and 7. 
From these tables we observe that i31 controls portfolio return effec-
tively. 
Table 2 00 
>1::0. 
Solutions for Different Values of Portfolio Return 
No. (/31' /3 u' Yz, ru> Optimal Solution X* r = {rP, rm, r02 
1 (0.055, 0.055, 0.008, 0.4) Xs = 0.5, X6 = 0.5 (0.046, 0.055, 0.0825) 
2 (0.060, 0.060, 0.008, 0.4) X2 = 0.0454, X3 = 0.0152, Xs = 0.4394, X6 = 0.5 (0.0331,0.6,0.1152) 
3 (0.065, 0.065, 0.008, 0.4) x 2 = 0.0713, X3 = 0.0597, Xs = 0.3690, X6 = 0.5 (0.0244, 0.065, 0.1403) 
4 (0.070, 0.070, 0.008, 0.4) ~ = 0.0935, X3 = 0.1098, Xs = 0.2967, X6 = 0.5 (0.0164, 0.07, 0.164) 
5 (0.075, 0.075, 0.008, 0.4) x 2 = 0.1157, X3 = 0.1598, Xs = 0.2245, X6 = 0.5 (0.0084,0.075,0.1876) 
(0.080, 0.080, 0.008, 0.4) x 2 = 0.1381, X3 = 0.2096, Xs = 0.1524, X6 = 0.5 (0.0003,0.08,0.2113) 
'--6 0 c 
7 (0.085,0.085,0.008,0.4) X2 = 0.1605, X3 = 0.2593, Xs = 0.0802, X6 = 0.5 (-0.0077, 0.085, 0.2351) ..., ::::l 
8 (0.090, 0.090, 0.008, 0.4) X2 = 0.1829, X3 = 0.3089, Xs = 0.0081, X6 = 0.5 (-0.0157,0.09, 0.2588) ~ 0 
9 (0.095, 0.095, 0.008, 0.4) X2 = 0.2310, X3 = 0.3128, X6 = 0.4562 (-0.0285, 0.095, 0.2919) ....... » 
10 (0.100, 0.100, 0.008, 0.4) ~ = 0.2801, X3 = 0.3142, X6 = 0.4057 (-0.0414,0.1,0.3253) I"'l .... 
(0.105, 0.105,0.008, 0.4) X2 = 0.3250, X3 = 0.3214, X6 = 0.3536 (-0.0534, 0.105, 0.357) 
c 
11 ~ 
:::!. 
12 (0.110, 0.110, 0.008, 0.4) X2 = 0.3701, X3 = 0.3284, X6 = 0.3015 (-0.0655, 0.11, 0.3889) ~ 
13 (0.115, 0.115, 0.008, 0.4) X2 = 0.4150, X3 = 0.3357, X6 = 0.2493 (-0.0775, 0.115, 0.4206) """0 ..., ~ 
14 (0.120, 0.120,0.008, 0.4) X2 = 0.4601, X3 = 0.3428, X6 = 0.1972 (-0.0895,0.12, 0.4524) I"'l .... 
15 (0.125, 0.125, 0.008, 0.4) Xl = 0.0092, x 2 = 0.5, X3 = 0.3415, X6 = 0.1494 (-0.1024, 0.125, 0.4858) I"'l .!D 
16 (0.130, 0.130, 0.008, 0.4) Xl = 0.0504, X2 = 0.5, X3 = 0.3421, X6 = 0.1074 (-0.1137, 0.13, 0.5157) < 0 
17 (0.135, 0.135, 0.008, 0.4) Xl = 0.0956, x 2 = 0.5, ~ = 0.3361, X6 = 0.0683 (-0.1258, 0.135, 0.5473) :-
18 (0.140, 0.140, 0.008, 0.4) Xl = 0.1410, x 2 = 0.5, ~ = 0.3296, X6 = 0.0293 (-0.1379,0.14, 0.579) 
~ 
z 
19 (0.145, 0.145, 0.008, 0.4) Xl = 0.2204, X2 = 0.4660, X3 = 0.3136 (-0.1501,0.145,0.6105) ~ 
20 (0.150, 0.150, 0.008, 0.4) Xl = 0.3137, X2 = 0.4771, X3 = 0.2092 (-0.175, 0.15, 0.6653) 
21 (0.155, 0.155, 0.008, 0.4) Xl = 0.4067, X2 = 0.4888, X3 = 0.1045 (-0.2,0.155, 0.7202) ~ \0 
22 (0.160, 0.160, 0.008, 0.4) Xl = 0.5, X2 = 0.5 {-0.225, 0.16, 0.7752 \0 O"l 
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Table 3 
Optimal Portfolio Return and Risk Analysis Using Table 2 
No. rm rm -rP r O -rm 85% 95% 
1 0.055 0.0090 0.0275 (0.0537,0.0591) (0.0546, 0.0564) 
2 0.060 0.0269 0.0552 (0.0560, 0.0683) (0.0587, 0.0628) 
3 0.065 0.0406 0.0753 (0.0590, 0.0763) (0.0630, 0.0688) 
4 0.070 0.0536 0.0940 (0.0620, 0.0841) (0.0673,.0.0747) 
5 0.075 0.0666 0.1126 (0.0650, 0.0919) (0.0717, 0.0806) 
6 0.080 0.0797 0.1313 (0.0680, 0.0997) (0.0760, 0.0866) 
7 0.085 0.0927 0.1501 (0.0711, 0.1075) (0.0804, 0.0925) 
8 0.090 0.1057 0.1688 (0.0741,0.1153) (0.0847,0.0984) 
9 0.095 0.1235 0.1969 (0.0765, 0.1245) (0.0888, 0.1048) 
10 0.100 0.1414 0.2253 (0.0788, 0.1338) (0.0929, 0.1113) 
11 0.105 0.1584 0.2520 (0.0812, 0.1433) (0.0971, 0.1176) 
12 0.110 0.1755 0.2789 (0.0837,0.1518) (0.1012,0.1239) 
13 0.115 0.1925 0.3056 (0.0861, 0.1608) (0.1054, 0.1303) 
14 0.120 0.2095 0.3324 (0.0886, 0.1699) (0.1095, 0.1366) 
15 0.125 0.2274 0.3608 (0.0909, 0.1791) (0.1136, 0.1430) 
16 0.130 0.2437 0.3857 (0.0934, 0.1879) (0.1178, 0.1493) 
17 0.135 0.2608 0.4123 (0.0959,0.1968) (0.1220,0.1556) 
18 0.140 0.2779 0.4390 (0.0983, 0.2059) (0.1286, 0.1620) 
19 0.145 0.2951 0.4655 (0.1007, 0.2148) (0.1302,0.1683) 
20 0.150 0.3250 0.5153 (0.1013, 0.2273) (0.1338, 0.1758) 
21 0.155 0.3550 0.5647 (0.1018, 0.2397) (0.1323, 0.1832) 
22 0.160 0.3850 0.6150 (0.1023, 0.2523) (0.1408,0.1908) 
Table 4 
Solutions for Different Values of Portfolio Risk 
No. (f3I, f3u ' YI' Yu ) Optimal Solution X* r =(rP,rm,rO) 
1 (0.05, 0.17, 0.009, 0.009) Xs = 0.5, X6 = 0.5 (0.046, 0.055, 0.0825) 
2 (0.05, 0.17, 0.0269, 0.0269) x 2 = 0.0202, X3 = 0.1038, Xs = 0.5, X6 = 0.376 (0.0408, 0.0643, 0.1164) 
3 (0.05, 0.17, 0.0406, 0.0406) X 2 = 0.0359, X3 = 0.1824, Xs = 0.5, X6 = 0.2817 (0.0308, 0.0714, 0.1423) 
4 (0.05,0.17,0.0536,0.0536) X 2 = 0.0506, X3 = 0.2577, Xs = 0.5, X6 = 0.1917 (0.0245,0.0781,0.1669) 
5 (0.05, 0.17, 0.0666, 0.0666) X 2 = 0.0746, X3 = 0.3001, Xs = 0.5, X6 = 0.1253 (0.0169, 0.0835, 0.1914) 
6 (0.05, 0.17, 0.0797, 0.0797) x2 = 0.1061, X3 = 0.3167, Xs = 0.5, X6 = 0.0773 (0.0081, 0.0878, 0.2159) 
7 (0.05,0.17,0.0927,0.0927) X 2 = 0.1382,x3 = 0.3301,xs = 0.5,x6 = 0.0317 (-0.0008,0.0919,0.2402) 
8 (0.05,0.17,0.1057,0.1057) x2 = 0.1704, X3 = 0.3435, Xs = 0.4861 (-0.0097,0.0959,0.2643) 
9 (0.05, 0.17, 0.1235, 0.1235) X 2 = 0.2189, X3 = 0.3469, Xs = 0.4342 (-0.0230,0.1005,0.2969) 
10 (0.05,0.17,0.1414,0.1414) X 2 = 0.2674, X3 = 0.3514, Xs = 0.3812 (-0.0363,0.1052,0.3297) 
11 (0.05,0.17,0.1584,0.1584) X 2 = 0.3139, X3 = 0.3538, Xs = 0.3322 (-0.0489,0.1095,0.3608) 
12 (0.05,0.17,0.1755,0.1755) x2 = 0.3610, X3 = 0.3552, Xs = 0.2837 (-0.0617,0.1138,0.3922) 
13 (0.05,0.17,0.1925,0.1925) X 2 = 0.4071, X3 = 0.3596, Xs = 0.2333 (-0.0743,0.1182,0.4234) 
14 (0.05, 0.17, 0.2095, 0.2095) x2 = 0.4511, X3 = 0.3710, Xs = 0.1779 (-0.0867, 0.1229, 0.4545) 
15 (0.05,0.17,0.2274,0.2274) x2 = 0.4975, X3 = 0.3831, Xs = 0.1194 (-0.0996,0.1278,0.4873) 
16 (0.05, 0.17, 0.2437, 0.2437) Xl = 0.0411, x2 = 0.5, X3 = 0.3765, Xs = 0.0823 (-0.1116, 0.1321, 0.5169) 
17 (0.05,0.17,0.2608,0.2608) Xl = 0.0911, x2 = 0.5, X3 = 0.3529, Xs = 0.0561 (-0.1246,0.1362,0.5482) 
18 (0.05,0.17,0.2779,0.2779) Xl = 0.1476, X 2 = 0.5, X3 = 0.3034, Xs = 0.049 (-0.1385,0.1394,0.5794) 
19 (0.05, 0.17, 0.2951, 0.2951) XI = 0.2042, x2 = 0.5, X3 = 0.2546, Xs = 0.0412 (-0.1524, 0.1427, 0.6108) 
20 (0.05, 0.17, 0.325, 0.325) XI = 0.3025, x2 = 0.5, X3 = 0.1703, Xs = 0.0272 (-0.1765, 0.1485, 0.6654) 
21 (0.05,0.17,0.355,0.355) XI = 0.4013, X 2 = 0.5, X3 = 0.0848, Xs = 0.0139 (-0.2008,0.1542,0.7202) 
22 (0.05,0.17,0.385,0.385) Xl = 0.5, x 2 = 0.5 (-0.225,0.16,0.775) 
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Table 5 
Optimal Portfolio Return and Risk Analysis Using Table 4 
No. rm. rm. r P r O - rm. 85% 95% 
1 0.0550 0.0090 0.0275 (0.0537,0.0541) (0.0500, 0.0564) 
2 0.0643 0.0235 0.0521 (0.0608,0.0721) (0.0631, 0.0669) 
3 0.0714 0.0406 0.0709 (0.0653, 0.0820) (0.0694, 0.0749) 
4 0.0781 0.0536 0.0888 (0.0701, 0.0914) (0.0754, 0.0825) 
5 0.0835 0.0666 0.1079 (0.0735, 0.0997) (0.0802, 0.0889) 
6 0.0878 0.0797 0.1281 (0.0758, 0.1070) (0.0838, 0.0942) 
7 0.0919 0.0927 0.1483 (0.0780, 0.1142) (0.0873, 0.0993) 
8 0.0959 0.1056 0.1684 (0.0801,0.1212) (0.0906, 0.1043) 
9 0.1005 0.1235 0.1964 (0.0820, 0.1300) (0.0943,0.1103) 
10 0.1052 0.1414 0.2245 (0.0840, 0.1389) (0.0981, 0.1164) 
11 0.1095 0.1584 0.2513 (0.0857, 0.1472) (0.1016,0.1221) 
12 0.1138 0.1755 0.2784 (0.0875,0.1556) (0.1050,0.1277) 
13 0.1182 0.1925 0.3052 (0.0893, 0.1640) (0.1086,0.1335) 
14 0.1229 0.2096 0.3316 (0.0915,0.1726) (0.1124, 0.1395) 
15 0.1278 0.2274 0.3595 (0.0937,0.1817) (0.1165, 0.1458) 
16 0.1321 0.2437 0.3848 (0.0958, 0.1898) (0.1199,0.1513) 
17 0.1362 0.2608 0.4120 (0.0971, 0.1980) (0.1232,0.1568) 
18 0.1394 0.2779 0.4400 (0.0977, 0.2054) (0.1255,0.1614) 
19 0.1427 0.2951 0.4681 (0.0984, 0.2129) (0.1279,0.1661) 
20 0.1485 0.3250 0.5169 (0.0998, 0.2260) (0.1323, 0.1743) 
21 0.1542 0.3550 0.5660 (0.1100, 0.2391) (0.1365,0.1825) 
22 0.160 0.3850 0.6150 (0.1023, 0.2523) (0.1408, 0.1908) 
6 Summary 
We presented an asset allocation method using possibilistic pro-
gramming techniques to characterize the imprecise nature of the rate 
of return. Unlike the traditional mean-variance method, our asset al-
location method takes the portfolio's skewness into consideration. It 
provides two control constraints that permit maximal flexibility for de-
cision makers to effectively balance the portfolio's return and the port-
folio's risk. The optimal allocation decision is made by solving several 
linear programming problems. Software packages are available that can 
effiCiently solve linear programming problems. 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
No. 
1 
2 
3 
4 
Table 6 
Solutions for Different Values of /3/ 
(fil' f3u' rl' ru) Optimal Solution X* r = (rP,r m , rO) 
(0.08,0.17,0.008,0.4) X 2 = 0.4977, X3 = 0.2554, Xs = 0.2469 (-0.0946,0.1201,0.4645) 
(0.11,0.17,0.008,0.4) Xl = 0.0788, X 2 = 0.5, Xs = 0.3596, X6 = 0.0616 (-0.1214,0.1352,0.5407) 
(0.14,0.17,0.008,0.4) Xl = 0.4137, X 2 = 0.3113, X3 = 0.275 (-0.1609,0.15,0.6387) 
(0.16,0.17,0.008,0.4) Xl = 0.5, X 2 = 0.5 (-0.225,0.16,0.775) 
Table 7 
O~timal Portfolio Return and Portfolio Risk Anal:ysis 
rm rm - rP ° r - r 
m 85% 95% 
0.1201 0.2147 0.3444 (0.0879,0.1718) (0.0879, 0.1373) 
0.1352 0.2566 0.4055 (0.0967, 0.196) (0.1224,0.1555) 
0.15 0.3009 0.4887 (0.1049, 0.2233) (0.135,0.1744) 
0.16 0.385 0.615 (0.1023,0.2523) (0.1408, 0.1908) 
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Some problems still remain to be solved. For example, instead of 
obtaining the most pessimistic value, the most probable value, and the 
most optimistic value for the rate of return from mean and standard 
deviation as shown in the examples, we could use simulation to generate 
the data directly from the historical resources. We could also use the 
possibility programming method to solve multistage asset allocation 
problems and assetjliability management problems. 
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Nonmedical Limits in Individual Life Insurance 
James B. Ross* and Shalini E. Perumpral t 
Abstract 
This paper shows data that illustrate the substantial variation among non-
medical schedules and the dramatic increase in their amount limits from 1972 
through 1992. Coefficients of variation are analyzed for several data subsets. 
We find that the variation of schedules in the sample of all firms has increased 
throughout the 1972-1992 period for issue ages up to 30, but has declined for 
issue ages beyond 30 during the 1982-1992 period. For the non-New York and 
stock companies our statistical tests indicate an increase in the variability of 
schedules over the full period 1972 to 1992. 
Key words and phrases: mortality, underwriting, medical examinations, sched-
ules, coefficient of variation 
Introduction 
The practice of granting life insurance without a medical examina-
tion began in England when underwriting evidence consisted of per-
sonal interviews, opinions of associates and friends, and/or attending 
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physicians' statements. Medical evidence began to be required in 1850, 
and a medical examination was considered essential until 1885. In 1886 
cautious experiments to remove the medical examination on smaller 
policies began, albeit with substantial restrictions that were gradually 
lifted in view of favorable results. 
The rationale for nonmedicallimits1 for insurance policies had been 
that the savings in medical exam expenses were sufficient to offset the 
additional mortality experienced in the absence of underwriting infor-
mation from medical exams. A shortage of medical examiners in rural 
areas following World War I led a group of Canadian companies to be-
gin nonmedical programs with restrictions on issue ages and amounts. 
The practice was well received in the field, the early experience was 
favorable, and the Canadian program was liberalized and expanded. 
Beginning in 1925 nonmedical underwriting spread rapidly through 
the American life insurance industry, and by 1935 86 percent of the 
129 members of the American Life Convention had adopted nonmedi-
cal programs. Today nearly every life insurer in the United States and 
Canada accepts some nonmedically underwritten business, and it is es-
timated that 67 percent of new ordinary policies and 33 percent of new 
ordinary amounts are written nonmedically (Black and Skipper, 1994, 
Chapter 24, p. 671). 
Because the insurer pays for medical evidence it uses in underwrit-
ing the application, there are initial expense savings when no medical 
examination is required. The actuarial mechanics of the construction of 
such schedules are well established: the present value over the policy 
life of the excess mortality experienced under nonmedical underwriting 
is equated to the expense savings at issue, and the equation is solved 
for the face amount that balances it. 
Nonmedical limit schedules theoretically should depend on the cost 
of medical exams and the additional mortality experienced in their ab-
sence, suggesting that the schedules for different companies should 
not vary much. In practice, however, variation among companies en-
ters via differing attitudes in areas such as mortality selection stan-
dards, persistency rates, returns on investments, target markets, de-
grees of accommodation to the writing agent, safety/profit margins in 
the premium structure, and stock versus mutual forms of insurer or-
ganization. This paper addresses questions raised by the existence of 
a large number of nonmedical limit schedules that exhibit substantial 
variation. 
1 A nonmedical limit for a new life insurance policy is the maximum amount of insur-
ance that can be issued without the benefit of a medical or paramedical examination. 
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Changes in nonmedical limits over the last two decades have been 
characterized in Black and Skipper (1994, Chapter 24, p. 672) as "non-
medical limits exploded." Great increases in nonmedical limits repre-
sent the responses by companies to large increases in the cost of med-
ical examinations over the period of this study. Companies have dealt 
with the cost increases in medical examinations by using less expensive 
paramedical exams and by making cost-effective use of blood and urine 
testing. 
The extent to which nonmedical limit schedules vary is an empirical 
question. This paper seeks to determine both the degree of the current 
variation and the trend in variation over time: Is competition driving the 
schedules together, or are individual company differences forcing them 
apart? We show how nonmedical limits have developed, summarize the 
current situation, and explore the variations of schedules of different 
insurers. 
2 Factors Impacting Nonmedical Limits 
While this paper focuses on nonmedical limits, there is a continuum 
of underwriting approaches of which medically examined business and 
nonmedical business are the extremes. All variations are driven by the 
trade-off between expense savings and differential mortality costs. This 
dynamic trade-off is a function of the increase in the cost-effectiveness 
of underwriting tools, increases in medical exam costs, and continu-
ing improvements in insured mortality. Paramedical underwriting pro-
vides the best example (Woodman, 1992). Paramedical underwriting 
has advanced to the point where separate mortality experiences are 
maintained for this approach. Blood and urine testing also offer pro-
tective values that are cost-effective at levels less than full nonmedical 
limits. Additionally, companies review periodically their use of other 
underwriting tools such as inspection reports, attending physicians' 
statements (APSs), personal health interviews (PHIs), and motor vehicle 
records (MVRs). These reviews may cause companies to revise the issue 
amounts at which they order such tools. 
Inflation is one of the major forces that drew attention to the non-
medical area. The chairman of an extended discussion in 1970 on the 
impact of inflation on underwriting remarked: "There is evidence that 
the cost of medical underwriting has increased more rapidly than the 
health care index, so we can conclude that the major components of 
underwriting costs have increased more rapidly than the Consumer 
Price Index" (Taylor 1970). The Statistical Abstracts of the United States 
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Price Index 1972-1982 1982-1992 1972-1992 
Consumer Prices 131% 45% 236% 
Medical Care 148% 106% 410% 
Physicians' Services 145% 94% 375% 
Average Policy Size Issued 168% 154% 580% 
provides the data for the percentage increases in related price indices 
shown below for the periods 1972-1982, 1982-1992, and 1972-1992. 
Data from the Life Insurance Fact Book show that the percentage in-
creases in the average size policy issued have more than kept pace with 
these inflationary increases in the several price indices. 
The onset of AIDS as a significant factor in underwriting occurred 
during the period 1982-1992. During this period AIDS dominated dis-
cussions of underwriting in the actuarialliterature.2 Company respon-
ses have included blood testing at much lower face amount levels in 
applicant cohorts where AIDS is a concern. Prior to 1985 blood testing 
generally was not requested until face amounts applied for exceeded 
$1 million. HIV / AIDS changed that dramatically. Blood/urine/saliva 
testing for HIV now begins at $25,000 to $100,000. Additionally, some 
observers feel that companies may have slowed increases in nonmedical 
limits and conformed their nonmedical schedules by issue ages to those 
of competitors to avoid being selected against by the HIV-infected. 
3 Literature Review 
This literature review concentrates on papers and discussions deal-
ing with the factors impacting nonmedical limits. Outside the actuarial 
literature there is substantial additional underwriting material relevant 
to this subject, particularly in the publications of the Home Office Life 
Underwriters Association and the Institute of Home Office Underwrit-
ers. 
2For the period up to December 31, 1991, during which information could affect 
company decisions on nonmedical limits for 1992, there were several papers and task 
force reports on AIDS (though not all focused on underwriting) that were published by 
the Society of Actuaries. These include the Guide for Practicing Actuaries (1988), Panjer 
(1989), Plumley (1989), Ramsay (1989 and 1990), the Report of the Society of Actuaries 
Committee on HW Research (1990), and the Report of the Task Force on the Financial 
Implications of AIDS (1990). 
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The literature contains three themes. The first theme consists of his-
torical examinations of nonmedical limits in ordinary (and industrial) 
life insurance. Parker (1921) reviews the Canadian experiment. Auden 
(1938) gives a brief history, an update on the practice of 114 companies, 
a review of the reasons for writing nonmedical business, and a report on 
the generally favorable mortality. Morton (1977) discusses nonmedical 
and paramedical underwriting in his review of underwriting principles 
and practices. Sankey (1990) and Black and Skipper (1994, Chapter 24, 
pp. 671-672) provide historic treatments for more recent periods. 
The second theme, review and liberalization, consists of a long series 
of discussions in the actuarial and underwriting journals responding to 
questions by editors. Smith (1924) emphasizes the early success of the 
Canadian nonmedical program. Larus (1925) cautions against compe-
tition on nonmedical limits, while Parker (1925) feels that companies 
doing a nonmedical business contribute meaningfully to the informa-
tion maintained by the Medical Impairment Bureau. 
As liberalizations develop, the discussions focus on nonmedical mor-
tality experience relative to that of medically examined business. Smith 
(1930) uses Canadian male select mortality as a benchmark; Shepherd 
(1930) benchmarks against American male select mortality. Both find 
the ratios of actual-to-expected mortality (AlE ratios) for nonmedical 
issues higher than the ratios for medically examined business; both 
find the AlE ratios for nonmedical issues in age groups beyond age 45 
substantially higher than their medically examined counterparts. Smith 
and Cross (1930) indicate higher lapse rates on the nonmedical issues. 
Marshall (1932) provides data showing the favorable mortality expe-
rience of Connecticut Mutual. Discussions in Record of the American 
Institute of Actuaries (1934) identify issue age 40 as the supportable up-
per age for nonmedical schedules, providing several examples at older 
issue ages of substantially higher AlE ratios (relative to American male 
select mortality) for nonmedical issues than for those medically exam-
ined. 
Auden (1938) cites reductions from upper age 45 to age 40 as the 
trend of the day, with nonmedical persistency still poor but nonmedical 
mortality satisfactory. He discusses the value of the forgone expense of 
the medical exam in offsetting additional mortality. Hunter (1940) in-
ventories mortality studies (up to 1931 for three Canadian companies 
and five American companies) and adds New York Ufe data through 
1939 to show generally favorable nonmedical experience. Discussions 
in Record of'the American Institute of Actuaries (1942) center around the 
problems of obtaining medical examiners during World War II and the 
nonmedical liberalizations that would help reduce the load on examin-
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ers (the consensus was "yes" to amounts, "no" to age extensions). The 
increase in the percentage of applications on a nonmedical basis that ac-
companied nonmedical schedule liberalizations is discussed, with one 
large company's percentage in 1942 going from 9 percent in July to 30 
percent in October! 
The central issue in Record of the American Institute of Actuaries 
(1946) is wartime mortality; all commentators on nonmedical limits 
come to the same general conclusion, viz. that nonmedical business 
still could be written satisfactorily at issue ages under 40 for amounts 
up to $5,000. The discussions in the Transactions of the Society of Actu-
aries (1950) indicate that the triggering incident for the announcement 
of nonmedical limit increases is a specific increase in medical examiner 
fees. 
Merriam (1951) describes an increase in medical examiner fees of 
about one-third, with resulting extensions of nonmedical limits in the 
Metropolitan Life to the age groups 41-45 and 46-50. Mathews (1953) 
provides survey evidence from 108 companies that such extensions 
are not common-only 5 percent of the companies issue nonmedically 
above age 40. Morton (1954) reports that most Canadian companies 
continu'e some nonmedical issue amount to age 45, but provides dis-
counted extra mortality costs that suggest only nominal amounts are 
feasible. Van Keuren (1956) indicates that Metropolitan Life, which in-
troduced nonmedical issues above age 40 in 1951, has discontinued 
them because of unsatisfactory mortality experience and the necessity 
to obtain medical exams on 25 percent of nonmedical applicants. 
Jacoby and Tookey (1959) both indicate pressure from physicians to 
increase the medical examination fees. They attribute this to doctors' 
aversion to paper work, the lagging of fees behind price levels, and 
resentment that insurers would attempt to fix doctors' fees. All discus-
sants (Transactions of the Society of Actuaries, 1960) note increases of 
$25,000 to $30,000 up to age 30, but few increases thereafter. 
Lew (1966) predicts increased use of bodily fluids testing to extend 
the use of nonmedical limits to older age groups. Gauer and van Keuren 
(1967) explore the use of technicians and early paramedical techniques. 
The difficulty of finding physicians willing to serve as medical exam-
iners is noted. Many discussants note the use of medical information 
phoned-in and recorded. Keltie (1969) attributes the slowdown in mor-
tality improvement on medically examined business to the spread of 
paramedical exams and alludes to reductions in the use of inspection 
reports and attending physicians' reports. 
The third theme consists of the readings gathered by the Society of 
Actuaries under the rubric of cost implications in the Professional Actu-
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arial Specialty Guide to Individual Underwriting (1993). Ormsby (1963) 
first examines the economics of underwriting in a paper that addresses 
the considerations involved in ordering inspection reports. He provides 
formulas for" ... converting changes in underwriting action attributable 
to information in the APS (attending physician's statement) into equiv-
alent 'net' single premiums at issue so that a comparison can be made 
of these 'net' single premiums with the total cost of obtaining and pro-
cessing the statement itself ... " The techniques outlined are applicable 
to the construction of nonmedical limit schedules. 
Mast (1978) discusses each element of the nonmedical limit ques-
tion. His paper determines the break-even amount as "... the pol-
icy size at which the increased mortality costs resulting from the lack 
of a medical examination are approximately counterbalanced by the 
consequent savings in underwriting expenses." He mentions an asset 
share approach, and discusses the net single premium technique used 
by Ormsby: " ... the relationship between the expenses associated with 
obtaining a medical examination and the present value of the increased 
mortality cost per $1,000 is used to determine the break-even amount." 
Reitano (1979) provides a consistent theory for evaluating the inter-
play between the cost of underwriting tools and the resulting mortality. 
He discusses two cases: 
• The actuarial approach typically used in setting nonmedical limits, 
using the present value of the difference between medical and 
nonmedical mortality experience (the two table technique); and 
• The underwriting approach for valuing underwriting tools (as in 
Ormsby), under which the value of the tool is the present value of 
the extra mortality costs that are saved by remOving certain lives 
from the standard issue class (the single table method). 
Bergstrom (1989,1991) discusses the assumptions and calculations 
that provide estimates for the protective values of blood chemistry pro-
file and urinalysis testing. The earlier study gives protective values 
for life insurance, the latter for major medical insurance. The reports 
show the techniques for expressing the results in terms of amount lev-
els above which the testing is cost-justified and in terms of return on 
the investment (ROI) in the testing. 
Mills (1991) provides a general model for such protective value stud-
ies, utilizing the axiom that" ... a particular underwriting procedure has 
positive economic value if its cost is less than the savings in mortality 
(or morbidity) made possible by its use." Mills provides an example for 
valuing the attending physician's statement in connection with disabil-
ity income. 
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Woodman (1992) assesses the value of the paramedical examina-
tion using the tools and approach specified by Bergstrom. He provides 
comparisons between medical, paramedical, and nonmedical mortality 
experience; his further analysis indicates the age-at-issue groups and 
amount ievels for which the several underwriting approaches are most 
appropriate. 
4 Data Sources 
The data used in the statistical analyses are the nonmedical limit 
amounts published in Best's Flitcraft Compend (Life-Health) for the edi-
tions dated 1973, 1983, and 1993. The data collection procedures used 
by A.M. Best Co. are such that the data relate to the years 1972, 1982, 
and 1992. It is these latter years that are used in the table headings and 
the text. 
The nonmedical limit information, when available, is given in the 
policy analysis section (preceding the statistical sections) of the Flitcraft 
Compend. The availability of nonmedical schedules is shown in Table 1, 
which gives in the panel headings the number of companies contribut-
ing nonmedical limit schedules to each year of the study. The material 
available for analysis grew substantially from 1972 to 1982, then shrank 
in 1992 because the A.M. Best Company split the Flitcraft Compendinto 
two sections, only one of which preserved the nonmedical data. As a 
result there are data on 113 companies for 1972, 164 companies for 
1982, and 119 companies for 1992. Forty-eight companies provided 
data for all three years. 
The basic data (not shown) consist of values for the nonmedical 
limits across each of the 15 issue age groups for each company plus 
additional values for independent variables representing specific char-
acteristics of individual companies. The issue age groups used by dif-
ferent life insurers in practice are so similar that less than 20 forcings 
were needed to put the nonmedical schedules into the common format 
of 15 groups by age at issue. 
Table 1 
Characteristics of the Sample of All Firms Nonmedical Limits (OOOs) 
Panel A: 1992 Sample (N = 119) 
Age at Issue 
Number of Companies* 
Mean 
Standard Deviation 
Median 
Mode 
Maximum 
Minimum 
Panel B: 1982 Sample (N = 164) 
Age at Issue 
Number of Companies* 
Mean 
Standard Deviation 
Median 
Mode 
Maximum 
Minimum 
Panel C: 1972 Sample (N = 113) 
0-4 5-14 15 16-1718-2021-2526-30 31-3536-4041-4546-50 51-5556-60 61-6566-70 
115 115 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 115 107 52 36 18 10 
222 225 224 220 208 209 209 180 140 86.6 66.3 25.4 17.5 5.50 1.63 
153 155 137 138 134 134 134 99.8 89.2 65.1 65.3 53.6 50.1 18.3 7.42 
200 200 200 200 200 200 200 150 100 75 50 0 0 0 0 
250 250 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 50 0 0 0 0 
1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 500 500 350 350 350 350 100 50 
000000000000000 
0-4 5-14 
162 162 
134 139 
84.5 82.5 
100 100 
100 100 
500 500 
o 0 
15 16-1718-2021-2526-30 31-35 36-4041-4546-50 51-5556-60 61-6566-70 
163 164 164 164 164 162 162 150 82 37 22 16 10 
139 141 141 145 144 108 70.6 40.1 25.2 15.8 14.4 8.50 5.57 
81.3 81.0 80.9 86.4 86.9 85.2 82.5 75.4 75.9 72.2 72.3 47.5 42.4 
100 100 100 100 100 75 50 20 2 0 0 0 0 
100 100 100 100 100 100 50 25 0 0 0 0 0 
500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 500 
o 15 15 25 25 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Age at Issue 0-4 5-14 15 16-1718-2021-2526-30 31-35 36-40 41-4546-50 51-55 56-60 61-6566-70 
Number of Companies* 113 113 113 113 113 113 112 111 111 71 18 9 5 2 0 
Mean 30.2 31.9 32.7 33.0 33.1 32.9 32.0 20.9 11.0 3.31 0.50 0.15 0.07 0.02 0 
Standard Deviation 9.18 7.83 6.61 6.46 6.39 6.19 6.77 6.04 5.22 3.62 1.49 0.58 0.34 0.17 0 
Median 30 30 30 35 35 30 30 20 10 3 0 0 0 0 0 
Mode 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 20 10 5 0 0 0 0 0 
Maximum 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 25 10 4 2.5 1.5 0 
Minimum 5 10 10 10 10 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
* Number of companies with nonzero nonmedical limits 
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5 Methodology 
For each age group for each of the years 1972, 1982, and 1992 these 
univariate statistics for the nonmedical limits are calculated: mean, 
median, mode, maximum, minimum, and standard deviation. We also 
count and display the number of companies that provide nonzero non-
medical limits to a particular age group. These characteristics are dis-
played in Table 1. The same statistics are provided in Table 2 for the 
48 companies with data for all three years. 
Because our interest is to determine the extent of current variation 
among issuers and the trend in variation over time, a test for station-
arity of variance seems logical. Given the tremendous increase in non-
medical limits in the decade from 1972 to 1982, however, stationarity 
tests of the variance do not provide any insight as to the real diver-
gences in behavior within the industry. Therefore, coefficients of vari-
ation are calculated for each age group for the years 1972, 1982, and 
1992, and a series of nonparametric tests is performed on this statistic. 
Statistical tests are used to determine: (i) whether variation within 
the industry has remained consistent for the two decades-this test 
was suggested in 1937 by Friedman (1991); and (ii) whether the varia-
tion has consistently increased or decreased over the two decades-this 
test was suggested in 1963 by Page (1991). Appendix A describes these 
tests for the entire sample, giving the null and alternative hypotheses, 
the calculated coefficients of variation, formulas for the test statistics, 
and the cut-off points for rejection at selected confidence levels. The 
Friedman and Page tests are performed on the entire sample and re-
peated again for those 48 companies for which data are available for 
both decades. This approach allows us to isolate any bias that may have 
been introduced by outliers or new entrants into the full sample. 
The 48 firms for which data are available for 1972, 1982 and 1992 
are also split into stock (22) and mutual (26) companies and New York 
(22) and non-New York (26) insurers. Similar tests are performed on 
these samples to determine whether there are any identifiable differ-
ences in behavior among these subgroups. The stock/mutual split is 
chosen to explore whether the philosophy or practices inherent in the 
form of company organization may influence the nonmedical limits. 
The non-New York/New York split is chosen to test whether the New 
York expense and commission limitations (and perhaps the extraterri-
toriality) would impact the nonmedical limits. 
Table 2 
Characteristics of the Sample of 48 Firms Nonmedical Limits (OOOs) 
Panel A: 1992 Sample (N = 48) 
Age at Issue 
Number of Companies* 
Mean 
Standard Deviation 
Median 
Mode 
Maximum 
Minimum 
Panel B: 1982 Sample (N = 48) 
Age at Issue 
Number of Companies* 
Mean 
Standard Deviation 
Median 
Mode 
Maximum 
Minimum 
Panel C: 1972 Sample (N = 48) 
0-4 5-14 15 16-1718-2021-2526-3031-3536-4041-4546-5051-5556-60 61-6566-70 
47 47 47 48 48 48 48 47 47 47 47 21 11 6 3 
253 259 261 264 252 252 252 204 149 83.5 66.4 29.1 21.5 7.04 1.63 
163 167 166 163 162 162 162 105 93.4 73.9 72.9 71.9 71.8 22.3 8.00 
250 250 250 250 250 250 250 200 100 50 50 0 0 0 0 
250 250 250 250 250 250 250 100 100 50 50 0 0 0 0 
1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 500 500 350 350 350 350 100 50 
o 0 0 30 30 30 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
0-4 5-14 
48 48 
137 136 
70.0 68.3 
100 100 
100 100 
300 300 
30 30 
15 16-1718-2021-2526-3031-3536-4041-4546-5051-5556-60 61-6566-70 
48 48 48 48 48 47 47 42 16 6 2 2 2 
135 135 136 135 134 94.0 50.7 23.1 7.42 1.28 0.11 0.11 0.11 
65.1 65.1 64.9 64.3 65.0 60.3 40.0 24.2 18.0 4.43 0.72 0.72 0.72 
100 100 125 125 120 75 50 15 0 0 0 0 0 
100 100 100 100 100 100 50 10 0 0 0 0 0 
300 300 300 300 300 300 200 100 100 25 5 5 5 
30 30 30 30 30 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Age at Issue 0-4 5-14 15 16-1718-2021-2526-3031-3536-4041-4546-5051-5556-60 61-6566-70 
Number of Companies* 48 48 48 48 48 48 48 47 47 27 3 2 1 1 0 
Mean 29.7 31.6 32.8 33.2 33.2 33.1 32.1 19.8 9.96 2.96 0.21 0.16 0.03 0.03 0 
Standard Deviation 9.31 7.52 5.92 5.60 5.60 5.61 6.09 5.62 3.43 3.20 0.92 0.69 0.22 0.22 0 
Median 30 30 30 35 35 30 30 20 10 3 0 0 0 0 0 
Mode 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 20 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Maximum 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 40 25 12 5 4 1.5 1.5 0 
Minimum 10 10 15 20 20 20 15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
* Number of companies with nonzero nonmedical limits 
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6 Analysis and Findings 
Panels A, B, and C of Table 1 show the descriptive statistics for all 
firms for the set of 15 age groups over 1972-1992. The data show the 
stunning increases in nonmedical limits, particularly over 1972-1982. 
The mean is consistently higher than the median and the mode, with few 
exceptions, suggesting that some companies offer significantly larger 
nonmedical limits than their competitors. 
Panels A, B, and C of Table 2 show the descriptive statistics for the 48 
companies. The same patterns of skewness, with the mean being higher 
than the median and the mode, emerge for 1992 and 1982, while the 
1972 figures emulate a normal distribution. 
Table 3 shows the percentage increase in the mean nonmedical lim-
its for the periods 1972-1982, 1982-1992, and from 1972-1992. Per-
centage increases for 1972-1982 are substantial in every age category, 
especially beyond issue age 40. There are further increases in the mean 
nonmedical limits for every issue age category in the second decade. 
These increases are much smaller than those in the earlier decade but 
more evenly distributed along the age range. 
Table 4 shows that the percentage of companies offering nonzero 
nonmedical limits at issue ages beyond age 40 has risen dramatically 
since 1972. This may reflect the lower mortality rates due to improved 
health care and the reduction of death rates from diseases significant to 
the elderly. The percentage of companies offering nonzero nonmedical 
insurance to groups below the age of 15 dropped slightly. 
A comparison of the various coefficients of variation3 suggests that 
the differences among companies increased over both decades for the 
first seven age groups (0-30) in the total sample, particularly in the 
decade from 1972 to 1982 (Table 5). For the next five age groups (31-
55) the variation increased from 1972 to 1982, but the differences in 
nonmedical limits among companies decline markedly. For the last 
three age groups the variation among companies from 1972 to 1992 
consistently declined. Much of the reduction in variation at the older 
ages can be attributed to those companies which went from zero to pos-
itive nonmedical limits in that age range. The data further suggest that 
positive socioeconomic factors for the older age groups in the decade 
from 1982 to 1992 may have overridden any differences in individual 
company underwriting costs. The greater variability in practice for the 
lower age groups, however, suggests that company poliCies differ more 
in targeting this age group. 
3The coefficient of variation is the ratio of the standard deviation to the (nonzero) 
mean. 
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Table 3 
Percentage Increases in Mean 
Non-Medical Limits: All Firms (in %) 
Age Range 1972-82 1982-92 1972-92 
0-4 347 66 640 
5-14 336 62 605 
15-15 325 61 585 
16-17 327 56 567 
18-20 326 48 528 
21-25 344 43 535 
26-30 353 44 553 
31-35 417 67 761 
36-40 545 97 1,173 
41-45 1,118 115 2,516 
46-50 4,980 161 13,160 
51-55 10,500 60 16,833 
56-60 21,186 17 24,900 
61-65 42,900 (36) 27,400 
66-70 00 (71) 00 
For the entire sample the null hypothesis that variation among firms 
did not change from decade to decade is rejected at the 5 percent level 
using Friedman's nonparametric test (Table 6). The alternate hypothe-
sis that the variation increased over time could neither be accepted nor 
rejected using Page's ordered test, while a second alternate hypothesis 
that the variation decreased over time failed to be accepted (Table 7). 
The analysis suggests that the divergent pattern in nonmedical limits 
for the younger age groups more than offsets the convergent patterns 
for the older age groups, but only to a small extent. There is no or-
dered pattern to this variation, however; neither the highest nor the 
lowest nonmedical limits fall in the same issue age category for the 
years 1972, 1982, and 1992. 
The results are similar when the tests are performed only on the 48 
firms for which data are available for both decades. The null hypothesis 
that variations among firms did not change from decade to decade fails 
to be rejected (Table 6 and Table 7). This is true even though the pattern 
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Table 4 
Percentage of Companies Offering 
Nonzero Nonmedical Privileges 
Age Percent Increase (in %) 
Range 1972 1982 1992 1972-82 1982-92 1972-92 
0-4 100.0 98.8 96.6 (1.2) (2.2) (3.4) 
5-14 100.0 98.8 96.6 (1.2) (2.2) (3.4) 
15-15 100.0 99.4 99.2 (0.6) (0.2) (0.8) 
16-17 100.0 100.0 99.2 0 (0.8) (0.8) 
18-20 100.0 100.0 99.2 0 (0.8) (0.8) 
21-25 100.0 100.0 99.2 0 (0.8) (0.8) 
26-30 99.1 100.0 99.2 0.9 (0.8) 0.1 
31-35 98.2 98.8 99.2 0.6 0.4 1.0 
36-40 98.2 98.8 99.2 0.6 0.4 1.0 
41-45 62.8 91.5 96.6 45.7 5.6 53.8 
46-50 15.9 50.0 89.9 214.5 79.8 465.4 
51-55 8.0 22.6 43.7 182.5 93.4 446.3 
56-60 4.4 13.4 30.3 204.5 126.1 588.6 
61-65 1.7 9.8 15.1 444.4 54.1 738.9 
66-70 0 6.1 8.4 00 37.7 00 
in the coefficient of variation for the first seven age groups shows an 
increasing variation over time. 
The null hypothesis fails to be rejected because there is a strong 
pattern of convergence in company practices in the age groups extend-
ing from 41 to 70. The increasing similarity in the behavior of these 
companies may have allowed other more independent firms to carve 
niches in these target markets, which would explain the ambivalence in 
the results for the entire sample. 
Sample: All Firms 
Age 0-4 5-14 
1992 69.02 69.17 
1982 63.00 59.59 
1972 30.43 24.54 
Sample: 48 FIrms 
Table 5 
Coefficients of Variation for All Age Groups 
15 16-17 18-20 21-25 26-30 31-35 36-40 41-45 46-50 51-55 56-60 61-65 66-70 
61.34 62.82 64.32 64.19 64.19 55.31 63.51 75.13 98.50211.04 286.21 332.91453.86 
58.35 57.51 57.35 59.38 60.10 78.89 116.88 188.10 300.59457.71 500.98 558.50762.51 
20.20 19.58 19.33 18.38 21.15 28.95 47.30 109.30 297.31 386.89 518.27 763.39 0 
Age 0-4 5-14 15 16-17 18-20 21-25 26-30 31-35 36-40 41-45 46-50 51-55 56-60 61-65 66-70 
1992 64.55 64.40 63.59 61.83 64.23 64.23 64.23 51.23 62.82 88.49 109.89247.35 334.40 316.56492.25 
1982 51.29 50.33 48.15 48.15 47.65 47.54 48.60 64.20 78.86 104.66 242.14345.96 631.64 631.64 631.64 
1972 31.35 23.83 18.03 16.86 16.86 16.95 18.97 28.40 34.47 108.35 442.35428.64 692.82692.82 0 
Sample: Mutual Companies - 26 Frrms 
Age 0-4 5-14 15 16-17 18-20 21-25 26-30 31-35 36-40 41-45 46-50 51-55 56-60 61-65 66-70 
1992 63.28 64.94 62.95 58.90 66.06 66.06 66.06 18.19 46.72 45.81 53.78 129.79 216.15 429.98509.90 
1982 44.72 45.03 45.03 45.03 45.03 74.42 45.98 65.86 57.50 90.57261.28269.03 509.90509.90 509.90 
1972 25.44 15.61 15.61 15.10 15.10 15.29 17.23 19.22 23.83 97.30355.62363.32 509.90509.90 0 
Sample: Stock Companies - 22 FIrms 
Age 0-4 5-14 15 16-17 18-20 21-25 26-30 31-35 36-40 41-45 46-50 51-55 56-60 61-65 66-70 
1992 56.21 56.21 53.23 54.73 53.23 53.23 53.23 54.95 77.74 102.65 133.59216.90267.07235.59409.65 
1982 60.07 56.91 52.80 52.80 51.54 51.54 52.15 65.28 97.72 119.65210.28431.80458.26458.26458.26 
1972 36.78 32.49 21.29 19.39 19.39 19.39 21.29 38.60 44.97 128.08 458.26458.26 0 0 0 
Sample: New York Companies - 22 Frrms 
Age 0-4 5-14 15 16-17 18-20 21-25 26-30 31-35 36-40 41-45 46-50 51-55 56-60 61-65 66-70 
1992 65.02 63.02 63.02 56.59 62.48 62.48 62.48 51.75 67.61 73.49 88.90 150.74 191.76248.84 342.88 
1982 54.97 56.56 52.83 52.83 52.83 52.94 54.77 75.99 79.04 104.48 218.55231.40 469.04 469.04 469.04 
1972 23.14 17.01 17.01 17.01 17.01 17.27 19.73 19.35 36.54 120.77325.86333.01 469.04 469.04 0 
Sample: Non-New York Companies - 26 Firms 
Age 0-4 5-14 15 16-17 18-20 21-25 26-30 31-35 36-40 41-45 46-50 51-55 56-60 61-65 66-70 
1992 49.92 49.92 48.78 51.20 52.47 52.47 52.47 49.53 60.06 93.39 124.77 236.58 331.10 340.63 500.00 
1982 46.45 43.44 43.44 43.44 42.71 42.71 42.97 48.82 80.75 97.89233.97500.00 500.00500.00 500.00 
1972 36.00 28.82 19.14 17.09 17.09 17.09 18.96 34.13 33.35 95.74500.00 500.00 0 0 0 
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Table 6 
The Friedman Test 
Friedman Test Test Indication on 
Sample Statistic 
All Firms 6.93 
48 Firms 2.53 
Mutual Companies (26) 3.63 
Stock Companies (22) 19.07 
New York Companies (22) 3.73 
Non-New York Companies (26) 11.03 
Note: Ho: tl = t2 = t3; 
HI: At least one of the tis is different. 
The 5% critical value is for this test is 5.99. 
Table 7 
The Page Test 
Sample 
All Firms 
48 Firms 
Mutual Companies (26) 
Stock Companies (22) 
New York Companies (22) 
Non-New York Companies (26) 
Note: Ho: tl = t2 = t3; 
HI: tl < t2 < t3; 
H2: tl > t2 > t3. 
Page Test 
Statistic 
HI: 190 
H2: 170 
HI: 187 
H2: 173 
HI: 188.5 
H 2: 171.5 
HI: 195 
H 2 : 170 
HI: 188 
H 2 : 170 
HI: 196 
H 2 : 164 
The 5% critical value is for this test is 190. 
Null at 5% Level 
Reject 
Fail to reject 
Fail to reject 
Reject 
Fail to reject 
Reject 
Test Indication on 
Null at 5% Level 
Unclear 
Fail to reject 
Fail to reject 
Fail to reject 
Fail to reject 
Fail to reject 
Reject 
Fail to reject 
Fail to reject 
Fail to reject 
Reject 
Fail to reject 
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When the 48 firms are divided into New York carriers and non-New 
York insurers, the statistical tests provide interesting results. The tests 
indicate that the variation among New York carriers did not change 
over the two decades, while the null (no change) is strongly rejected 
for non-New York insurers (Table 6). Furthermore, Page's ordered test 
rejects the null in favor of the alternate that the variation among firms 
is increasing over time for the non-New York carriers (Table 7). The 
pattern in the coefficient of variation for the New York insurers remains 
similar to that for the sample of 48 firms. 
When the sample of 48 firms is split on the basis of organization 
into stock and mutual firms, we again find interesting differences. For 
the stock companies, the null hypothesis that the variation in company 
practices did not change over time is strongly rejected in favor of the 
alternate (Table 6). Furthermore, Page's test rejects the null in favor 
of the alternate that the variation in company practices is increasing 
over time (Table 7). These variations are preponderant in the issue age 
groups from 0 to 30. Although the pattern of increasingly divergent 
practices exists at the lower age groups for the mutual companies, there 
seems to be convergence at the higher age groups. As a result, Fried-
man's test fails to reject the null of no changes. This result is further 
confirmed by Page's test-the null fails to be rejected in favor of either 
increasing or decreasing divergence in mutual company practices over 
time. 
7 Conclusions 
This study examines nonmedical limits for a sample of life insurance 
companies over a 20 year period to determine the extent of variability in 
company practices at several points in time and the change in variability 
over time. The study shows a greater variability in company practices 
for the lower age groups than for higher age groups. Part of this vari-
ability could be attributed to the fact that almost all companies offer 
nonmedical insurance in the lower age brackets. The number of com-
panies offering nonmedical insurance at higher age brackets decreases 
sharply, particularly after age 50. 
Analysis of data over time shows that the percentage of companies 
offering insurance at the higher age brackets has risen while the per-
centage at lower age brackets has dropped slightly. The number of 
companies offering nonmedical insurance to those below age 45 in-
creased substantially in the first decade of our study, but decreased 
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slightly in the second decade. There is a continuous increase, however, 
in the number of firms offering nonmedical insurance at the higher age 
brackets. This fact could be attributed to improved mortality rates for 
the older population and to companies' increased interest in the senior 
citizen market. 
When the entire sample is examined, statistical tests suggest an in-
crease in variability of company nonmedical limit schedules. When the 
subs ample of 48 firms for which data are available over both decades 
is examined, however, there appears to be no substantive change in the 
variability of nonmedical limits. One possible explanation for these re-
sults is that new firms entering or leaving the market attempt to carve 
special niches that contribute to the greater variability in nonmedical 
limits. 
Interesting questions about nonmedical limits in practice abound. 
Do companies construct new nonmedical limit schedules analytically 
along the lines suggested earlier in this paper? Or do they forego such 
calculations and base their decisions in part on the schedules of other 
companies-particularly competitors? How do companies manage their 
agency operations with nonmedical limits less liberal than competitors? 
And where is the industry headed with respect to limits for nonmedical 
and paramedical acceptances and for blood/urine testing? Qualitative 
data are required to provide useful answers to these questions. Perhaps 
these data are best secured through a survey instrument addressed to 
the companies. The survey approach would have the additional ben-
efit of providing a larger sample by avoiding the data limitations that 
a source such as the Best's Flitcraft Compend (Life-Health) necessarily 
imposes. 
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Appendix 
The Friedman and Page statistics are explained below for the sam-
ple of all firms; for more details on these statistics see Hettmansperger 
(1991). They are nonparametric tests and are performed on the coeffi-
cient of variation for the sample of all firms and for all the subsamples. 
The first column of Table Al recognizes that there are 15 issue age 
groups in the sample. In the remaining three columns the values of 
the coefficient of variation (CV) and the respective ranking of each year 
based on the CVs are provided. A value of three is given to the year 
with the highest value of the CV, and the other years are rank-ordered 
accordingly for each age group. The years 1972, 1982, and 1992 are 
represented by tl. t2, and t3, respectively, in the tests below. 
For the Friedman test, the null hypothesis and the alternative hy-
pothesis are: 
Ho : tl = t2 = t3; 
HI : At least one of the tiS is different. 
The test statistic is: 
K* = 
12 k 
nk(k + 1) j~ (R.j)2 - 3n(k + 1) 
15 xl~ x 4 x [(22)2 + (36)2 + (32)2] - 3 x 15 x 4 
6.93 
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Table Al 
Coefficient of Variation 
And Rank (in parentheses) 
Age Year 
Group 1972 1982 1992 
1 30.4 (1) 63.0 (2) 69.0 (3) 
2 24.5 (1) 59.6 (2) 69.2 (3) 
3 20.2 (1) 58.3 (2) 61.3 (3) 
4 19.6 (1) 57.5 (2) 62.8 (3) 
5 19.3 (1) 57.3 (2) 64.3 (3) 
6 18.8 (1) 59.4 (2) 64.2 (3) 
7 21.1 (1) 60.1 (2) 64.2 (3) 
8 28.9 (1) 78.9 (3) 55.3 (2) 
9 47.3 (1) 116.9 (3) 63.5 (2) 
10 109.3 (2) 188.1 (3) 75.1 (1) 
11 297.3 (2) 300.6 (3) 98.5 (1) 
12 386.9 (2) 457.7 (3) 211.0 (1) 
13 518.3 (3) 501.0 (2) 286.2 (1) 
14 767.4 (3) 558.5 (2) 332.9 (1) 
15 0.0 (1) 762.5 (3) 453.9 (2) 
R· 
.J 22 36 32 
where k is the total number of years (k = 3); n is the number of issue 
age groups (n = 15); Rij is the rank of the i-th observation in year j 
relative to the other k - 1 years; and 
n 
R.j = L Rij j = 1,2, ... , k. 
j;l 
The calculated value of K* has a chi-square distribution with two 
degrees of freedom. The critical values at the 5 percent and 10 percent 
levels are 5.99 and 4.61, respectively. Thus, the hypothesis is rejected in 
favor of the alternative that the variations in the years 1972, 1982, and 
1992 are not the same. (The hypothesis, however, fails to be rejected 
at the 1 percent level.) 
Page's test for ordered alternatives asks whether the variable (in this 
case the coefficient of variation) is increasing over time or is decreasing 
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over time. The null hypothesis and the alternatives are: 
Ho : tl = t2 = t3; 
HI : tl < t2 < t3; 
H2: tI>t2>t3. 
The test statistic for HI is: 
k 
L L j x R.j 
j=I 
1 x 22 + 2 x 36 + 3 x 32 
190. 
The value of the test statistic is equal to the critical value of 190 at 
the 5 percent confidence level. Therefore the hypothesis is neither ac-
cepted nor rejected in favor of the alternative HI that the coefficient of 
variation is increasing over time. 
The test statistic for H2 is: 
k 
L L (k - j + 1) x R.j 
j=I 
3 x 22 + 2 x 36 + 1 x 32 
170. 
Because the calculated value of 170 is less than the critical value of 190, 
the hypothesis that the coefficient of variation remains constant over 
time fails to be rejected. 
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A Proposal for Improving the System of Financing 
Health Care in Singapore 
Robert Keng Heong Lian* and Loi Soh Loit 
Abstract* 
Like many other countries, including the United States, Singapore faces the 
dual problems of rising health care costs and an aging population. To cope with 
these problems, the Singapore government introduced the Medishield scheme 
in 1989 that provides low cost catastrophic medical insurance coverage. The 
scheme suffers from a serious deficiency, however: coverage ceases at age 
70. This deficiency is exacerbated by Medishield's premium payment structure 
which is akin to the premium structure of a one year renewable term policy 
so no reserves are developed. As a result, coverage beyond age 70 requires 
exorbitant premiums that are beyond the reach of the average Singaporean. 
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We propose a premium payment structure under which the annual pre-
mium payable remains level in real terms throughout the lifetime of the in-
sured. This makes the premium structure similar to one that is a level percent-
age of salary. The model uses such key variables as the rate of return, the rates 
of inflation of general costs and of medical costs, and the rate of increase in 
the morbidity rate. 
Key words and phrases: premiums, inflation, reserves, gains and losses, surplus 
Introduction 
Singapore soon will face the problem of rising health care costs as 
its population ages. To cope with this anticipated problem, the Singa-
pore government introduced the Medisave scheme in 1984 under which 
every working person must contribute a certain percent of his or her 
income to meet personal or immediate family hospitalization expenses, 
particularly medical expenses incurred during old age. l 
1.1 The Medisave Scheme 
Medisave is compulsory and is administered by the Central Provident 
Funds (CPF) Board, a statutory board of the Singapore government. All 
employed persons are required to be members of the CPF and must con-
tribute 40 percent of their income2 to meet their retirement, housing, 
education, investment, and health care needs. This 40 percent contri-
bution is jointly and equally shared by the employer and the employee 
and is allocated as follows: 
• 6 to 8 percent of the total contribution goes to the Medisave ac-
count; 
• 4 percent of the total contribution goes to the special account; 
• The balance (28 to 30 percent) of the total contribution remains 
in the ordinary account. 
The operation of the Medisave special account and ordinary account 
are described below. 
The Medisave Account: Funds in the Medisave accounts may be used 
to meet personal or immediate family's hospitalization expenses, 
I Medisave coverage ceases at age 70. 
2Income is subject to a maximum monthly contribution of $2,400. 
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especially after retirement. For example, these funds can be used 
to pay for the hospital bills of the member's spouse, children, 
parents, or grandparents up to: 
• $300 per day for daily hospital charges; and 
• A fixed limit per table of surgical operation according to the 
complexity of the operation. 
If the hospital bill exceeds Medisave limits, the member is obli-
gated to pay the part of the hospital bill not covered by Medisave. 
In addition, Medisave can be used to pay for the hospital stay for 
the delivery of the first three children. 
Employee contribution rates progressively increase with age as 
shown in Table 1: For self-employed workers, contribution rates 
are lower. Medisave contributions and savings earn interest at 
Table 1 
Singapore Medisave 
Contribution Rates 
Age Rate 
Below 35 6% 
35t044 7% 
45 and above 8% 
prevailing market rates and are tax-deductible. The Medisave bal-
ance can be accumulated up to $17,000; any amount in excess of 
this limit is automatically transferred into the ordinary account. 
The Special Account: Funds in the special account can be used to fi-
nance the Minimum Sum scheme, which is a compulsory national 
retirement scheme to help members support a modest standard 
living during retirement. Starting from $40,000 in 1995, the min-
imum sum will be raised by $ 5,000 a year until it reaches $80,000 
in 2003. At least half the minimum sum must be in cash, the 
other half may consist of tangible assets such as property. The 
cash portion ensures members of a monthly income in retirement. 
Prior to retirement, members have three options to invest their 
minimum sum: (i) buy a life annuity from an approved insurance 
company, (ii) keep it with an approved bank, or (iii) leave it with 
the CPF Board. If the income in the special account is less than 
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the minimum sum, the balance of the minimum sum is covered 
by the income in the ordinary account. 
The Ordinary Account: Funds in the ordinary accounts can be used for 
several different purposes including: (i) retirement (together with 
the special account to meet the minimum sum requirement); (ii) 
housing (can be government or private houses, for the purpose 
of owner occupation or for investment in one or more houses); 
(iii) education (restricted to local tertiary education), and (iv) in-
vestment (in common stocks and bonds, government bonds, fixed 
deposit, unit trust, gold, as well as endowment insurance policy). 
1.2 The Medishield Scheme 
CPF members' Medisave accounts, however, may be strained in the 
event of a prolonged illness that requires long-term medical treatment. 
To protect the Medisave account, the Singapore government introduced 
the Medishield scheme in 1990, a low cost medical insurance that adds 
more value to Medisave. Medishield is major medical insurance with 
participation built in by way of deductible and co-insurance as mea-
sures to contain cost. All CPF members automatically are covered under 
Medishield unless they elect to opt out. The Medishield premium and 
any costs not covered by Medishield, such as deductibles, co-insurances, 
and amounts in excess of the maximum claimable amount, can be paid 
from the Medisave account. Table 2 shows the benefits and claim limits 
under Medishield. Those limits are per policy. Each of the family mem-
ber will have his/her own policy. Therefore, for example the deductible 
$4,000 is for the particular family member and not the entire family. 
Likewise for all of the rest. 
Let AP(x, z) be the actual annual premium charged for one year 
health insurance coverage in calendar year z payable under Medishield.3 
The actual premium charged is determined from expected claims by 
applying the percentage loading according to the formula: 
AP(x, z) = (1 + e)EC(x, z) (1) 
where EC(x, z) is the expected claim cost in the calendar year z for 
insured age x last birthday on l/l/z, and e is the expense and other 
loading applied to the net premium to get the actual annual premium 
charged. 
Table 3 shows how these premiums increase with age. 
3 As these premiums are only for coverage for one year, they are similar to the pre-
miums for yearly renewable term policy in life insurance. 
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Table 2 
Medishield Benefits and Claim Limits (in Singapore $s) 
Benefits Limits 
Deductible $4,000 per policy year 
Claim Limits 
Hospital Stay* 
Intensive Care Unit* 
Surgical Operations 
Implants 
$70,000 per policy year; $200,000 lifetime 
$500 per day 
Outpatient Treatment 
$800 per day 
$400 to $5,500 per policy year 
$3,500 per policy year 
Limits vary according to treatment. 
*Includes meals, prescriptions, investigations, and other miscellaneous charges. 
The annual premiums shown in Table 1 are the 1995 published rates 
charged by the CPF's Medishield program on an annual basis for an in-
sured of age x last birthday. Because we do not have access to orig-
inal data such as the morbidity rate and other assumptions used by 
Medishield in determining AP (x, z), it is difficult to estimate the annual 
premiums for ages beyond age 70. A quick estimate of the projected 
premiums beyond age 70 can be obtained by assuming that health care 
costs continue to increase exponentially at advanced ages. The formula 
AP(x, 1995) =' 13.17(l.06)X (2) 
for x=' 25,35,45,55,62.5, and 67.5 gives a good least squares fit to the 
data in Table l. Equation (1) is used to provide estimates for AP(x, z) 
for higher ages as tabulated in Table 4. Table 4 shows that if coverage 
is extended beyond age 70, the annual premium for ages over 70 will 
be more than most Singaporeans can afford. 
1 .3 Objectives 
The objective of this paper is to develop a model of the Medishield 
program without the restriction that coverage ceases after age 70, where 
it is needed most. To pay for this extended benefit, we develop a pre-
mium structure that remains level in real terms and is approximately 
a constant percentage of a worker's salary. A method for performing 
a detailed analysis of the annual gains and losses and the sources of 
surplus of the Medishield program is provided. 
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Table 3 
Medishield 
1995 Annual Premiums* 
Age (x) AP(x, 1995) 
o - 30 $ 60 
31 - 40 $ 90 
41 - 50 $180 
51 - 60 $360 
61 - 65 $480 
66 - 70 $660 
*In Singapore dollars. 
2 Notation 
The analysis presented in this paper is based on population infor-
mation that may be most readily available at the start of each calendar 
year. If, however, information is gathered on a different basis, such as 
is the case for fiscal years, then our results can easily be modified. This 
requires changing 1/1/ z to the date at the start of the fiscal year. All 
events are then defined over the fiscal year in an obvious manner. 
The following notation is used throughout this paper: 
lbd Last birthday; 
b Annual morbidity rate of increase due to age; 
9 Annual rate of inflation (general cost of living); 
m Annual rate of medical inflation; 
i Annual valuation rate of interest; 
v (1 + i)-I; 
Zo Calendar year of issue on the policy; 
Xo Age lbd on l/l/zo; 
z Current calendar year; 
x Current age last birthday on 1/1/ z; 
kP~T) Probability that a Medshield insured age x 
lbd survives to age x + k lbd; 
q~d) Probability that a Medshield insured age x 
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Table 4 
Medishield Extrapolated 
AurnnualPrenrlum* 
Age Premium 
70 $ 778 
75 $1,041 
80 $1,393 
85 $1,865 
90 $2,495 
95 $3,339 
*In Singapore dollars. 
lbd dies before age x + 1 lbd; 
q~W) Probability that a Medshield insured age x 
lbd withdraws before age x + 1 lbd; 
ECS(x, z) 
ECD(x,z) 
ECW(x,z) 
1 + is 
1 +!d 
1 +iw 
LP(xo, zo) 
q (d) + q(w). 
x x' 
Morbidity rate in calendar year Z for insured 
age x lbd on l/l/z; 
Expected Medshield claim cost in calendar year z 
for an insured age x lbd on 1/1/ z who survives 
to l/l/z + 1; 
Expected Medshield claim cost in calendar year z 
for an insured age x lbd on 1/1/ z who dies 
before l/l/z + 1; 
Expected Medshield claim cost in calendar year z 
for an insured age x lbd on 1/1/ z who withdraws 
before l/l/z + 1; 
Annual extra claim inflation factor for survivors; 
Annual extra claim inflation factor for deaths; 
Annual extra claim inflation factor for withdrawals; 
Level (in real terms) annual premium payable upto 
age 65 for Medshield coverage sold in calendar 
year Zo to a person age Xo lbd on 1/1/ zoo 
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Note that for all calculations we will use the Singapore male mortal-
ity table for the minimum reserve calculation for annuity (MAS 309)4 
with qgg = 1. This table is deemed suitable, as it is based on the a(90) 
table with improvement in mortality over time. There is no service ta-
ble, with decrements for disability and withdrawals, available for use 
in Singapore's Medishield program as of May 1996. 
3 The Individual Model 
We develop a model in which the charged premium remains level in 
real terms throughout the working life of the member (Black & Skipper, 
1994, Chapter 22). Level premium in real terms means that the pre-
miums in subsequent years are adjusted by the rate of inflation of the 
general cost of living. Such level premiums also decrease the rate of 
growth of premiums at the older ages and tend to make lifetime cov-
erage more affordable. Another advantage of this approach is that it 
makes financial planning easier in an environment where wages and 
salaries keep pace with the general cost of living increases; these pre-
miums are approximately a constant percentage of wages and salaries. 
A key feature of our model is that it removes the restriction that 
coverage ceases after age 70, as is the case with the Medishield program. 
Thus, coverage is available in the advanced ages where people may need 
it most. 
3.1 Benefits 
For increased flexibility, we develop three separate expected claim 
costs in any calendar year: (i) for those who continue their Medishield 
policy during the next calendar year (ECS(x, z)), (ii) for those who die 
within the calendar year (ECD(x, z)), and (iii) for those who withdraw 
from the Medshield program during the calendar year (ECW(x, z)). Us-
ing anti-selection arguments, one may expect those who withdraw to be 
healthier than those who remain, while those who die may tend to have 
larger than average costs. Thus anti-selection arguments suggest that 
we adjust the expected claim costs by the appropriate extra claim infla-
tion factor (1 + f) to reflect the different expected experiences among 
those who die, withdraw, or continue with the policy. 
4The MAS 309 is the notice No. 309 issued by the Monetary Authority of Singapore 
(equivalent to the Federal Reserve Board in the United States) to life insurers. In MAS 
309, the mortality tables for calculating the minimum reserves for annuities are given. 
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We will assume that expected claim costs are paid at the end of the 
calendar year. As a result, we include the expected interest accrued to 
the end of the calendar year in our definition of the expected claims. 
Our model assumes that the expected claim cost for an insured in-
creases for two reasons: (i) increases in the underlying rate morbidity 
rate, and (ii) increases due to medical inflation. Motivated by equation 
(1), we model the morbidity rate due to age (within the a calendar year) 
as: 
r;+l = (1 + b)r;, 
which gives 
ECS(x + 1, z) = (1 + b)ECS(x, z). 
On the other hand, the impact of annual medical inflation on expected 
claim costs is assumed to affect only the size of claims not the morbid-
ity rate. So, r;+l = r;, and 
ECS(x,z + 1) = (1 + m)(1 + is)ECS(x,z). 
The final factor to be applied is the extra claim inflation factor. The 
combined effect on expected claim costs is as follows: 
ECS(x+k,z+k) 
ECD(x + k,z + k) 
ECW(x + k,z + k) 
[(1 + b)(1 + m)(1 + is)]kECS(x, z) (3) 
[(1 + b)(1 + m)(1 + !d)]kECD(x,z) (4) 
[(1 + b)(1 + m)(1 + iw)]kECW(x,z). (5) 
Note that we expect iw ::; is ::; !d. 
The actuarial present value of the future health claims on 1/1/ z for 
individual age x on 1/1/ z is denoted by AH C (x, z) where 
AHC(x,z) 
00 I v(k+l)k+1P~T)ECS(x + k,z + k) 
k=O 
00 
+ '" v(k+l) p(T)q(d) ECD(x + k z + k) L k x x+k ' 
k=O 
00 
+ I v(k+l\p~T)q~-::ECW(x + k,z + k). (6) 
k=O 
Notice that equation (6) includes costs incurred after age 70.s Using 
equations (3), (4), and (5) the expression for AHC(x, z) can be rewritten 
5Recall that the Medishield program ceases coverage at age 70 while the proposed 
Medishield program provides coverage beyond age 70. 
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as follows: 
AHC(x,z) 
where 
ax 
A(d) 
x 
A(w) 
x 
1 + i1 
1 + iz 
1 + i3 
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00 
ECS(x, z) L (1 + id-(k+l\+! p!T) 
k=O 
00 
+ ECD(x,z) L (1 + iz)-(k+l\p!T)q~~~ 
k=O 
00 
+ ECW(x,z) L (1 + i3)-(k+l\p~T)q~,:j 
k=O 
ECS(x, z)ax + ECD(x, z)A~d) 
+ ECW(x, z)A~w) (7) 
00 L (1 + i )-(k+l) p(T) 1 k+! x (8) 
k=O 
00 L (1 + i )-(k+l) p(T)q(d) 
z k x x+k (9) 
k=O 
00 L (1 + i )-(k+l) p(T)q(W) 
3 k x x+k (10) 
k=O 
l+i (11) (1 + b)( 1 + m)( 1 + is) 
l+i (12) (1 + b)(1 + m)(1 + id) 
l+i (13) (1 + b)(1 + m)(1 + iw) 
3.2 Level Premiums in Real Terms 
By assuming a constant rate of inflation, g, we can determine the in-
dividual net premium (payable to age 65) that is level in real terms. That 
is, if LP(x, z) is the net level (in real terms) annual premium payable 
up to age 65 for health insurance coverage for a newly insured age x 
last birthday on 1/1/ z, then the premiums increase annually by a fac-
tor of (1 + g). This implies that the premium for policy year (k + 1) is 
(1 + g)kLP(x, z). 
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The actuarial present value of the future premiums on 1/1/ Zo for 
individual age Xo on 1/I/zo is denoted by AFP(xo, zo) where 
where 
and 
AFP(xo,zo) 
5 .. 
ax :6s - x l 
6S-Xo-l 
L v\p~~)O + g)kLP(xo, zo) 
k=O 
6S-x-l L (1 + g)kV\p~T) 
k=O 
6S-x-l L (1 + i4)-\p~T) 
k=O 
iix:6S-xl at i4, 
i4 = (i - g)/O + g). 
The net premium is then given by 
LP(xo, zo) = [ECS(xo, zo)axo + ECD(xo, zo)A1~) 
(14) 
(15) 
(16) 
+ ECW(xo, zo)A1~)] /5 iixo:6S-xn I. (17) 
4 Analysis of Gains and Losses 
Once expected claim costs have been determined and the premiums 
have been set, the actual experience of the fund must be evaluated an-
nually to see how it compares with what was expected. Large surpluses 
or large deficits may signal problems inherent in the pricing or bene-
fit structure. To get a clear picture of the year's experience, we need 
to develop a formal system for determining reserves, surpluses, and 
gains. 
Let VeX, zlxo, zo) be the actuarial reserve on 1/I/z for an insured 
active worker who is age x last birthday on 1/1/ z but was age Xo last 
birthday on 1/1/ Zo at which time the policy was issued. 
Vex, zlxo, zo) ECS(x, z)ax 
+ ECD(x, z)A1d ) + ECW(x, z)A1w ) 
- LP(xo, zo)(1 + g)(z-zo) 5iix:6s=x1 (18) 
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for x 2:: xo. But as 
it follows that 
s .. 
ax :65 - x l 
Vex, zlxo, zo) 
(T) 
1 Px s .. + -1--' ax+l'64-xl + 1-4 . 
vECS(x, Z)p~T) + vECD(x, z)q1d ) 
+ vECW(x, z)q1W ») 
+ Vp~T)V(X + 1, z + Ilxo, zo) 
- LP(xo, zo)(1 + g)Z-zo. 
Equation (19) can be rearranged to give 
Vex + I,z + Ilxo,zo) (1 + i)(V(x, zlxo, zo) 
+ (1 + i)LP(xo, zo)(1 + g)Z-ZO) 
- ECS(x, Z)p~T) 
- ECD(x, z)q1d ) 
- ECW(x, z)q1W ) 
(19) 
+ q~T)V(X + 1, z + Ilxo, zo). (20) 
Given this recursive relationship between successive years' reserves, 
we can develop an analysis of gains and losses in a manner similar to 
Anderson (1990, Chapter 2). To this end we introduce the following 
notation: 
Ylz Set of the Medishield insureds alive on 1/1/ z 
Wz Set of withdrawals from Ylz during calendar year z; 
'Dz Set of deaths from Ylz during calendar year z; 
N z Set of new Medishield insureds who joined the 
program during calendar year z. 
In addition, let j denote a member of the set Ylz, and we append the 
subscript j to our previous notation to refer to values that depend on 
the insured j's policy experience. 
i.e., 
We define TVz to be the total actual Medishield reserve as of I/1/z, 
TVz = L Vj(x, zlxo, zo) 
je.Jtz 
(21) 
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where Vj(x, zlxo, zo) is the reserve for insured j. Following Anderson, 
we decompose TVz+l to give 
TVZ+l = 
JEDz 
- L Vj(x+1,z+1I x o,zo) 
jE'Wz 
+ L Vj(x+1,z+1I x o,zo). (22) 
jENz 
In order to simplify our mathematical expressions and reduce clutter, 
we use the following abbreviation: 
Vj(Z + 1) = Vj(x + l,z + 1Ixo,zo). 
Substituting equation (20) into equation (22) yields 
TVZ+l = (1 + i)TVz 
+ (1 + i) L LP(xo, zo)(l + g)Z-ZIl 
(23) 
+ L Vj(z + 1). (24) 
jENz 
To develop an expression for the surplus, we must now consider 
the fund balance at the start of each calendar year. Let Fz be the actual 
fund balance on 1/1/ z. 
(25) 
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where 1z is the actual interest earned during calendar year z; T Pz is the 
total premiums actually received during calendar year z; and T C z is the 
total claim costs actually paid during calendar year z. The surplus in 
hand on I/I/z, SURz is defined to be 
SURz = Fz - TVz . 
Using equations (24) and (26) yields 
SURZ+l = (1 + i)SURz + 
+ [Iz - iFz - 1TPz + 1TCz ] 
(26) 
+ [(TPz + 1TPz ) - (1 + i) L LPj(xo,zo)(I + g)Z-ZO] 
+ [ L Vj(z + 1) - L q~W)Vj(z + 1)] 
jE'Wz jE..7tz 
(27) 
where 1TPz is the expected interest earned on TPz; TdS ) is the total 
claims costs generated by those who survive to the end of calendar 
year z; 1Tds) is the expected interest earned on Tds); Tdd) is the 
total claims costs generated by those who died during calendar year 
z; 1Tdd) is the expected interest earned on Tdd); TdW) is the total 
claims costs generated by those who withdrew during calendar year z; 
1Tdw) is the expected interest earned on Tdw ); 
TCz = TC~s) + TC~d) + TC~w) 
1TC = 1TC(s) + 1TC(d) + 1TC(w) z z z z . 
The actuarial gain for calendar year z is defined to be 
GA1Nz = SURz+l - (1 + i)SURz . (28) 
The various components of the gain can be identified from equation 
(27). 
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5 Closing Comments 
The model we have developed is simply a first step in the process 
of developing a more comprehensive model of the Medishield program. 
We need actual Singapore data on mortality and morbidity to test the 
model. 
There are several known limitations, however, inherent in our cur-
rent model: 
• We failed to separate morbidity by sex. Females, in general, have 
different morbidity patterns than males. They tend to have higher 
morbidity during their child-bearing years. 
• We have simplified the morbidity pattern over calendar year as 
well as over age. A more appropriate model would use very gen-
eral rates: r~~) for males and rXl for females. These rates must 
be developed from population data. 
• Insureds who die during a calendar year are likely to have very 
high medical expenses during the preceding five years of life. This 
should be explicitly included in the model. The current model 
accounts for these high end-of-life expenses through experience 
losses attributable to deaths. 
• Persons who withdraw are likely to reenter if they expect to be ill 
or are ill. This poses severe anti-selection problems. 
Our proposed model is only a first attempt at extending the current 
Medishield program. Much more work needs to be done before this 
proposal can be implemented in practice. 
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Concentration in American Property-Casualty 
Companies 
Edward Nissan* 
Abstract t 
A Theil's entropy index utilizing premiums written as units is employed to 
measure trends in concentration of the largest 200 property-casualty compa-
nies in the United States between 1985 and 1993 based on Best's Insurance 
Report data. Each of the indexes confirms that concentration trends experi-
enced no increase for the whole period for all 200 firms, the top 20, and sub-
sets of lower ranked companies. Significant differences are observed, however, 
between groups of companies for the same period. 
Key words and phrases: mergers and acquisitions, Theil's entropy, insurance 
1 Introduction 
Throughout its history the United States economy has experienced 
cycles of mergers and acquisitions. The most recent cycle, according 
to Shleifer and Vishny (1991) and Sikora (1995), occurred during the 
1980s. Significant factors contributing to mergers and acquisitions 
in the 1980s included laxity in antitrust enforcement policies and im-
provements in takeover technology (such as leveraged buyouts and junk 
bonds). 
The property and casualty insurance industry was not exempt from 
this merger wave. Farinella (1996) reports that between 1985 and 1995 
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some 660 corporate retirements, acquisitions, and mergers occurred in 
response to what Gart (1994) describes as tremendous changes within 
the insurance industry. Increasing competition drives the change and 
forces more company mergers, creating conglomerates of multiple func-
tion companies. Multiple functions allow a company to take advantage 
of the opportunities in the emerging financial services field. Such activ-
ities may lead insurance companies to engage in anticompetitive prac-
tices, resulting in allegations of collusion, restriction of output, and 
favorable terms from consumers. Anticompetitive practice may cause 
the repeal of the McCarran-Ferguson Act which exempts insurance com-
panies from federal antitrust enforcements. 
Roughly 3,000 companies constitute the property-liability insurance 
industry. Due to numerous affiliations, however, there are really only 
800 independent decision-making units or groups. In 1993, accord-
ing to Huebner, Black, and Webb (1996), the net premiums written, the 
combined admitted assets, and policyholders' surplus totaled $253.8 
billion, $571.5 billion, and $182.3 billion, respectively. Policyholders' 
surplus serves as a cushion so that larger-than-expected losses can be 
paid. The abundance of cash, access to cheap capital, and low inter-
est rates helped boost the recent trend in mergers and acquisitions 
(Farinella 1996). 
There are two major conflicting arguments regarding mergers. One, 
according to Gilbert (1989), is that mergers enhance efficiency by pro-
moting consumer welfare through a superior allocation of productive, 
financial, and managerial resources. Potential competition serves as a 
control on monopoly power. Salop (1987) and Adams and Brock (1996) 
note that the rationale for this argument is provided by economists at 
the University of Chicago. Simply stated, this theory focuses on con-
sumer welfare as the sole concern. The other argument, supported by 
economists at Harvard University, is that mergers damage the overall 
working of the economy, lessen competition, and increase concentra-
tion of sales and thereby create monopoly power in a given industry. 
The process of concentration is defined as the increase in the extent 
economic activity is controlled by large firms. 
Clarke (1985) distinguishes market and aggregate concentration and 
absolute and relative concentration. Market concentration concerns a 
specific industry under the control of a few large firms which may lead 
to the exercise of monopoly power. Aggregate concentration occurs 
when a few large firms control broad segments of the economy (such as 
manufacturing, financial, and insurance sectors) or when the power of 
conglomerates extend beyond a particular industry. Changes in aggre-
gate concentration may signal a change in the distribution of economic, 
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political, or social power. Another distinction is between relative and 
absolute concentration. If all firms grow the same proportion, concen-
tration increases absolutely but relatively remains the same. Relative 
concentration is concerned with the share of output held by large firms 
among a fixed number of firms. Accordingly, various indexes are pro-
posed to measure such concentrations. 
The most widely used indexes are the k-firms concentration ratio, 
whereby the share of sales of the k largest firms (out of a total of n 
firms) are combined; the Herfindahl, defined as the sum of the shares 
of all n firms with the share of each firm weighted by itself; the Gini, 
which measures the extent to which firms in the industry are unequal 
in size; the coefficient of variation, which is the ratio of the standard 
deviation to the mean; and the Theil's entropy, l which is used in physics 
as a measure of disorder. Hannah and Kay (1977) find Theil's entropy 
to be one of the most satisfactory indexes. As a result, Theil's entropy 
is used throughout this paper as the measure of concentration. 
2 Past Studies 
In the two decades spanning 1973 to 1991 three studies provide ex-
cellent information on the structure of the property insurance industry. 
The common denominator of these articles is an assessment of mar-
ket concentration by product line category or by ownership category. 
Joskow (1973) informs us that the 1206 property-liability insurance 
firms as a whole in 1971 held assets of $ 68 billion and premiums of $ 35 
billion. Over half of the latter was written by the top 20 firms, resulting 
in a slight increase in concentration since 1961. Joskow also examines 
concentration within two individual lines, automobile and fire. Again, 
the top 20 firms accounted for concentration levels of approximately 
56 percent in each line, increasing from 45 percent for automobile and 
from 49 percent for fire in 1954. Joskow believes that as a result of 
effective competition, consumers moved their business from high cost 
firms to low cost firms and thereby caused concentration to increase. 
1 Entropy in used in information theory a measure of disorder. In the field of eco-
nomics, entropy is conveniently translated as a measure of the concentration of firms 
in an industry. Sawyer (1981, pp. 29) explains that this use of entropy in economics 
is justified along the lines that an industry will be more competitive the greater the 
uncertainty as to which of a given number of firms will secure the business of a buyer 
chosen at random, and entropy is a measure of this uncertainty. Note that a rise in en-
tropy indicates an increase in competitiveness and hence a decrease in concentration. 
Brockett (1991), Brockett and Song (1995), and references therein provide examples of 
other applications of information theory to actuarial science. 
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Mayers and Smith (1988) use geographical concentration, line-of-
business concentration, and specialization as indicators of success for 
the ownership type structure (Uoyds, common stock, mutual, recipro-
cal) of the insurance companies. Mayers and Smith find stock compa-
nies are less concentrated geographically than the other three forms 
of ownership. When not controlling for size, mutual companies were 
the least concentrated by line of business. When controlling for size, 
however, reciprocals were the most concentrated. 
The third significant paper, by Cummins and Weiss (1991), assesses 
concentration for the personal and commercial categories for four, ten, 
and 50 largest firms. They discover that for the personal lines in 1989 
the top four firms controlled 43.2 percent and 41.8 percent of private 
passenger auto liability and private passenger auto physical damage, 
respectively. For homeowners, 39.5 percent was controlled by the top 
four firms. On the commercial side, 26.7 percent of workers' compen-
sation was controlled by the top four firms. Cummins and Weiss echo 
the assessment of Joskow that concentration in some insurance lines 
results from the efficiency advantage some companies have in deal-
ing with clients and from gains in market share that accompany lower 
prices for insureds. 
3 Aim and Purpose 
Most studies on concentration of property insurance have been based 
on a product line category or on ownership category, the two impor-
tant classifications according to Gart (1984). Due to the two interre-
lated categories, the noticeable reorganization of the insurance indus-
try where there is increased interest in financial services, and general 
corporate mergers, many insurance companies operate on many lines 
and thus have become conglomerates. Specifically, mergers among 
competing firms, who already occupy substantial positions as pointed 
out by Manne (1965), are viewed with suspicion. 
Utton (1970) explains that where overall (aggregate) concentration 
exists, it is most likely that some individual markets will be highly con-
centrated. There are also arguments that stress the significance of ag-
gregate concentration. Among these arguments is the notion that when 
a large proportion of economic activity is held by a relatively few firms, 
it constitutes a threat to democratic government directly through pres-
sure groups and indirectly through advertising. A follow-up to this 
notion is the concern that basic policy decisions such as future invest-
ment, price, and product poliCies (which are functions associated with 
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entrepreneurship) are made by a small number of individuals, perhaps 
one or two members of the board of directors. Furthermore, large di-
versified firms can affect the market conduct even though their relative 
shares do not constitute a monopoly. If one large firm has a stronger 
position in a specific product line and another firm has a stronger po-
sition in another line, it is unlikely that any of the firms compete in the 
market where it has the advantage for fear of retaliation in the market 
where its position is not strongly established. The focus of attention, 
therefore, is the overall concentration of economic power controlled by 
a small number of large firms, typically the largest 100 or 200 enter-
prises. 
The purpose of this paper is to quantify the effects of reorganiza-
tion and mergers of recent years on aggregate concentration. Such an 
assessment will add further insight into the structure of the property-
casualty insurance industry with data from Best's Insurance Reports on 
the largest 200 American property casualty companies. Similar stud-
ies concerned with aggregate concentration in the industrial sector have 
been conducted using the Fortune 500, a popular source of data for such 
studies. Notable among these are the works by Hexter and Snow (1970), 
Nissan and Caveny (1985, 1988), Attaran and Saghafi (1988), Saghafi 
and Attaran (1990), and Deutsch and Silber (1995). The data supplied by 
Best's Insurance Reports since 1985, whereby the 200 largest American 
property-casualty companies are ranked, provide a similar opportunity 
for measuring aggregate concentration for the insurance industry. 
4 Measurement 
Using the data on shares of premiums reported in Best's Insurance 
Reports for the largest 200 firms or groups in 1985, 1989, and 1993, 
Theil's entropy is used to quantify the degree of concentration. The 
three periods 1985, 1989, and 1993 are spaced in time to show if any 
significant changes occurred. Between 1985 and 1989 approximately 
250 mergers and acquisitions occurred. Between 1990 and 1993 ap-
proximately 300 occurred. The question is whether these mergers have 
resulted in an increase in concentration. 
Theil's (1967) entropy, E, is defined as 
n 
E=-LPilogpi,O:::;E:::;logn 
i=l 
(1) 
where Pi 2': 0 is the i-th firm's proportional share of premiums; n is the 
number of firms, and :L. Pi = 1. 
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If all n firms have an equal share, then E = log n, and concentration 
is at a minimum, in contrast to E = 0 when one firm controls all shares. 
Therefore, a decline in E corresponds to an increase in concentration. 
For a given level of entropy E*, the numbers eqUivalent, (n *), is the 
number of equally sized firms it would take to produce the same level 
of entropy E*, i.e., 
n* = eE*. (2) 
5 Empirical Results 
The largest 200 property-casualty insurance companies or groups of 
companies accounted in 1993 for 73 percent of net premiums written 
($189 billion of $259 billion), 78 percent of admitted assets ($ 527 billion 
of $672 billion), and 84 percent of holders' surplus ($153 billion of $182 
billion). These huge sums indicate that this comparably small number 
of firms held a significant control of the market. 
The three panels of Table 1 report for 1985, 1989, and 1993 the to-
tal net premiums, the mean, the standard deviation, the minimum, the 
maximum, and the coefficient of variation. The information in Table 1 
is supplied for the largest 200 companies as well as by smaller sets of 
four groups of companies 001-020; 021-050; 051-100; 101-200. Total 
net premiums written by the 200 companies increased from approxi-
mately $117 billion in 1985 to $189 billion in 1993, an increase of 62 
percent. The largest 20 companies accounted on average for 50 percent 
of total premiums written throughout the period, followed by the next 
30 companies of lesser rank accounting for approximately 20 percent. 
The lesser ranked sets of 50 companies and 100 companies, ranked 51 
to 100 and 101 to 200, accounted for approximately 16 percent and 15 
percent, respectively. 
In 1993 the average net premiums written for all the 200 companies 
reached almost $1 billion, with the largest 20 companies writing on 
average $4.7 billion. The smallest company among the 200 in 1993 
wrote $200 million worth of premiums, while the largest wrote well over 
$22 billion. For all 200 companies the coefficient of variation shows an 
increase from 1.81 in 1985 to 2.01 in 1989 to 2.18 in 1993. For the 
respective three periods the most noticeable increase in the coefficient 
of variation occurred for the top 20 companies, moving from 0.80 to 
0.94 to 1.12. The coefficient of variation for the other groups remained 
virtually the same throughout the three periods. 
Table 2 shows the results for the computation of the concentration 
index, the Theil's entropy E of equation (1). There are slight changes 
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Table 1 
Summary Information of Net Premiums Written 
of Largest Property.Casualty Companies 
Coefficient 
Standard of 
Com~anies Total Percent Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum Variation 
Panel A: 1985 
All 200 117,103 100 586 1,058 114 10,331 1.81 
001-020 56,840 49 2,842 2,281 1,228 10,331 0.80 
021-050 23,460 20 782 183 547 1,201 0.23 
051-100 19,005 16 380 79 265 540 0.21 
101-200 17,798 15 178 46 114 264 0.26 
Panel B: 1989 
All 200 166,645 100 833 1,677 148 16,873 2.01 
001-020 83,380 50 4,169 3,920 1,664 16,873 0.94 
021-050 32,706 20 1,090 272 770 1,657 0.25 
051-100 27,010 16 540 118 350 757 0.22 
101-200 23,549 14 236 54 148 348 0.23 
Panel C: 1993 
All 200 189,030 100 945 2,060 200 22,226 2.18 
001-020 93,100 49 4,655 5,202 1,982 22,226 1.12 
021-050 36,735 20 1,225 264 879 1,882 0.22 
051-100 30,730 16 615 139 425 853 0.23 
101-200 28,465 15 285 60 200 423 0.21 
Source: Best's Insurance Reports: Property-Casualty United States (Oldwick, 
New Jersey: A.M. Best Company, 1985, 1989, and 1993) and calculations by 
the author. Total, mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum are in $ 
millions. 
in the magnitudes of E over time among the 200 companies, as well 
as the smaller subsets of 20, 30, 50, and 100 companies. This is also 
obvious from the numbers equivalent n * of equation (2). The numbers 
equivalent for all the 200 firms was reduced from 99 in 1985 to 92 in 
1989 to 91 in 1993. For the top 20 the sequence is 16, 15, 14. Hardly 
any change is visible for the lower ranked companies. 
Next we need to ascertain whether these apparent differences in 
entropy over time are statistically significant. Let Eij denote the entropy 
associated with the proportion of premiums (Pij) written for firm i in 
time period j, be denoted by 
Eij = - Pij log Pij (3) 
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Table 2 
Concentration of Premiums Written 
of Largest Property·Casualty Companies 
Numbers 
ComQanies Theil's Entr0I2Y (E} Standard Deviation EQuivalent 
Panel A: 1985 
All 200 1.9976 .0112 99 
001-020 1.2022 .0265 16 
021-050 1.4661 .0079 29 
051-100 1.6901 .0052 49 
101-200 1.9859 .0040 97 
Panel B: 1989 
All 200 1.9661 .0119 92 
001-020 1.1720 .0293 15 
021-050 1.4646 .0084 29 
051-100 1.6890 .0055 49 
101-200 1.9887 .0036 97 
Panel C: 1993 
All 200 1.9594 .0119 91 
001-020 1.1333 .0317 14 
021-050 1.4678 .0073 29 
051-100 1.6881 .0057 49 
101-200 1.9908 .0033 98 
Source: Best's Insurance Reports: Property-Casualty United States (Oldwick, 
New Jersey: A.M. Best Company, 1985, 1989, and 1993) and calculaLions from 
equation (1). 
for i = 1,2, ... , n, j = 1985,1986, ... ,1993 and 2:r=l Pi} = 1. From 
equation (1), it is obvious that 
n 
E.j = L Eij = nE.j. 
i=l 
To test the hypothesis of equality of a pair of total entropies E.j 
and E.k. for j, k = 1985, 1989 and 1993, the appropriate test statistic 
(assuming that a large sample approximation is appropriate) is 
where 
Z = E.j - E.k 
~n(sJ + Sf) (4) 
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Under the null hypothesis, the statistic Z has a standard normal distri-
bution. 
The results indicate that differences in total entropy are not sta-
tistically significant at (){ = 0.05, in which case IZI < 1.96. None of 
the computed IZI values for the groups of companies 20, 30, 50, and 
100 exceeds 1.96. The important conclusion from these results is that 
the levels of concentration among these groups remained virtually the 
same throughout the period 1985-1993. In other words, no substan-
tial shares of premiums written were transferred from one company to 
another. 
The picture looks a bit different when the comparisons are made 
between the groups at each period. Note in Table 1 that E increases in 
magnitude, indicating a decrease in concentration as one moves down 
the hierarchy from the top 20 companies to the bottom 100 companies 
for every period, thus pointing to the existence of larger concentration 
among the top 20 than among the next 30. In turn, there is more con-
centration among this group of 30 than among the smaller group of 50 
companies, which has higher concentration than the next group of the 
smaller 100 companies. The patterns, however, remain the same for 
every period. Concentration does exist, especially among the largest 
firms, yet the level of concentration has remained stable. 
The reorganization and mergers of recent years have not resulted in 
a perceptible increase in concentration in the property-liability insur-
ance industry, unlike what has happened in other services such as retail 
trade, electric and utilities, and the transportation sectors, as shown by 
O'Neill (1996). These services experienced large increases in concentra-
tion in recent years. 
6 Summary 
This paper focuses on measuring aggregate concentration using as 
units net premiums written of the 200 largest property casualty com-
panies, an important sector in the U.S. economy. Theil's entropy index 
is employed for the period 1985 to 1993. The index is not sensitive 
to measuring an increase in concentration among the 200 companies 
or by groups of 20,30, 50, and 100 companies. Concentration between 
these groups of companies remained stable for every period under con-
sideration. During the period under consideration which was marked 
by a substantial activity of mergers and takeovers the property-liability 
insurance industry cannot be accused of increasing its overall economic 
power in spite of the large number of mergers. 
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The findings that no perceptible increase is detected in aggregate 
concentration in the property-liability insurance industry do not pre-
clude the possibility that some lines of insurance have become con-
centrated as a result of recent mergers and acquisitions. Tests at the 
aggregate level may mask increasing trends in concentration on a by-
line basis. Past studies were conducted using data prior to 1990. Be-
cause mergers and acquisitions have been relatively high in the past five 
years, documenting changes in by-line concentration since 1989 would 
be useful. 
The debate whether industry concentration is due to growth of effi-
cient firms that manage to maintain low cost operations through econo-
mies of scale or whether concentration is due to collusion and suppres-
sion of competition continues. In the mean time, efforts must be made 
to provide empirical evidence as to whether concentration exists and, 
if so, whether it is increasing or decreasing over time. 
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Bias of Excluding High and Low Data for 
Long-Tailed Distributions 
Cheng-Sheng Peter Wu* 
Abstract 
Property and casualty actuaries frequently employ a technique of averaging 
(called high-low averages) that excludes the same amount of data at both ends. 
For example, (0 in selecting loss development factors, the middle three of the 
latest five years or the middle eight of latest 12 quarters sometimes are used, 
or (ii) in calculating average expense ratios, the largest expense ratios and the 
smallest expense ratios may be removed from the sample. Although high-
low averages can reduce the impact of influential data on analyzed results, 
the averages will result in downward bias when they are applied to pricing or 
reserving data that exhibit a long-tailed property. We derive the bias for two 
commonly used distributions: lognormal and Pareto. An example is provided 
using chain-ladder reserving where loss development factors are assumed to 
be lognormally distributed. 
Key words and phrases: lognormal distribution, Pareto distribution, percentile, 
influential data, long-tailed distributions, chain-ladder 
High-Low Percentile Average 
Property and casualty (P&C) actuaries often encounter a wide variety 
of large loss risks. These large loss risks sometimes result in pricing 
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or reserving data that have disproportional influence on analyzed re-
sults. Long-tailed distributions, such as lognormal or Pareto distribu-
tions, have been used to describe the insurance data with the large loss 
risks. 
One remedy to minimize the effect of influential data (Le., large 
losses) on analyzed results is to exclude only the influential data. This 
requires a great deal of caution, however. According to Neter, Wasser-
man, and Kutner (1989): 
... an outlying influential case should not be automatically 
discarded, because it may be entirely correct and simply rep-
resents an unlikely event. Discarding such an outlying case 
could lead to the undesirable consequences of increased vari-
ances of some of the estimated regression coefficients. 
P&C actuaries frequently employ a technique of averaging that ex-
cludes the same amount of data at both ends. This averaging tech-
nique will be called high-low averaging in this paper. High-low aver-
ages, such as the averages of the middle three among five years, middle 
eight among ten quarters, etc., can be used in many different situations 
including the calculation of loss development factors, to select under-
writing expense ratios or to determine loss adjustment expense ratios. 
This paper, however, focuses on the particular type of high-low aver-
aging called high-low percentile averaging where the data are sampled 
from a single distribution and the average excludes data lying outside 
a speCified lower and upper pair of percentile points. 
Applying high-low percentile averages to data sampled from a long-
tailed distribution results in a systematic downward bias. The down-
ward bias is the percentage difference between the mean and the condi-
tional mean given that the data lie between a specified lower and upper 
pair of percentile points, Le., 
with 
E[X] 
Ep[X] 
E [X] - E[X] 
Downward Bias = p E[X] x 100% 
Expected value for random variable X; 
Expected value of X given that X lies between 
its upper and lower p percentile points, Le., 
1 fX 2(P) 
-- xdF(x) 
1 - 2p xJ{p) 
(1) 
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where F(x) is cumulative probability function (cdf) of X, and X2 (p) and 
xICp) are the upper and lower percentile points respectively of F(x), 
i.e., 
F(X2(P» = 1 - p F(xICp» = p, xICp) ~ X2(P)· 
Once the downward bias is calculated, the sample high-low average 
can be modified as follows: 
M dT d S 1 H" h L A Sample High-Low Average (2) 
o I Ie amp e Ig - ow verage = 1 + Downward Bias 
Figure 1 illustrates such downward bias when the upper and the 
lower deciles (p = 0.10) of the lognormal distribution are excluded. 
The more data excluded or the more skewed the distribution, the higher 
the downward bias is. Results in Figure 1 can be extended to high-
low averages used by P&C actuaries. For example, a middle 8-of-10 
average also excludes the upper and lower 10 percent of the data. The 
only difference is that the high-low average is based on the sample or 
empirical cumulative distribution function, while Figure 1 is based on 
the theoretical cumulative distribution function. 
In Section 2, the downward bias is derived using the theoretical cu-
mulative distribution function for two commonly used long-tailed dis-
tributions: lognormal and Pareto. The downward bias when the sam-
ple (empirical) cumulative distribution function is used is not easily 
derived. Section 3 provides a chain-ladder reserving example in which 
high-low percentile averages are used to select loss development fac-
tors, and the lognormal distribution is assumed for the loss develop-
ment factors. 
2 Downward Bias for the Lognormal and Pareto 
In this section two long-tailed distributions, the lognormal and the 
Pareto, are used for illustration. Other long-tailed distributions should 
follow the general results given for these two distributions. Many of 
the results in this section can be found in Hogg and Klugman (1984) or 
other statistical texts. 
2.1 Lognormal Distribution 
If Z is a standard normal distribution, then X has a lognormal dis-
tribution if and only if 
InX = J1 + a"Z, (J > O. 
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Table 1 
Bias for Lognormal 
p u = 0.2 u = 1.0 u = 1. 5 
0.05 -0.8% -18.2% -38.1% 
0.10 -1.1% -25.1% -48.6% 
0.20 -1.6% -32.6% -59.1% 
Let <I> be the cumulative distribution of the standard normal distribu-
tion, i.e., 
Ix e-y2/2 <I>(x) = --dy, -00 )'[IT 
it follows that the theoretical cumulative distribution function of X is 
F(x) = <I>(lnx - J.l). 
u 
In addition, we have 
F(xrCp»=p => Inx1(P) = J.l+ u<I>-l(p), and 
F(X2(P» = 1 - P => Inx2(p) = J.l + u<I>-l(1- p). 
It can be easily proved that 
E[X] 
Ep[X] 
1 
eXP{J.l+zu2}, and 
E[X] [<I>(lnX2(p) - J.l- ( 2) _ <I>(lnxrCp) - J.l- ( 2)] 
(1 - 2p) u u 
E[X] [ -1 -1] (1- 2p) <I>(<I> (1 - p) - u] - <I> (<I> (p) - u) . 
This gives the downward bias as: 
The above result indicates that the degree of bias only depends on p, 
the percentage of data being excluded, and u, the shape factor. The bias 
does not depend on J.l, the location parameter. Table 1 above shows the 
bias for several combinations of u and p. 
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Table 2 
Bias for Pareto 
p ()(=3 ()( = 10 ()( = 50 
0.05 -23.1% -14.0% -11.7% 
0.10 -31.2% -20.4% -17.6% 
0.20 -40.1% -28.1% -24.7% 
2.2 Pareto Distribution 
Here the theoretical cumulative distribution function is more tractable: 
F(x) = 1 - (_A_) ex 
A+x 
where A > 0 and ()( > 1 are the location and shape parameters. The 
upper and lower percentile points are easily seen to be given by: 
F(xICp»=p => xICp)=AX((1-p)-1/ex-1), and 
F(X2(P» = 1- P => X2(P) = A x (p-l/ex -1). 
In addition, 
E[X] 
Ep[X] 
A / «()( - 1) and 
E[X] [ ] ()((1 - p)f3 - pf3) - «()( - 1)(1 - 2p) . (1 - 2p) 
where (3 = «()( - 1) / ()(. Finally, the downward bias is: 
Bias = ()( [(1 - p)f3 - pf3 - (1 - 2p)] . (1 - 2p) (4) 
The degree of bias for Pareto distribution depends only on the per-
centage of excluded data (p) and the shape factor «()(), but not on the 
location parameter (A). Table 2 above shows the bias for different com-
binations of ()( and p. 
3 A Case Study: Chain-Ladder Reserving Example 
The chain-ladder technique is a loss development technique that as-
sumes that past loss development patterns reflect future loss develop-
ments. For more information regarding loss development techniques, 
see Wiser (1990, Chapter 2). 
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Let Li,} denote the loss for accident year i developed to age j and 
D },}+l denote the age-to-age development factor from development age 
j to j + 1. The estimate of the ultimate loss for year i developed to age 
j, ULi(j), is: 
(5) 
where UDi(j) is the age-to-ultimate development factor for year i de-
veloped to age j and 
UDi(j) = n D}+k,}+k+l' 
k=O 
(6) 
Table 3 shows an automobile bodily injury loss triangle and the as-
sociated age-to-age development factor triangle. These data were intro-
duced by Zehnwirth (1989) and analyzed by Kelly (1992), and others. 
Table 3 also shows three types of averages for selecting the age-to-
age and age-to-ultimate development factors: all year straight averages, 
all year averages excluding one high and one low data, and all year 
averages excluding two high data and two low data. These averages 
are factor averages, not volume-weighted averages. When the number 
of data points for older accident years is not enough to calculate one 
high-one low (two high-two low) averages, straight averages (one high-
one low averages) will be used. 
Results in Table 3 show that the straight averages result in the high-
est estimates, while the two high-two low averages result in the lowest 
estimates. This suggests that age-to-age loss development factors may 
have a long-tailed property. 
The possibility that age-to-age development factors may have a long 
tail has not gone without notice. Hayne's study (1986) assumes in quan-
tifying variability of loss reserves, that the age-to-age development fac-
tors are lognormally distributed: 
In(D},}+d ~ N(/-l}, a}) 
where /-l} and a} are the mean and variance of the normal distribution. 
The main advantage of assuming lognormal distributions for age-
to-age development factors is that the age-to-ultimate factors and, con-
sequently, the ultimate loss estimates are also lognormally distributed, 
Le., 
00 00 
InUDi(j) ~ N( L /-lk. LaD· 
k=} k=} 
Table 3 
,.... 
Vl 
Loss and Loss Develo~ment Factor Triangles 0 
Losses: 
Development Age 
Accident 
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1971 $568,891 $2,148,049 $3,425,871 $4,160,541 $4,840,910 S5,058,131 $5,205,931 $5,263,030 $5,327,859 
1972 $428,753 $1,399,393 $2,355,291 $3,451,062 $3,961,134 $4,452,987 $4,695,982 $4,995,827 
1973 $458,252 $1,447,324 $2,864,930 $3,818,152 $4,699,285 $4,978,063 $5,175,219 
1974 $355,229 $1,304,036 $2,596,936 $3,344,939 $3,892,227 $4,166,594 '--0 
1975 $282,419 $970,751 $2,129,544 $3,032,994 $3,662,977 c 
"'" 1976 $267,600 $1,312,390 $2,528,827 $3,367,532 ::J~ 
1977 $560,307 $1,500,309 $2,686,208 0 
1978 $360,171 $1,371,944 ...... :t> 
1979 $445,545 ("'\ ..... 
C 
PJ 
"'" Age-to-Age Factors: ~ 
Development Age '"0 
"'" Accident PJ("'\ 
Year 1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-6 6-7 7-8 8-9 ::!. ("'\ 
1971 3.7759 1.5949 1.2144 1.1635 1.0449 1.0292 LOll 0 1.0123 .!b 
1972 3.2639 1.6831 1.4652 1.1478 1.1242 1.0546 1.0639 < 0 
1973 3.1584 1.9795 1.3327 1.2308 1.0593 1.0396 :-
1974 3.6710 1.9915 1.2880 1.1636 1.0705 .j:>. 
1975 3.4373 2.1937 1.4242 1.2077 z 0 
1976 4.9043 1.9269 1.3317 
1977 2.6777 1.7904 
1978 3.8091 \0 
1979 \0 01 
Table 3 (continued) 
Loss and Loss Development Factor Triangles 
Age-to-Age Development Factors: 
Development Age 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
All Year Average - Straight Average 3.5872 1.8800 1.3427 1.1827 1.0747 1.0411 1.0374 1.0123 
All Year Average - 1 High and 1 Low 3.5192 1.8743 1.3442 1.1783 1.0649 1.0396 1.0374 1.0123 
All Year Average - 2 High and 2 Low 3.5370 1.8989 1.3322 1.1636 1.0649 1.0396 1.0374 1.0123 
Age-to-Ultimate Development Factors: 
Development Age 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
All Year Average - Straight Average 12.5843 3.5081 1.8660 1.3897 1.1751 1.0934 1.0502 1.0123 1.0000 
All Year Average - 1 High and 1 Low 12.1459 3.4513 1.8414 1.3699 1.1626 1.0918 1.0502 1.0123 1.0000 
All Year Average - 2 High and 2 Low 12.1050 3.4224 1.8023 1.3529 1.1626 1.0918 1.0502 1.0123 1.0000 
Notes: 1. These are automobile bodily injury data that were studied by Kelly (1992). 
2. No tail development is assumed. 
3. If the number of data points is not enough, straight averages (1 high - 1 low) will be used for 1 high - 1 low (2 
high - 2 low). 
~ 
t: 
~ 
III 
VI 
0' 
..... 
r 
o 
::s 
lO 
.:, 
~. 
(!) 
c.. 
CJ 
VI 
..... 
~. 
a-
t: 
!:!'. 
o 
::s 
VI 
f-' 
Ul 
f-' 
152 Journal of Actuarial Practice, Vol. 4, No.1, 1996 
Kelly (1992) and McNichols (1992) also conclude that a lognormal as-
sumption is better in describing age-to-age development factors than a 
normal assumption because lognormal distributions can take only pos-
itive values and their long-tailed property reflects no upper boundary 
for the development factors. 
Fitting lognormal distributions to the age-to-age development fac-
tors in Table 3 produces the parameter estimates in Table 4. First, /1 j 
and a} are calculated for each development age. These parameters are 
then summed from that age to ultimate to obtain age-to-ultimate devel-
opment factors for a development age. No tail development is assumed 
in Tables 3 or 4. 
There are noted differences between the sample variances given in 
Table 4 and the sample variances given by Kelly (1992). In Table 4 the 
sample variances are equal to the sum of squares divided by a factor of 
n - 1 (to yield the traditional unbiased estimate of the sample variance), 
while Kelly divides the sum of squares by n (to yield the maximum 
likelihood estimate of the sample variance). 
Given these lognormal parameter estimates, the high-low averages 
in Table 3 can be modified to correct the downward bias for the av-
erages. The modified averages are given in Table 5. For example, the 
one high-one low all-year average (middle six of eight) for the one year-
to-two year development factor excludes the upper and the lower 12.5 
percent of the sample data. According to the results given in Section 
2.1, with P = 12.5%, /11 = 1.2636, and O"f = 0.2155, a bias of -0.97 
percent is indicated for the lognormal assumption. 
Table 5 shows the indicated biases for each development age and the 
modified high-low averages. Table 6 compares the estimated ultimate 
losses and reserves among the straight averages, the high-low averages, 
and the modified high-low averages. 
Three issues for dealing with limited volume data should be noted. 
First, for limited volume data additional parameter variation is intro-
duced because sample parameters are assumed for true parameters. 
Second, this is a bootstrap procedure because excluded data are used 
to calculate the sample parameters, which in turn are used to calculate 
the degree of bias to modify the high-low averages. 
Last, even though the true parameters are known, the indicated bias 
when sample size is small will not be the same as the indicated bias 
when sample size is large. In the chain-ladder reserving example, the 
indicated bias is -0.97 percent for the one high-one low all-year average 
(middle six of eight) for the one year- to-two year development factor. 
~ 
s::: 
~ 
III 
II' 
Table 4 0' ..... 
Lognormal Parameters for Loss Devel0l!ment Factors r 0 
Natural Logarithm Transformation of Age-to-Age Factors in Table 2: ::s lC 
Development Age .:.; III 
Accident Year 1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-6 6-7 7-8 8-9 . (J) 
1971 1.3286 0.4668 0.1943 0.1515 0.0439 0.0288 0.0109 0.0122 c.. 
1972 1.1829 0.5206 0.3820 0.1378 0.1170 0.0531 0.0619 0 II' 
1973 1.1501 0.6828 0.2872 0.2076 0.0576 0.0388 ..... ~. 
1974 1.3005 0.6889 0.2531 0.1515 0.0681 0-s::: 
1975 1.2347 0.7856 0.3536 0.1887 :::!". 0 
1976 1.5901 0.6559 0.2864 ::s 
II' 
1977 0.9849 0.5825 
1978 1.3374 
Age-to-Age DeveloQment Factors: 
Lognormal Mean - All Year Average 1.2636 0.6262 0.2928 0.1674 0.0717 0.0403 0.0364 0.0122 
Lognormal Variance - All Year Average 0.0308 0.0120 0.0046 0.0009 0.0010 0.0001 0.0013 0.0000 
Age-to-Ultimate DeveloQment Factors: 
Lognormal Mean - All Year Average 2.5106 1.2470 0.6208 0.3280 0.1606 0.0889 0.0486 0.0122 
Lognormal Variance - All Year Average 0.0507 0.0199 0.0079 0.0033 0.0025 0.0014 0.0013 0.0000 
f-' 
Ul 
W 
f-' 
Ul 
~ 
Table 5 
Modified High-Low Averages for Loss Develo~ment Factors 
Age-to-Age Factors in Table 2: 
Development Age 
Accident Year 1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-6 6-7 7-8 8-9 
1971 3.7759 1.5949 1.2144 1.1635 1.0449 1.0292 1.0110 1.0123 
1972 3.2639 1.6831 1.4652 1.1478 1.1242 1.0546 1.0639 
1973 3.1584 1.9795 1.3327 1.2308 1.0593 1.0396 '-0 
1974 3.6710 1.9915 1.2880 1.1636 1.0705 s:: 
"" 1975 3.4373 2.1937 1.4242 1.2077 :::l~ 
1976 4.9043 1.9269 1.3317 0 
1977 2.6777 1.7904 
...., 
» 
1978 3.8091 n .... 
s:: 
III 
Age-to-Age DeveloQment Factors: ~. ~ 
All Year Average - Straight Average 3.5872 1.8800 1.3427 1.1827 1.0747 1.0411 1.0374 1.0123 "'0 
"" III 
n 
.... 
Lognormal Parameters: n 
Lognormal Mean - All Year Average 1.2636 0.6262 0.2928 0.1674 0.0717 0.0403 0.0364 0.0122 ~ 
< Lognormal Variance - All Year Average 0.0308 0.0120 0.0046 0.0009 0.0010 0.0001 0.0013 0.0000 0 
.j:>. 
All Year Average - 1 High and 1 Low 3.5192 1.8743 1.3442 1.1783 1.0649 1.0396 1.0374 1.0123 z 
% of High and Low Data Excluded 12.5% 14.3% 16.7% 20.0% 25.0% 33.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0 
Downward Bias -0.97% -0.40% -0.17% -0.03% -0.04% -0.01% 
Modified 1 High and 1 Low 3.5536 1.8819 1.3464 1.1787 1.0654 1.0397 1.0374 1.0123 
\0 
\0 
O'l 
Table 5 (continued) 
Modified High.Low Averages fo~ Loss D~v:~lopment Factors 
Age-to-Age Development Factors: 
Development Age 
1-2 2-3 3-4 4-5 5-6 6-7 7-8 
All Year Average - 2 High and 2 Low 3.5370 1.8989 1.3322 1.1636 1.0649 1.0396 1.0374 
p% of Data Excluded 25.0% 28.6% 33.3% 40.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 
Downward Bias -1.31% -0.54% -0.22% -0.04% 
Modified 2 High and 2 Low 3.5840 1.9092 1.3351 1.1641 1.0654 1.0397 1.0374 
Age-to-Ultimate DeveloQment Factors: 
Straight Average 12.5843 3.5081 1.8660 1.3897 1.1751 1.0934 1.0502 
Modified 1 High and 1 Low 12.3453 3.4740 1.8460 1.3711 1.1632 1.0919 1.0502 
Modified 2 High and 2 Low 12.3702 3.4515 1.8079 1.3541 1.1632 1.0919 1.0502 
8-9 
1.0123 
0.0% 
1.0123 
1.0123 1.0000 
1.0123 1.0000 
1.0123 1.0000 
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Table 6 ,.... V1 
Com~arison of Ultimate Losses and Reserves Between Different Averaging Technigues O'l 
Age-to-Ultimate Loss Development Factors: 
Undeveloped Straight 1 High & 2 High & Modified 1 High Modified 2 High 
Accident Year Losses Avel'al!e 1 Low 2 Low & 1 Low &2Low 
1971 $5,327,859 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
1972 $4,995,827 1.0123 1.0123 1.0123 1.0123 1.0123 
1973 $5,175,219 1.0502 1.0502 1.0502 1.0502 1.0502 
1974 $4,166,594 1.0934 1.0918 1.0918 1.0919 1.0919 
1975 $3,662,977 1.1751 1.1626 1.1626 1.1632 1.1632 '-0 
1976 $3,367,532 1.3897 1.3699 1.3529 1.3711 1.3541 c ..... 
1977 $2,686,208 1.8660 1.8414 1.8023 1.8460 1.8079 ::::l !::!.. 
1978 $1,371,944 3.5081 3.4513 3.4224 3.4740 3.4515 0 
1979 $445,545 12.5843 12.1459 12.1050 12.3453 12.3702 
...., 
» 
Total: $31,199,705 ("'I .... 
C 
llJ 
Ultimate Losses: :::!. !::!.. 
Straight 1 High & 2 Higb & Modified 1 High Modified 2 Higb 'iJ 
Accident Year Average 1 Low 2 Low & 1 Low &2Low ..... llJ ("'I 
1971 $5,327,859 $5,327,859 S5,327,859 55,327,859 $5,327,859 !:!. ("'I 
1972 $5,057,365 55,057,365 S5,057,365 55,057,365 $5,057,365 .!D 
1973 $5,434,955 $5,434,955 S5,434,955 55,434,955 $5,434,955 < 
1974 $4,555,688 $4,549,008 $4,549,008 $4,549,326 $4,549,326 0 
1975 $4,304,274 $4,258,744 $4,258,744 $4,260,887 $4,260,887 ~ 
1976 $4,680,012 $4,613,276 $4,555,846 $4,617,162 $4,560,077 z 
1977 $5,012,583 $4,946,406 $4,841,310 $4,958,844 $4,856,293 0 
1978 $4,812,972 $4,734,976 $4,695,357 $4,766,110 $4,735,286 
1979 $5,606,883 $5,411,560 55,393,340 S5,5OO,387 $5,511,474 \!) 
Total: $44,792,590 $44,334,149 544.113,782 $44.47~,89~_ . $44,293~20 \!) en 
Table 6 (continued) 
Comparison of Ultimate Losses and Reserves Between Different Averaging Techniques 
Reserves: 
Accident Year 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
Total: 
Straight 
Average 
o 
$61,538 
$259,736 
$389,094 
$641,297 
$1,312,480 
$2,326,375 
$3,441,028 
$5,161,338 
$13,592,885 
1 High & 
1 Low 
o 
$61,538 
$259,736 
$382,414 
$595,767 
$1,245,744 
$2,260,198 
$3,363,032 
$4,966,015 
$13,134,444 
2 High & 
2 Low 
o 
$61,538 
$259,736 
$382,414 
$595,767 
$1,188,314 
$2,155,102 
$3,323,413 
$4,947,795 
$12.914,077 
Modified 1 High Modified 2 High 
& 1 Low &2Low 
o 0 
$61,538 $61,538 
$259,736 $259,736 
$382,732 $382,732 
$597,910 $597,910 
$1,249,630 $1,192,545 
$2,272,636 $2,170,085 
53,394,166 $3,363,342 
55,054,842 55,065,929 
$13.273,189 $13,093,815 
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This is the indicated bias when the sample size is large with p = 12.5%, 
III = 1.2636, and a"l = 0.2155. On the other hand, a further simulation 
test based on 5,000 replicates indicates that the bias is -0.80 percent 
when middle six of eight are used for the average. This simulated bias 
is smaller than the theoretical bias when sample size is large. 
4 Summary and Conclusions 
For many insurance applications, high-low averages result in lower 
estimates than straight averages because insurance data exhibit a long-
tailed property. This downward bias is shown in a simple reserving 
example in which high-low averages are used to select loss development 
factors. These averages, however, can be modified using equation (2). 
The analysis and data given in this paper are far from complete. The 
levels of the downward bias that would most likely exist in practice have 
not been reviewed. Also, the level of the downward bias for a limited 
volume of data has not been fully explored. There needs to be more 
in-depth research in this area. 
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Disclosure and Confidentiality Requirements of 
Corporate Pension Plan Actuaries 
Theodore Konshak* 
Abstract 
Corporate pension plan actuaries are subject to the standards of the Joint 
Board for the Enrollment of Actuaries. The Joint Board is empowered to estab-
lish such standards under the provisions of the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act of 1974, a federal law. In consideration of these statutory stan-
dards, this article will discuss whether standards published by professional 
actuarial organizations have any applicability. The contrast between the dis-
closure requirements of federal law and the confidentiality standards of the 
Society of Actuaries will be highlighted. 
Key words and phrases: ERISA, actuarial standards, fiduciaries, enrolled actu-
ary, plan auditor 
Introduction 
Defined benefit pension plans promise to pay a monthly income to 
each participant for the remainder of the participant's lifetime or for 
the lifetimes of both the participant and his or her spouse. Money is 
deposited into a trust fund, is invested by the pension plan trustees, 
and is periodically withdrawn by the plan administrator to pay retirees 
their monthly benefits. In the United States, the minimum amount to be 
deposited into the trust fund is based on an annual actuarial valuation 
performed by an enrolled actuary under the terms of the 1974 Employee 
Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA). 
In addition to providing actuarial services under ERISA, actuarial 
service providers also can earn income by providing an employer with 
*Theodore Konshak is an emolled actuary with Negotiated Pension Plans, Ltd. 
Mr. Konshak's address is: Negotiated Pension Plans, Ltd., 1107 Wilson Avenue, Green 
Bay, WI 54303-4206, USA. 
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a wide variety of services including, but not limited to, recordkeeping 
services for defined contribution pension plans and consulting services 
on the legal requirements of the pension plan. 
This paper reviews the required disclosures of the emolled actuary 
under ERISA and the confidentiality provisions of the Professional Code 
of Conduct of the Society of Actuaries to determine if the statutory 
standards of ERISA are being subverted, inadvertently or otherwise, by 
these professional standards. 
2 Enrolled Actuaries and Plan Auditors 
Corporate pension plans are classified into two general types based 
on whether the provisions of the plan define the deposits or the with-
drawals: 
• In a defined benefit plan, the plan provisions define a series of 
monthly withdrawals payable during the lifetime of the partici-
pant. The minimum deposit under federal law is determined by 
an actuarial valuation performed by an emolled actuary . 
• In a defined contribution plan, the plan provisions define the de-
posits than can and will be made. Withdrawals are these deposits 
and the investment earnings on these deposits. Defined contri-
bution plans do not require the services of an emolled actuary 
because the deposit is specified by the terms of the plan. 
A pension plan auditor examines the financial statements of the 
pension plan. In addition to determining whether the money is actu-
ally there, the pension plan auditor reviews the statement of where the 
money has gone. Both defined benefit and defined contribution pension 
plans with at least 100 participants require the services of an auditor. 
Under ERISA administrators of pension plans must engage both an 
emolled actuary and pension plan auditor on the behalf of all plan par-
ticipants. For emolled actuaries, this is the actual language of Section 
103(a)(4)(A) of ERISA. 
Engagement on the behalf of all plan participants is a legal require-
ment to ensure the impartiality of actuarial determinations and the in-
tegrity of pension plan audits. The accuracy of audited pension records 
should not reflect the effort an employer is willing to exert. The mini-
mum deposit required under federal law should not reflect the amount 
the employer currently is willing to contribute. Impartiality of actuar-
ial determinations and integrity of pension plan audits are duties and 
obligations of the emolled actuary and pension plan auditor. 
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The administrators of pension plans who hire the enrolled actuary 
and pension plan auditors are fiduciaries under Section 21 (A) of ERISA. 
This means plan administrators must discharge their duties solely in 
the interest of plan participants (Section 404(a)(1) of ERISA). Fiducia-
ries are the responsible parties and may be held legally liable for any 
misconduct. 
Enrolled actuaries are accredited and regulated by the joint Board 
for the Enrollment of Actuaries, a federal board consisting of three 
members appointed by the Secretary of the Treasury and two members 
appointed by the Secretary of Labor. The joint Board is administered 
by an executive director appointed by the Secretary of the Treasury. 
Section 3042 of ERISA describes the enrollment of actuaries by the 
joint Board: 
The joint Board shall, by regulations, establish reasonable 
standards and qualifications for persons performing actuar-
ial services with respect to plans to which this Act applies 
and, upon application by any individual, shall enroll such in-
dividual if the joint Board finds that such individual satisfies 
such standards and qualifications ... The joint Board may, 
after notice and an opportunity for a hearing, suspend or 
terminate the enrollment of an individual under this section 
if the joint Board finds that such individual-(l) has failed 
to discharge his duties under this Act, or (2) does not satisfy 
the requirements for enrollment as in effect at the time of 
his enrollment. 
The Standards of Performance for Enrolled Actuaries were published 
by the joint Board under Title 20, Chapter VIII, Part 901, Subpart C of 
the Code of Federal Regulations. 
The executive director of the joint Board maintains a roster of all 
persons whose enrollment to perform actuarial services under ERISA 
has been suspended or terminated. This roster contains the names of 
only two suspended enrolled actuaries. 
To date the joint Board has devoted most of its limited resources to 
the accreditation of enrolled actuaries through examinations and con-
tinuing education. Regulation of enrolled actuaries through its stan-
dards of performance has not been a priority. These statutory stan-
dards of performance may be expanded and be more strictly enforced 
if the composition of the joint Board is changed to include representa-
tives of the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC).l 
1 The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) is the federal agency that insures 
the payment of benefits from failed pension plans. As in other insolvency insurance 
162 Journal of Actuarial Practice, Vol. 4, No.1, 1996 
A representative of the PBGC presently can participate in discus-
sions of the Joint Board, but cannot vote on any issues. As the minutes 
of the March 15, 1995 meeting of the Joint Board indicate, the PBGC 
has attempted in the past to obtain voting representation on the Joint 
Board. Umeasonable actuarial determinations of the variable rate pre-
mium paid by corporate sponsors to the PBGC could intensify their 
efforts to obtain such representation. 
3 Actuarial Codes of Conduct 
3.1 Professional 
Actuarial organizations publish codes of professional conduct to 
govern the relationship between consulting actuary and client! employer. 
The professional codes of conduct of virtually every actuarial organiza-
tion in the United States are identical to the Code of the Society of Ac-
tuaries. Uniformity is necessary because the Actuarial Board for Coun-
seling and Discipline (ABCD) enforces these actuarial codes of conduct 
for the professional actuarial organizations sponsoring its activities. 
The following is from Precept 10 and Annotation 10-1, respectively, 
of the Code of Professional Conduct of the Society of Actuaries (1996)2: 
An actuary shall not disclose to another party any confiden-
tial information obtained through professional services per-
formed for a principal (Le., client or employer) unless autho-
rized to do so by the client or employer or required to do so 
by law. "Confidential information" refers to information not 
in the public domain of which the actuary becomes aware in 
conjunction with the rendering of professional services to a 
principal. It may include ... information which the actuary 
has reason to believe that the principal would not wish to be 
divulged. 
3.2 Criminal 
Under Title I, Section 103(d) of ERISA the results of the annual actu-
arial valuation are to be disclosed on an actuarial statement prepared by 
pools sponsored by the federal government (e.g., the FDIC for banks and the FSLIC for 
savings and loan associations), the PBGC is financed by premiums paid by the corporate 
sponsors of the defined benefit pension plans covered under the program. 
2 Society of Actuaries. 1996 Society of Actuaries Yearbook. Schaumburg, Ill.: Society 
of Actuaries, 1996. 
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the enrolled actuary (Le., the Schedule B prepared by the enrolled actu-
ary and attached to the annual Form 5500 filed by the plan administra-
tor). Section 103(d) of ERISA also requires the disclosure of information 
including, but not limited to, a statement of actuarial assumptions and 
methods used to determine costs and justifications for any change in 
those actuarial assumptions or methods. Section 103(d)(13) of ERISA 
requires disclosure of "such other information as may be necessary to 
fully and fairly disclose the actuarial position of the plan." 
Section 1027 of the Criminal Codes states: 
Whoever, in any document required by Title I of the Em-
ployee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (as amended 
from time to time) to be published, ... knowingly conceals, 
covers up, or fails to disclose any fact the disclosure of which 
is required by such title or is necessary to verify, explain, 
clarify, or check the accuracy and completeness any report 
required by such title to be published ... shall be fined not 
more than $10,000, or imprisoned not more than five years, 
or both. 
ERISA created an enrolled actuary engaged on behalf of all plan par-
ticipants, imposed duties and obligations under ERISA on that enrolled 
actuary, and subjected him or her to the standards of the Joint Board for 
the Enrollment of Actuaries. Professional actuarial organizations also 
have standards governing the relationship between consulting actuary 
and client/employer. Confidentiality and full disclosure are examples 
of when the duties of the enrolled actuary are diametrically opposed to 
the standards of professional actuarial organizations. 
3.3 Contrast to Pension Plan Auditor 
Under the terms of Section 103(a)(3)(A) of ERISA the pension plan 
auditor examines the books and records of the pension plan under gen-
erally accepted auditing standards. In contrast, actuarial services are 
not performed under ERISA according to generally accepted actuarial 
standards. That term does not appear and would not have to appear 
in ERISA because the Joint Board for the Enrollment of Actuaries estab-
lishes the standards for enrolled actuaries. 
The statement preceding the enrolled actuary's signature on Sched-
ule B (Form 5500) makes no reference to generally accepted actuarial 
standards: 
To the best of my knowledge, the information supplied in 
this schedule and on the accompanying statements, if any, is 
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complete and accurate and, in my opinion, each assumption 
used in combination represents my best estimate of antici-
pated experience under the plan. Furthermore, in the case 
of a plan other than a multiemployer plan, each assump-
tion used is (a) reasonable (taking into account the experi-
ence of the plan and reasonable expectations) or (b) would, 
in the aggregate, result in a total contribution equivalent to 
that which would be determined if each such assumption 
were reasonable. In the case of a multiemployer plan, the 
assumptions used, in the aggregate, are reasonable (taking 
into account the experience of the plan and reasonable ex-
pectations). 
Because actuarial determinations under ERISA are calculated accord-
ing to standards established by the JOint Board for the Enrollment of 
Actuaries and not according to the standards of the actuarial profes-
sion, enrolled actuaries have no legal basis for citing any actuarial stan-
dard under the Code of Professional Conduct of the Society of Actuar-
ies or any other actuarial organization. Auditing standards have legal 
recognition and standing under ERISA. The standards of professional 
actuarial organizations do not enjoy such recognition or standing. 
3.4 Consequences of Suspension 
One of the two suspended enrolled actuaries on the joint Board ros-
ter is currently a trustee of a major actuarial foundation. The other 
continues to be a consulting pension actuary with a major employee 
benefits consulting firm and was the discussion leader at a workshop 
on public employee retirement systems at an annual enrolled actuaries 
meeting.3 
At least in these two cases employment and status within the actu-
arial profession were not adversely impacted by suspension as an en-
rolled actuary. Legally the statutory standards of the joint Board take 
precedence. In practice, does the lack of detrimental consequences 
for suspension as an enrolled actuary suggest minimal respect for the 
statutory standards of the joint Board? 
3Under the separation of powers doctrine, pension plans sponsored by state and 
local governments (Le., public employee retirement plans) are exempted from the re-
quirements of ERISA, a federal law, and their actuaries therefore do not have to be 
enrolled by the Joint Board. 
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Table 1 
Changes in Actuarial Assumptions and Techniques 
Number of Changes 
Type of Change Actual Reported Justified 
Investment Return 8 5 2 
Retirement Ages 4 2 1 
Salary Increase 7 5 3 
Terminations of Employment 7 2 2 
Disabilities 2 1 0 
Deaths 7 3 2 
Payment of Plan Expenses 3 2 1 
Funding Method Changes 14 13 1 
Other 5 3 1 
Total 57 36 13 
4 Changes in Actuarial Assumptions & Techniques 
4.1 The Study 
Section 103(d) of ERISA and the instructions for completing Sched-
ule B require the enrolled actuary to attach a statement of actuarial 
assumptions and techniques, a statement of the changes in actuarial 
assumptions and techniques, and a statement justifying those changes 
in actuarial assumptions and techniques. In a study of a sample of 20 
pension plans that changed actuarial consulting firms, Konshak (1995)4 
tabulated the number of actual, reported, and justified changes. These 
results are reported in Table 1. The asset values of the pension plans 
sampled range from $207 million to $16 million. 
The actual changes in presented in Table 1 are obtained by compar-
ing the statement of actuarial assumptions and techniques attached 
to the 1993 Schedule B to the similar statement attached in the 1992 
Schedule B. Reported changes and justifications are tabulated from the 
1993 attachments to Schedule B. 
4Konshak, T. Financial Effect of Actuarial Marketing Practices on the Solvency of 
Corporate Pension Plans: First Annual Study. (A Research Report). Green Bay. Wis.: 
Negotiated Pension Plans, Ltd., 1995. A copy of this study can be obtained by writing 
directly to the author. 
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According to the analysis of 1993 and 1992 Schedule B attachments 
there were 57 changes in actuarial assumptions and techniques re-
quired to be reported and justified. Thirty-six of these changes were 
reported by the enrolled actuary on the current Schedule B attachment. 
Only 13 of the reported changes (12 changes in actuarial assumptions 
and one change in actuarial techniques) were justified by the enrolled 
actuary. 
The practice of failing to disclose and justify changes in actuarial 
assumptions and techniques is either incompetence (enrolled actuaries 
certify to their familiarity with those portions of ERISA relating directly 
or indirectly to the responsibilities of an enrolled actuary on the Form 
5434-A application for their triennial renewal of enrollment) or a knowl-
edgeable concealment (corporate pension plan actuaries choose not to 
be governed by these provisions of ERISA). In any event, these individ-
uals have failed to discharge their duties under the terms of ERISA. 
4.2 An Example of a Justification 
Although most of the justifications for changes in actuarial assump-
tions and techniques are not immediately verifiable, one justification 
from the Konshak study will be analyzed for reasonableness. 
The assumed rate of future employment terminations was changed 
and justified by the enrolled actuary solely on the basis of prior plan 
experience: "The ultimate withdrawal rates were increased by a factor 
of 10 in order to better reflect actual plan experience." Enrolled actu-
aries who change actuarial assumptions and techniques in this study, 
however, normally would not have a personal and intimate knowledge 
of the prior plan experience. Pension plans in this example changed 
actuarial service providers. 
The prior experience of the pension plan can be established by study-
ing individual participant records if available from the prior enrolled ac-
tuary or corporate sponsor. Corporate sponsors, however, generally are 
unwilling to incur the substantial expense of performing such a study. 
The corporate sponsor in this case changed actuarial service providers 
to reduce its actuarial expenses and provided that as the reason for the 
change in enrolled actuary on the Schedule C (Form 5500) filed with 
the federal government: "Change due to receipt of more competitive 
bid from another actuary firm." 
The change in the assumed rate of future terminations of employ-
ment was the only change in actuarial assumptions or techniques made 
by the new enrolled actuary, and this assumption change significantly 
decreased the minimum deposit payable under federal law. The expla-
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nation for the change in enrolled actuary implies an experience study 
would not have been performed due to cost considerations and sug-
gests another reason for the change in withdrawal rates: cutting costs 
for the corporate sponsor. 
5 Resolution of Conflicting Values 
Pension actuaries believe they can balance their roles as consultants 
to the employer (subject to the standards of the Code of Professional 
Conduct) with their duties and obligations as enrolled actuaries (sub-
ject to the requirements of ERISA and the standards of the Joint Board). 
Technically, the previously quoted section of the Society of Actuaries' 
Code of Professional Conduct relating to confidentiality does not con-
flict with the statutory requirements of ERISA: "An actuary shall not dis-
close to another party any confidential information obtained through 
professional services ... unless ... required to do so by law." A written 
disclaimer in the Code, however, can not erase a sentiment to maintain 
confidentiality through superficial rather than full disclosure. 
The justification quoted in the previous section for the change in 
withdrawal rates could have been subjected to a peer review. If an expe-
rience study had been performed, a peer reviewer could have avoided 
the aforementioned challenge to the reasonableness of this justifica-
tion by suggesting its inclusion: "Based on the results of an experience 
study, the ultimate withdrawal rates were increased by a factor of 10 
in order to better reflect actual plan experience." None of the assump-
tion changes made by the other enrolled actuaries included in my study 
were justified in terms of an experience study. 
If an experience study had not been performed, a peer reviewer 
could make two criticisms. First, the rate of increase, "by a factor of 10," 
will draw the attention of the reader and should be eliminated. Second, 
even though the statement preceding the enrolled actuary's signature 
on the Schedule B necessitates consideration of both prior and expected 
experience by requiring reasonable assumptions "taking into account 
the experience of the plan and reasonable expectations," this assump-
tion change should have been justified solely in terms of the expected 
future experience of the plan. Drawing attention to the prior plan ex-
perience makes a regulatory request for data and a challenge based on 
that prior plan experience more likely. If the justification were changed 
according to these recommendations, it would be consistent with the 
justifications provided by the other enrolled actuaries reviewed by the 
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Konshak study: "The withdrawal rates were increased to better reflect 
the expected future experience of the plan." 
Of the 12 actuarial assumption changes justified by the enrolled 
actuaries included in the Konshak study, nine were justified solely on 
the basis of the expected future experience of the plan. Two of the 
assumption changes were justified both in the terms of the prior and 
the expected future experience of the plan (consistent with the enrolled 
actuary's statement on the Schedule B). Only the justification being an-
alyzed was justified solely in terms of prior plan experience. None of 
the enrolled actuaries supplied evidence or any specific information to 
support their assertions. 
By failing to introduce the uncertainty involved in predicting the fu-
ture experience of the plan, the justification analyzed in Section 4.2 
above lacks the vagueness of the other justifications reviewed by the 
Konshak study and therefore could be subjected to a challenge on its 
reasonableness. By maximizing vagueness and minimizing specifics, 
the other justifications reflect a sentiment to conceal under the confi-
dentiality provisions of the Code of Professional Conduct rather than a 
sentiment to disclose under the statutory requirements of ERISA. 
6 Conclusions 
The codes of conduct of professional actuarial organizations and 
their standards of actuarial practice are irrelevant for the enrolled ac-
tuary performing actuarial services under ERISA. Actuarial codes and 
standards can only confuse the issue and provide opportunities to sub-
vert, inadvertently or otherwise, the intent of statutory standards. Giv-
ing any credibility to the confidentiality provisions of any professional 
actuarial code would be irresponsible and contrary to the disclosure 
requirement of federal law. 
Enforcement from federal agencies is a reasonable and expected re-
sult for those pension actuaries who believe their professional codes of 
silence are above the law. This enforcement to date has been passive 
and lacking, but the Joint Board may actively search for enrolled actu-
aries failing to discharge their duties under ERISA when the PBGC has 
more influence with the Joint Board. 
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Discussion of Theodore Konshak's "Disclosure and 
Confidentiality Requirements of Corporate Pension 
Plan Actuaries" 
Richard Daskais* 
Mr. Konshak's paper expresses concerns that enrolled actuaries 
are not properly discharging their duties to pension plan participants 
in choosing actuarial assumptions. The paper cites an apparent conflict 
between the disclosure requirements of ERISA and the confidentiality 
requirements of the actuarial professional organizations' codes of con-
duct. 
I do not believe the examples cited in the paper show that actuar-
ies rely on the codes' confidentiality requirements to avoid disclosure 
required under ERISA. I believe the short justifications of assumption 
changes offered in the examples are consistent with the nature of the 
reporting of assumptions required on Schedule B and its attachments. 
At worst, the lack of justification (or a justification that is too short) is 
simply benign negligence on the part of the enrolled actuary; unfortu-
nately, this negligence does not present a favorable view of the actuarial 
profession. 
The paper implies that when plan sponsors change enrolled actuar-
ies, the reason is often to reduce their contributions to pension plans. 
While this may sometimes be the case, I believe the more important 
abuses by enrolled actuaries in their choices of assumptions occur when 
the actuary knows his or her client's wishes and reflects these wishes 
in his or her choice of assumptions; no change in enrolled actuary is 
required. The most common abuse, in my opinion, is to choose con-
servative assumptions that are far from the actuary's best estimate in 
order to produce large deductible contributions. Conservative assump-
tions are used for small plans (often simply tax shelters for the prin-
cipal participant or participants) and for larger plans whose costs are 
* Richard Daskais, F.s.A., F.CA., has been a consulting actuary specializing in pen-
sions since 1957, except for a period from 1985 to 1989 when he was a vice president of 
Goldman, Sachs & Co. He was a member of the firm Daskais and Walls, Inc. in Chicago 
from 1966 to 1984. 
Mr. Daskais' address is: 1174 Shellburn Lane, Ventura CA 93001-4055, USA. 
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passed to customers (e.g., plans of regulated utilities and government 
contractors). 
My opinion of larger plans is based on my experience since the early 
1970s in two areas: doing projections to analyze asset allocation policy 
where it was clear that the middle of the range of expected investment 
returns was much greater than the enrolled actuary's assumed invest-
ment return and consulting for government agencies on the level of 
pension cost reimbursement to contractors. In none of these activities 
was I or a colleague at my firm the enrolled actuary for the pension 
plan. Because of confidentiality responsibilities to clients (which may 
dismay the author), I cannot cite specific examples. 
The paper refers to the "lack of detrimental consequences" for ac-
tuaries who have been disciplined by the Joint Board; i.e., there was 
apparently no discipline by actuaries' professional organizations. An 
important reason for the failure of the professional organizations to 
discipline is that there are significant disincentives for an individual to 
institute disciplinary proceedings against an actuary who has violated 
the organizations' codes of professional conduct. At best, there may be 
a major investment of time, and at worst the individual may find him-
self or herself a defendant in a defamation suit. Unfortunately, I have 
no easy solution to this problem; I am confident that the organizations' 
relevant committees have considered it. 
Brian A. Jones * 
Mr. Konshak's paper provides a useful summary of data from a 
1995 study of the 5500 Schedule B of 20 pension plans. I do not find 
the rest of the paper equally useful, and I do not believe the author 
supports his conclusions. Specifically:l 
The codes of conduct of professional organizations and their 
standards of actuarial practice are irrelevant for the enrolled 
actuary performing actuarial services under ERISA. Actuarial 
codes and standards can only confuse the issue and provide 
opportunities to subvert, inadvertently or otherwise, the in-
tent of statutory standards. 
Not so. The Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) binds all mem-
bers of sponsoring organizations, and violation can lead to discipline. 
* Brian A. Jones is an enrolled actuary and a member of a number of actuarial orga-
nizations and of the New York and D.C. Bars. 
Mr. Jones's address is: 10 Clinton Street, Brooklyn NY 11201, USA. 
1 Unless otherwise stated, all quotations are taken from Mr. Konshak's paper. 
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To the extent that the CPR would conflict with any applicable law or reg-
ulation, it specifi-cally states that "the requirements oflaw or regulation 
shall take precedence." There cannot, therefore, be any real conflict be-
tween the two. If an observer purports to find such subversion in the 
text of the CPR, he or she simply has not read or understood it. If an 
actuary were to cite the CPR to justify such subversion, he or she would 
be perverting it. 
The assertion that the "standards of professional actuarial organi-
zations do not apply to enrolled actuaries" is simply incorrect (unless, 
of course, it is confined to enrolled actuaries who are not members of 
the sponsoring organizations). Repeated assertions in the body of the 
paper do not make it any less incorrect. Any broad claim such as this 
requires only one hypothetical to refute it: would the author seriously 
maintain that if an actuary found that a participant for whom he or she 
expected to compute a joint and survivor annuity was not, in fact, mar-
ried to the apparent spouse, he or she could trumpet that fact to the 
world on the ground that ERISA and associated regulations do not dis-
cuss confidentiality and the CPR cannot apply? Any such actuary could 
and would be disciplined under the CPR. I doubt that a court would 
hold that the Joint Board's standards pre-empted the entire CPR. 
Giving any credibility to the confidentiality provisions of any 
professional actuarial code would be irresponsible and con-
trary to the disclosure requirement of federal law. 
Federal law takes precedence under the CPR. The issue of the supe-
riority of federal law in the event of conflict is never reached. Giving 
credibility to confidentiality provisions in a way that conflicts with ap-
plicable law would be contrary to the CPR as well as federal law. 
Enforcement from federal agencies is a reasonable and ex-
pected result for those pension actuaries who believe that 
their professional codes of silence are above the law. 
The paper offers no support for the notion that actuaries hold such 
a belief. All that is demonstrated is a lack of written justification for 
assumption changes on some Schedule Bs. The work may be sloppy, 
but I doubt whether it is motivated by the confidentiality provisions 
of the CPR. There is nothing in the body of the paper to suggest any 
"sentiment to maintain confidentiality through superficial rather than 
full disclosure." (Indeed, it is not clear whether the alleged sentiment is 
being attributed to a limited number of actuaries or to the drafters of 
the CPR.) 
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Again, in discussion of two suspensions, the author asks whether 
"the lack of detrimental consequences for suspension as an enrolled 
actuary suggest[s] minimal respect for the statutory standards of the 
Joint Board?" Is it not likely that the relevant professional bodies simply 
decided that there was no need to impose any additional penalties on 
these two people beyond the Joint Board's action? 
This enforcement to date has been passive and lacking but 
the Joint Board may actively search for enrolled actuaries 
failing to discharge their duties under ERISA when the PBGC 
has more influence with the Joint Board. 
The author is entitled to his opinion, and some may agree. It seems 
unlikely that if PBGC does increase its influence with the Joint Board, 
however, it will put much emphasis on issues of client confidentiality. 
Authors' Reply to Discussion 
An example involving actuarial services performed under ERISA may 
clarify the difference in opinion. Under the Standards of Performance 
for Enrolled Actuaries published by the Joint Board at 901.20(h): 
An enrolled actuary shall provide written notification of the 
nonfiling of any actuarial document he/she has signed upon 
discovery of the non- filing. Such notification shall be made 
to the office of the Internal Revenue Service, the Department 
of Labor, or the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation where 
such document should have been filed. 
The corporate sponsor proudly notifies the enrolled actuary of the 
alteration and subsequent filing of an actuarial document the enrolled 
actuary signed and certified. The Code of Professional Conduct of the 
Society of Actuaries has materiality prOvisions under its Annotation 14-
1. The Joint Board's Standards of Performance for Enrolled Actuaries 
have no materiality provisions. 
If you fail to notify based on immateriality, you have used the sen-
timent of the Code of Professional Conduct to subvert the standards 
of the Joint Board. Let those governmental agencies decide if it is im-
material. Because enrolled actuaries are engaged on behalf of all plan 
participants, you are traveling down the wrong path if your decision is 
based on the potential response of that corporate sponsor ("they're go-
ing to call me a whistle-blower and ... "). Because the enrolled actuary 
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is an individual person under ERISA Section 3042, it is not a decision to 
be made by the actuarial consulting firm on its own behalf. And last, 
there is nothing to decide under 901.20(h). 
Immateriality is a defense. Confidentiality is more of an underlying 
sentiment used to eliminate or diminish the need for a defense. Is the 
failure to justify actuarial assumption changes due to benign neglect? 
Sloppiness? These excuses would be more readily accepted if enrolled 
actuaries did not benefit from those mistakes. 
When the enrolled actuary is changed, the plan administrator must 
provide an explanation for the change on the Schedule C attached to 
the Form 5500. The prior enrolled actuary must also be given a "No-
tice to Terminated Enrolled Actuary" containing the explanation for the 
change as disclosed on the Schedule C. The notice instructs the prior 
enrolled actuary to supply his or her comments on this explanation 
directly to the Office of Enforcement of the Pension and Welfare Ben-
efits Administration, U.S. Department of Labor. Will the prior enrolled 
actuary be influenced by the confidentiality and professional courtesy 
provisions of the Code? 
The joint and survivor annuity example presented by one of the 
discussants, Brian A. Jones, is not an actuarial service performed un-
der ERISA. Hopefully Mr. Jones (or one of his non-actuarial associates) 
would inform the plan administrator of these facts. The plan admin-
istrator would need this information to properly discharge his or her 
duties under ERISA. 
Is the success of saying "I didn't hear that!" contingent upon a sense 
of confidentiality? 



